Multiplying Diversity: Family Unification and the Regional Origins of Late-Age Immigrants, 1981– 2009

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Abstract:

We analyze administrative data about new legal permanent residents for the period 1981-2009 to investigate the mechanisms driving two unintended consequences of the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act: (1) the surge in Asian immigration and (2) the gradual increase in late-age migration. Using an indicator of family unification migration that allows for variation in the size of new LPR cohorts by regional origins, age and visa categories, we show that between 1981 and 1996, every 100 initiating immigrants from Asia directly or indirectly sponsored between 220 and 255 relatives, of whom between 46 and 51 were ages 50 and above; from 1996 through 2000, Asian family unification migration spiked such that each 100 initiating immigrants sponsored nearly 400 relatives, with one-in-four ages 50+. Regional comparisons and analyses of the top four sending countries show direct links between specific policies and the age composition of family unification migration.

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> *This bill that we will sign today is not a revolutionary bill. It does not affect the lives of millions. It will not reshape the structure of our daily lives or add importantly to our wealth and power…this Bill says simply that from this day forth those wishing to emigrate to America shall be admitted on the basis of their skills and their close relationship to those already here.*
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> -Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965[1]

In hindsight, it seems odd that the sponsors of the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 would claim that the legislation would have limited impacts on the nation. That was certainly the intention, but definitely not the result. At the height of the civil rights movement, President Johnson's vision of the Great Society that aspired to end poverty and racial injustice resonated with proponents of immigration reform who sought to eliminate the racist quota system governing immigrant admissions. Given longstanding restrictions on Asian immigration, for example, Congress could not imagine that the number of immigrants from Asia would surpass that from Latin America by 1978 and exceed a quarter of a million annually between 1981 and 1999.[2]

History shows that the 1965 Amendments had far-reaching unintended consequences both for the demographic contours of future immigration streams and for the ethno-racial makeup of the U.S. population (Reimers 1992; Hirschman, 2005). The changed regional origins of U.S. immigrants since 1970 have been extensively documented (Reimers 1985; 1992; Smith and Edmonston 1997), but there is limited research illustrating *how* the seemingly benign provisions of the 1965 Amendments fostered the surge of immigration from Asia. Research addressing changes in the age composition of the immigrant streams is scarcer still, except for a spate of studies in the late 1990s

[1] Cf. Kennedy, 1966, p.148.

[2] 1988 *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, Table 3. See Also Figure 1 below.

that evaluated the consequences for immigrants of welfare reform (Fix and Passel, 1999; Friedland and Pankaj, 1997).[3]

Like Reimers (1983; 1992), we argue that the architects of the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act seriously underestimated the power of family networks as drivers of future immigration momentum from new origin countries, particularly nations with no tradition of sending migrants to the United States. Furthermore, in their zeal to promote family unity, Congress inadvertently aggravated population aging by adding parents of U.S. citizens to the uncapped family relatives category. To make our case we estimate the multiplicative impact of the family unification provisions by regional origins, age and sponsorship categories. Using administrative data about new legal permanent residents, we address three questions about changes in the age, regional origins and admission auspices of immigrants admitted since 1980. First, how has the age composition of legal permanent residents (LPRs) admitted to the United States changed since 1980? Second, to what extent is family unification migration responsible for the rise in late-age migration? Finally, what are the regional origins of late-age immigrants and how have these changed over time? To address these questions we develop and estimate a family migration multiplier that portrays the number of additional immigrants that are associated with initiating non-family immigrants.

As background for the empirical analyses, we provide a brief overview of the legislative considerations that led to the gross miscalculation of the impact of the 1965 Amendments and explain why relatively few studies have empirically examined the magnitude and consequences of family unification chain migration. Following a brief overview of the data used to derive estimates of family chain migration, we present estimates of family unification multipliers by regional origins and age. The concluding section discusses the policy implications with reference to health care and comprehensive immigration reform.

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[3] For exceptions see Tienda and O'Neil, 2012; Carr and Tienda, 2012.

Legislative Background: Sentimental Myopia or Factual Naïveté

The Congressional debates leading to 1965 Amendments to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) provide insight about the issues that preoccupied advocates and detractors of immigration reform in the 1960s. According to Senator Edward Kennedy (1966:145), who at the time chaired the hearings of the Subcommittee on Immigration, there were specific concerns "that the bill would greatly increase annual immigration, would contribute to increased unemployment and relief rolls, would ease the bar to the entry of security risks, and would permit excessive entry of persons from Africa and Asia." Put bluntly, Congress was worried about changing the ethnic mix of the country once the bans on immigration from Asia and Africa were rescinded. Having nixed the Bracero Program just the year before, moreover, there was little appetite for admitting unskilled workers, economic interests of the agricultural industry notwithstanding.

In response to these concerns, the immigration reform legislation targeted highly skilled workers and expanded visas favoring favor family unification. Proponents of the 1965 Amendments reasoned—naively in retrospect—that elimination of quotas would not result in "excessive entry of persons from Africa and Asia" because the family preference categories would favor peoples of European stock. At the time, Asians represented about one percent of the U.S. population (Hirschman, 2005:Table 1). Reporting to the House subcommittee on immigration, chaired by his brother Senator Edward Kennedy, Attorney General Robert Kennedy reported that "5,000 immigrants would come in the first year, but we do not expect that there would be any great influx after that" (Reimers, 1983:16).[4] That reformers did not appreciate the force of social ties in driving future flows proved highly consequential for the ethno-racial composition of U.S. immigration; however, it was not the family unification visas that would initially drive Asian immigration, but rather the employment visas, limited though they were (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990; Reimers

[4] Owing to the exclusion of Chinese and Japanese laborers during the late 19th and early 20th century and the restrictions on immigration from the Asia-Pacific triangle imposed by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, architects of the family preferences assumed limited availability of Asians to sponsor relatives from abroad.

1992) as well as the unanticipated surge in Asian refugees following the fall of U.S.-backed governments in Indochina.[5]

Concerns about the ethnic mix also were evident in Congressional debates about how to set annual immigration caps and whether to impose annual caps on both the Western and Eastern Hemispheres. Assuming, albeit erroneously, that the primary beneficiaries of the family unification would hail from Europe, Congress imposed limits on both hemispheres. This solution avoided the appearance of maintaining prejudicial quotas and addressed anxieties that the rapid population growth in Latin America would spur future demand for visas. Hispanics comprised less than five percent of the U.S. population at the time (Bean and Tienda, 1987) and hence did not appear to represent huge future demand for family unification visas. Reformers never imagined that 35 years later Hispanics would become the largest ethnic group or that unauthorized immigration could surpass legal immigration during the late 1990s (Passel 2005).

Architects of the 1965 Amendments also vastly underestimated the significance of exempting immediate relatives of U.S. citizens from the hemispheric ceilings. The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act exempted spouses and dependent children of U.S. citizens from the annual ceilings; however, the 1965 Amendments added parents of U.S. citizens (whether naturalized or native-born) to the exempt category.[6] It is doubtful that the policy decisions were guided by systematic data analysis. Even today, largely owing to data constraints, only a few studies directly

[5] In the 1965 legislation Congress allocated a meager 27,000 visas each for third preference, designated "for members of the professions of exceptional ability and their spouses and children" and sixth preference for "workers in skilled or unskilled occupations in which laborers are in short supply" (Jasso & Rosenzweig, 1990: 40).

[6] The decision to add parents to the exempt category appears to have been grounded on sentimental considerations rather than a policy analysis. In fact, Senator Kennedy saw the 1965 Amendments as a first step toward further broadening the family unification provisions. In 1969 he introduced a bill to raise the worldwide ceiling to 300,000, exclusive of family members, and also to amplify family unification by adding parents of permanent residents to the second preference. Had the bill become law, many of the unintended demographic consequences of the 1965 Amendments would be even greater.

link the visa preference system, including exempt family categories, to changes the composition of new immigrants (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1986; 1989; GAO 1988; Reimers 1992; Yu, 2008).[7]

Establishing links between family unification entitlements and the composition of future immigration flows ideally requires data spanning at least one generation (preferably two) over multiple years in addition to information about visa type and regional origins. No existing data meet these requirements now much less in the early 1960s; however, using a combination of census and administrative data, a few studies have used synthetic cohort methods to illustrate how family unification chain migration is associated with changes in the composition of immigration streams since 1970. Before illustrating empirically how chained migration is responsible for shifts in the regional origin and age composition of new immigrants, it is instructive to summarize the methodological approaches, findings and limitations of prior studies about family unification chain migration.

Ethnic composition of immigrant flows

Most descriptions of changing regional origins of legal permanent residents are based on the 10-year intervals used in official government statistics, and consequently conceal important regional variation *within* decades. Contrary to beliefs of immigration reformers, once entry restrictions were lifted in 1965, immigration from Asia rose and surpassed flows from Latin America during the late 1970s. In fact, Asian nations contributed the largest numbers of non-family immigrants during the 1970s and 1980s, most of whom entered either as skilled employees or government-sponsored refugees after the fall of U.S.-backed governments in Southeast Asia (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1989; 1990).

[7] Studies based on the New Immigrant Survey are exceptions. These data represent persons granted legal permanent residence in 2003, including persons who adjusted their status, but cannot be used to describe chain migration beyond that particular admission cohort.

Figure 1 shows that in 1976, the number of new LPRs from Latin America slightly exceeded the number admitted from Asia, but this changed after 1978 and for the next decade immigration from Asia remained higher than that from Latin America until about 1988, when the legalization program authorized by the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) took effect. Because the vast majority of IRCA beneficiaries were from Latin America (Tienda, et al., 1991), LPR admissions from the region spiked between 1988 and 1992 as applications for legal status were adjudicated. Admissions from Asia and Latin America were relatively proportionate between 1993 and 1995, but over the next dozen years, immigration from Latin America surpassed that from Asia largely owing to a surge in asylum requests from Central Americans and parole status granted to Cubans (Sanchez and Tienda, 2013). Since 2010, however, Asian immigration once again surpassed that from Latin America (Nowrasteh, 2012); and, barring another massive legalization program favoring Latin Americans, Asian immigration will likely remain above that from South America owing to the growing momentum of family unification migration and the rising demand for visas from the two largest countries, China and India.

Figure 1 About Here

That employment visas were capped at less than 30,000 annually initially kept Asian immigration in check, but only temporarily because labor migrants proved especially adept in sponsoring relatives. Using published data for legal permanent immigrants admitted in 1985, Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) examine nativity differentials in sponsorship rates of spouses and parents—two immediate family relatives exempted from the numerical caps. They show that foreign-born residents were *four times* more likely to sponsor immigrant spouses than native-born citizens, with Mexico, Philippines, Korea, China and the Dominican Republic among the top five beneficiaries of the entitlement. Furthermore, the highest parent sponsorship rates corresponded to *naturalized* citizens, and especially for immigrants from Asia. Owing to data limitations, Jasso and Rosenzweig were unable to consider sponsorship of capped family preferences; however, their

insights about the sponsorship behavior of naturalized citizens suggest that family chain migration was the major driver of the dramatic growth of Asian immigration in general, and late-age migration in particular.

Latin American pathways to U.S. residence differ from those used by Asians for several reasons. Until hemispheric ceilings were imposed on the Western hemisphere in 1978, Latin American immigration was relatively unrestricted; in fact, the 1924 act explicitly exempted the countries of Central and South America from the quota system, which was designed to curtail immigration from Southern and Eastern Europe (Tienda, 2002). Three sets of circumstances permitted the activation of family chain migration from Latin America after the 1965 reforms went into effect: 1) the sizable U.S.-born Mexican-American population eligible to sponsor relatives; 2) a long tradition of labor migration; and 3) lax border enforcement, which permitted Mexican workers virtually unrestricted access to Southwestern rural labor markets both during and after the termination of the Bracero Program (Sanchez and Tienda, 2013). Although the 1965 Amendments imposed annual ceilings for both hemispheres, until 1978 no country-limits were imposed on the western hemisphere. Mexico consumed one-quarter and one-third of all visas allocated to the Americas during the 1960s and 1970s, respectively (US DHS, 2011:Table 2). According to Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) the 1978 law, which brought both hemispheres under a worldwide ceiling and extended the annual country limits to all nations, raised naturalization incentives for Western hemisphere immigrants in order to take advantage of the family unification entitlements.

More than any other country, Mexico witnessed the largest reduction in annual visas after 1978. Not surprisingly, with the legal migration pathway sharply curtailed, unauthorized entry from Mexico surged. As important, the legalization of nearly three million immigrants, the vast majority from Latin America, dramatically increased the pool of legal residents eligible to sponsor relatives. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) claim that both employment and government-sponsored immigrants—refugees and legalized immigrants—have the highest sponsorship rates partly

because they are unlikely to have many U.S. relatives. Therefore, we expect that the legalization program substantially increased family unification migration from Latin America during the late 1990s and into the 21st century.

Age composition of immigrant flows

Still coping with the demographic headwinds set in motion by the baby boom and the challenge of providing health insurance for seniors, Congress never considered whether and how immigration might aggravate population aging. In 1965, when Congress established the Medicare and Medicaid programs by amending the Social Security Act, less than 10 percent of LPR cohorts were ages 50 and over, and a mere two percent were ages 65 and over (U.S. DOJ, 1971: Table 10). Published statistics for legal permanent immigrants reveal a sharp increase in both the number of exempt relatives admitted since 1965 and the share of numerically exempt relatives admitted as parents of U.S. citizens, and therefore likely to be over 50 years old. Between 1967 and 1971, for example, the number of exempt sponsored relatives rose from 47,000 to 81,000, of which parents represented 11 percent in 1971 (U.S. DOJ, 1971:Table 4).[8] In 1981, over 151,000 exempt family relatives were granted LPR status, with parents comprising 22 percent of the total (U.S. DOJ, 1981:Table 4A). By 2010, the number of exempt relatives admitted to LPR status skyrocketed to nearly 475,000, with parents accounting for nearly one-quarter of the total (U.S. DHS, 2011:Table 6).[9]

That most immigrants are in their prime working ages or younger likely deflected research attention to the growth of late age-migration. Even as the baby boom approaches retirement age and concerns about the solvency of Social Security rise, surprisingly few studies have focused on

[8] The published statistics do not tabulate class of admission by age; therefore, it is not possible to ascertain how much parent admissions contributed to late-age admissions.

[9] Although the size of the exempt cohort varied annually over the most recent decade—from a low of 331,286 in 2003 to a high of 580,348 in 2006—the parent share rose gradually from less than 18 percent in 2001 to 24 percent in 2010 (U.S. DHS, 2011:Table 6).

the changing age composition of new LPRs, which is distinct from the aging of the foreign-born population. Two primary mechanisms drive the growth of the elderly foreign born population: aging of adults who arrived during their prime working years, and sponsorship of adult siblings and elderly parents by legal permanent residents who acquire citizenship (Terrazas, 2009). For example, He (2002) shows that between 1960 and 2000, the *number* of foreign-born residents ages 65 and over was stable at around three million; however, between 1990 and 2010, the number of foreign-born seniors (aged 65 and over) nearly doubled, rising from 2.7 million to almost five million (Batalova, 2012), as shown in Figure 2.

Figure 2 About Here

Because Europeans were the major source of U.S. immigrants until the 1960s, they comprise the largest group of foreign-born seniors through 2000 (Terrazas, 2009); however, by 2010 Asians and Latin Americans surpassed Europeans among foreign-born seniors. From stock measures it is not possible to distinguish how aging in place and late-age migration contribute to the changing composition of foreign-born seniors; however, a comparison of the total foreign-born and the senior foreign-born population is consistent with Jasso and Rosenzweig's (1989) claims that sponsorship of parents is significantly higher for Asians than other groups. Note that as of 2000, the share of seniors among the foreign-born of Asian origins is relatively similar to the overall foreign-born share of Asian origins, which is not the case for Latin Americans. This puzzle, first observed in 2000, provided a motivation for the present study.

A recent study by Carr and Tienda (2012) shows that immigration of seniors has been rising largely due to increases in the number of numerically exempt parents of U.S. citizens, and to a lesser extent numerically-limited family-sponsored relatives and refugees. Using administrative data for new cohorts of legal permanent immigrants supplemented with special tabulations from the Department of Homeland Security, they determined that every 100 initiating immigrants admitted between 1981-1985 sponsored an average of 260 family members, compared with an average of

345 for initiating immigrants admitted between 1996 and 2000. Furthermore, the number of family migrants ages 50 and over rose from 44 to 74 per 100 initiating migrants. Their analysis of chained migration did not consider the regional origins sponsored migrants, hence they were unable to empirically validate Jasso and Rosenzweig's (1989: 884) argument that parent sponsorship is "an overwhelmingly an Asian phenomenon." Accordingly, we build on their study by examining whether and how family unification migration contributes to the rise in late-age migration and the changing regional origins of legal permanent residents admitted to the United States between 1980 and 2009.

Data and Methods

We use the *Immigrants Admitted to the United States* (micro-data) (U.S. Department of Justice 2007) supplemented with special tabulations from the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (USDHS) to examine changes in the age composition of immigrant cohorts since 1981.[10] The micro-data file consists of records for all LPR admissions between 1981 and 2000, including persons present in the United States who adjusted their status to permanent resident during those years but excluding the 2.7 million immigrants granted legal permanent resident status by the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. We augment the *Immigrants Admitted* data with two sets of summary tabulations: (1) for LPR admissions for the period 2001-2009, including both new arrivals and status adjustments; and (2) for IRCA legalization admissions for the period 1989-2000.[11]

Both data sources include several items that are necessary to derive age-, cohort- and origin-specific estimates of family unification chain migration, including year of admission, age (or age group) at admission, visa admission category (detailed or aggregated), and country or region of

[10] The Department of Homeland Security Yearbook of Immigration Statistics does publish the age distribution of legal permanent residents in the aggregate and broken down by sex, but age distributions are not tabulated by visa categories or regions of origin.
[11] These tabulations were obtained as a custom request from U.S. Department of Homeland Security (USDHS).

origin. The pooled data consist of a multi-dimensional table that cross-classifies admission age, admission year, admission class, and regional (country) origin. Specifically, the analysis file consists of 51,210 observations with (Age*Year*Sponsorship*Origin) count data over 29 years that represent nearly 25.5 million legal permanent residents admitted to the United States between 1981 and 2009. Each observation is a frequency count of admissions for the given set of age, year, sponsorship, and origin values. In this classification, admission years are aggregated into 5-year cohorts, beginning with 1981-1985; origin is grouped into either five broad regions (Africa; Asia; Europe; Mesoamerica (including Canada and the Caribbean); and South America, which includes Oceania[12]) or the top-four source countries (China, India, the Philippines, and Mexico); and age at arrival is aggregated into three broad categories: 0-16 (youth), 17-49 (working ages), and 50+ (late-ages).

A key requirement for our estimates of family unification chain migration is class of admission, which is not available on population-based surveys. Following Carr and Tienda (2012) and Yu (2008), we collapse 352 specific visa classes into 10 exhaustive categories that represent the major admission classes. Importantly, these major classes differentiate between (1) initiating versus family unification immigrants; (2) accompanying versus later-sponsored family immigrants; (3) citizen- versus LPR-sponsored family immigrants; and (4) numerically-capped versus uncapped immigrants.

Initiating immigrants, who comprise all LPRs *not* sponsored by a family migrant, are the lynchpin of our taxonomy. Specifically, initiating immigrants are the first in their families to move to the United States, and they must be either sponsored by nonfamily entities or marry a native-born U.S. citizen. The upper panel of Figure 3 presents the initiating immigrant aggregated classes;

[12] We use the term Mesoamerica, which includes Mexico and Central America, rather than North America because very few U.S. immigrants hail from Canada. Tis terminology also makes clear that Central America is not part of South America. We would prefer to classify Oceania with Europe but the aggregated tabulations we obtained did not permit us to reallocate these LPRs. The numbers are relatively small and the allocation decision is inconsequential for our estimates.

they are denoted by the subscript "0", and letters E, G, and S designate employer, government and spouse sponsors. Using these admission criteria, we estimate a series of *family migration multipliers*, which measure the intensity of family chain migration relative to the number of initiating immigrants per cohort admitted**.**

Figure 3 About Here

In contrast to initiating immigrants, *family unification immigrants* consist of all LPRs sponsored by family members who themselves are immigrants (both naturalized citizens and legal resident aliens) or who are an initiating immigrant's accompanying family members.[13] The lower panel of Figure 1 presents the four types of family immigrants: (1) family dependents who accompany initiating immigrants; (2) later following dependents of initiating LPRs (admitted under numerically-capped family 2nd preferences); (3) U.S. citizens' numerically-uncapped immediate relatives including spouses, minor children and parents; and (4) U.S. citizens' numerically-capped preference relatives including adult citizens' married and unmarried offspring and siblings and their respective dependents (admitted under numerically-limited family 1st, 3rd or 4th preferences). Antecedent subscripts 1 through 4 indicate migration phase, i.e., the sequence in the migration chain.

Only initiating immigrants can start new migration chains, which are activated when spouses and children accompany initiating immigrants or when initiating immigrants sponsor spouses, minor children or unmarried adult offspring (subject to numerical caps). After naturalization, family immigrants also are entitled to sponsor family members, thus activating the multiplicative properties of chained migration (Yu 2008; Carr and Tienda 2012).

[13] Unlike the USDHS use of the term "family immigrants," which reflects LPRs admitted as U.S. citizens' immediate relatives or under family-sponsored preferences, we also include as "family immigrants" the accompanying family dependents of initiating immigrants (Monger 2010: 2). For example, we characterize the accompanying family members of an employer-sponsored initiating immigrant as family immigrants, whereas USDHS classifies them under employment-based preferences admissions.

Expressed in formulaic terms, the age-, origin-, and cohort-specific family unification migration multiplier is given by:

$$FMM_{jkt} = \frac{\sum {}_1D_{jkt} + {}_2D_{jkt} + {}_3S_{jkt'} + {}_3C_{jkt'} + {}_3P_{jkt'} + {}_4F_{jkt'}}{\sum {}_0E_{j'kt} + {}_0G_{j'kt} + {}_0G'_{j'kt} + {}_0S_{j'kt}}$$

where, the terms in the numerator represent counts of specific types of sponsored family migrants, and the denominator terms represent the counts of each type of initiating immigrant. Each term's core notation consists of an upper case letter and a leading subscript 0-4 that in combination represent an aggregated class of admission. Specifically, ${}_0E$, ${}_0G$, ${}_0G'$, and ${}_0S$ denominator terms are employer sponsored, government sponsored and spouse initiating immigrants. The numerator reflects initiating immigrants' accompanying and later-following family dependents (${}_1D$ and ${}_2D$); U.S. citizens' numerically exempt spouses, children and parents (${}_3S$, ${}_3C$ and ${}_3P$); and U.S. citizens' adult offspring and siblings and respective dependents (${}_4F$).

Subscript *j* denotes one of the three age groups at admission (<17, 17-49 or 50+) among family unification immigrants. Subscript *j'*, which is applied to the initiating immigrant terms, indicates all ages. The subscript *k* signifies region of origin (Asia, Africa, Europe, Mesoamerica, or South America and Oceania combined) or, in more detailed analyses, a top sending country of origin (China, India, Philippines, or Mexico). Subscripts *t* and *t'* reflect five-year admission cohorts corresponding, respectively, to the early and later stages of the migration chain. For initiating immigrants and their accompanying and later-following dependents (${}_1D$ and ${}_2D$ unification migrants), admission cohort *t* consists of one of the following cohorts: 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, or 1996-2000. Subscript *t'* is applied to numerically-exempt immediate relatives (${}_3S$, ${}_3C$, ${}_3P$) and citizens' family preference relatives (${}_4F$) in order to approximate the timing of naturalization and eligibility for citizen-based sponsorship among initiating immigrants from cohort *t* such that $t' = t + 9$; this lag reflects the average eight year duration in LPR status plus an

additional year for visa processing delays. The family migration multiplier is further detailed in Carr (2013).

Regional Variations in Family Unification Migration

Table 1, which reports the changing age composition of new LPR cohorts over the past 30 years, reveals considerable variation in the level of late-age migration across regions and over time. As was true historically, working-age adults have dominated U.S. immigration streams. Approximately two-thirds of all LPRs admitted between 1981 and 2009 were in their prime working ages. However, even as the size of the flows rose, there was a clear shift in the age composition of new LPRs, with a drop in the share of youth accompanied by a rise in the share of immigrants ages 50 and over. The worldwide averages reported in the last row show that dependent youth outnumbered late-age LPRs by more than 2:1 for the first 5-year cohort, but after 2005, the share of youth and seniors was roughly equal.

Table 1 About Here

This pattern is mirrored for all regions with notable variations in both the starting levels of late-age migration and the percentage change over the 30-year period. During the early 1980s late-age migrants made up higher shares of the flows from Asia and Europe, 13 and 14 percent, respectively, but the absolute number of Asian LPRs ages 50 and over was four times that from Europe owing to the different cohort sizes. By the end of the period, late-age migration from Asia approached 20 percent—the largest share among all regions. By comparison, about 16.6 percent of European LPRs from the 2006-2009 cohort were ages 50 and over and, again, the cohort was approximately one-quarter as large. Both the cohort size and the share of late-age migrants approximately doubled for new LPRs from Mesoamerica and South America. Only Africa sent below average shares of late age migrants throughout the period; however, even this region witnessed a

doubling in late-age migration over the 30-year period, from 6 percent during the early 1980s to 12 percent for the most recent LPR cohort.

To investigate how family unification chain migration contributes to the regional diversification and age composition of future flows, we calculated the migration multipliers for each of the major regions using the formula described above. The first and second columns of Table 2 report the number of initiating and family migrants, respectively, followed by age-specific multipliers and the all-ages multiplier (which is the sum of the age-specific multipliers). With two exceptions, discussed below, all of the family unification multipliers are above one, which suggests substantial family chain migration**,** the process by which migrants from a particular location join relatives in the same destination as new LPRs take advantage of family reunification entitlements by sponsoring new immigrants (Jasso and Rosenzweig 1990: 213). Substantively the 1.78 migration multiplier in the top row of Table 2 indicates that every 100 initiating European immigrants admitted between 1981 and 1985 collectively sponsored 178 additional family members, among which 22 were ages 50 and older.

Table 2 about Here

The size of the multipliers, which vary across regions and according to the size of initiating cohorts, yields several insights about how family unification chain migration diversifies future flows in ways the proponents of the 1965 Amendments never anticipated. Contrary to reformers' intentions, for example, the lowest multipliers correspond to Europe, and for the 1986-90 and 1991-1995 cohorts, the multipliers barely exceed one. Moreover, the European LPRs admitted during the 1980s and early 1990s primarily sponsored youth or working-age family members rather than relatives ages 50 and over. Further defying reformers' expectations, and despite the establishment of hemispheric and country caps that limited immigration from Asia, family unification multipliers for the region are consistently above two, signifying that every initiating cohort sponsored between 221 and 256 additional family members per 100 sponsors. In fact, the

1996-2000 initiating cohort sponsored almost 400 additional family members per 100 initiating LPRs, of which 106 were aged 50 and over. Although African migration streams are smaller than those from Asia, the initiating cohorts grew steadily during the 1980s and 1990s, as did the number of sponsored family migrants. New LPRs from Africa activated family unification migration chains by sponsoring between 151 and 229 family members per 100 initiating migrants, with seniors representing a higher share of sponsored relatives over time (14 vs. 18 percent, respectively, for the 1981-1985 and 1996-2000 LPR cohorts).

Cubans and Mexicans dominated the U.S.-bound migration streams from Latin America during the 1960s, but economic dislocations and armed conflicts in South America propelled an exodus from several Andean (Colombia, Peru and Ecuador) during the 1980s, which ignited new family migration chains (Sanchez and Tienda, 2013). In fact, the largest regional family migration multipliers for the period under consideration correspond to South Americans admitted during the early 1980s and the late 1990s. The lower multipliers for the intermediate cohorts reflect the large cohort sizes resulting from the IRCA legalization program and the lag before new LPRs can sponsor family relatives. Still, the monotonic rise in the number of family migrants signals an intensification of family chain migration such that every 100 initiating migrants admitted between 1996 and 2000 collectively sponsored about 531 additional family members, of which 109 were ages 50 and over.

Mesoamerica's family migration multipliers exhibit the greatest temporal variation because Mexicans and Central Americans were the largest beneficiaries from the IRCA legalization program, which dramatically increased the size of initiating cohorts. New LPRs from this major sending region also appear to be taking advantage of their family unification entitlements by sponsoring relatives. The family migration multipliers of 3.5 and 4.2, respectively, for the 1981-1985 and 1996-2000 initiating cohorts indicate that each 100 LPRs from Mesoamerica sponsored, respectively, around 350 and 420 additional relatives by 2009, of which 39 and 75 were ages 50 and over. Although the multipliers corresponding to the 1986-1990 and 1991-1995 LPR cohorts from

Mesoamerica are below unity, given the oversized initiating cohorts, jointly they sponsored over two million family members by 2009.[14]

The shaded column shows how late-age migration contributed to family unification migration over the three decades. Three points are noteworthy. First, there are large regional differences in the occurrence of late age family sponsorship. For example, 23 percent of family migrants sponsored by the 1981-1985 initiating cohort from Asia were ages 50 and over, compared with only 11 and 16 percent of migrants sponsored by the same initiating cohorts from Mesoamerica and South America. Second, late-age migration rose for all regions, albeit not uniformly, as illustrated by a comparison of the two largest sending regions. Specifically, the share of Asian origin family migrants ages 50 and over rose from 23 to 27 percent between the those sponsored by the 1981-1985 versus the 1996-2000 initiating cohorts; by comparison, late-age migration from Mesoamerica rose from 11 percent of relatives sponsored by the 1981-1985 initiating cohort to 18 percent of those sponsored by the 1996-2000 cohort. Other sending regions were intermediate between these extremes. Third, and most important, the social and policy significance of the late-age multiplier depends on the number of sponsored family members, which varies appreciably over time because immediate family members are not subject to country caps. For Asia and Mesoamerica, the family unification late-age migration multipliers imply that the 1996-2000 initiating cohorts sponsored roughly 322,000 relatives ages 50 and over from Asia and 236,000 from Mesoamerica.

Although informative, regional trends conceal a great deal of country-specific variation that can clarify how Asia became the dominant regional source of immigrants just a decade after the restrictions on entry from the Eastern Hemisphere were lifted in 1965 (Figure 1), and the extent to

[14] The multiplier values associated with the IRCA initiating cohorts indicates that the index is sensitive to the size of the initiating immigrant cohort, which more than doubled the size of the values for government sponsored LPRs. Another reason for the comparatively low multipliers for these cohorts is the large representation of Mexicans, who average longer times to naturalization, and whose waiting times in the queue for country-capped visas are among the longest (Carr, 2013).

which sponsorship of relatives is responsible for the rise of late-age migration. We focus our attention on the four top sending countries because of their potential to intensify late-age migration due to the growing visa backlogs for non-exempt family relatives (Wasem, 2010) and because the absence of a cap for immediate family relatives, including parents of U.S. citizens, potentially can accelerate the growth of late age migration in the future.[15]

Family unification chain migration: Mexico, China, India and the Philippines

Mexico is currently and has been the largest single source of legal U.S. immigrants since before the 1965 Amendments were enacted.[16] Despite the longstanding role of Mexicans as a source of low-wage labor for the United States, U.S. citizens sponsor the vast majority of LPRs from Mexico using their family reunifications entitlements. Of the Mexicans granted LPR status in fiscal year 2010, for example, 88 percent were admitted under either a capped or exempt family visa; less than 10 percent qualified for an employment visa (Sanchez and Tienda, 2013). After restrictions on Asian immigration were lifted in 1965, India and China joined Philippines in sending large numbers of legal immigrants to the United States by availing themselves to the skilled employment preference visas (Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1989). Table 3, which summarizes changes in the age composition of new LPRs from the top four sending countries and the six admission cohorts, shows rather distinct country profiles based on the size, growth and age composition of the streams.

Table 3 About Here

Cohort shares of late-age migrants from China, India and the Philippines remained above the world average (see last row in Table 1). Notwithstanding the regional increase in late-age migration from Asia over the 30-year period, China experienced a six-percentage point *decline* in

[15] This is particularly important for China, whose population will age gradually until 2015, and then rapidly thereafter (see Peng, 2011).

[16] Between 1961-1970, for example, 454,000 Mexicans were granted LPR status compared with 428,000 for ALL of Asia, including 35,000 and 27,000 from China and India, respectively (see U.S.DoJ, *1980 Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service*, Table 2).

the cohort share of LPRs ages 50 and over; however, the apparent drop in the cohort share of late-age migrants belies the 80 percent increase in the number of late-age LPRs. The Indian and Filipino migration flows differ from the Chinese pattern both in their age composition and cohort sizes. Not only did the flow of new LPRs from India more than double over the last 30 years, but the share of late-age migrants also rose from 17 percent for the earliest 5-year cohort to 22 percent for the most recent cohort. Partly because of U.S. involvement in the Pacific during the late 19th and early 20th century, U.S.-bound migration from the Philippines has longer antecedents than that from India and China. This is reflected in the consistently larger cohort sizes through 2000, after which the number of Indian and subsequently Chinese immigrants surpassed the number of new Filipino LPRs. Unlike India or China, the cohort share of late-age migrants from the Philippines was fairly steady, hovering around 21 to 22 percent of the cohort stream until after 2005, when almost one-in-four new LPRs were ages 50 and over.

Mexico exhibits yet a fourth age pattern of migration in two respects. First, the prevalence of late-age migration is consistently lower than the top three Asian nations throughout the period. Over time, however, the cohort share of late-age migrants from Mexico converged with the worldwide average of 14.8 percent. Moreover, for the 2006-2009 cohort Mexico exceeds the worldwide average cohort share of late-age migrants (18 vs. 17 percent, respectively). Second, Mexican LPR cohorts are more than double the size of the three top-sending countries, especially for post-IRCA cohorts. This is important because cohort size determines the potential scale of late-age migration. Thus, except for the earliest cohort, the *absolute number* of late-age migrants from Mexico was significantly higher compared with China, India and the Philippines. For perspective, fewer than 20,000 Mexicans granted LPR status between 1981 and 1985 were ages 50 and over, as compared with more than 100,000 for the 2006-2009 period.[17]

[17] Although only between 8 and 6 percent of Mexican LPRs admitted during the late 1980s and early 1990s were ages 50 and over, this represented over 100,000 and 94,000 late-age migrants from this source country.

Country-specific estimates of family unification chain migration, reported in Table 4, coupled with the Appendix tables reporting age composition of major admission categories, show how the expansion of the exempt relatives to include parents drove the rise in late-age migration. Substantively, the multiplier estimates indicate that every 100 initiating Mexican immigrants admitted between 1981 and 1985 collectively sponsored 188 additional relatives, of which 22 were ages 50 and over. By comparison, the 1996-2000 initiating immigrant cohort sponsored about 638 additional relatives, including 112 ages 50 and over, suggesting an intensification of family unification chain migration. The smaller multipliers for the interim Mexican cohorts do not imply fewer sponsored relatives compared with the 1981-1985 initiating cohort, but rather the atypically large cohorts resulting from the IRCA legalization program. Nevertheless, it appears that IRCA indirectly increased late-age migration as legalized immigrants acquired citizenship and subsequently used their family unification entitlement to sponsor relatives exempt from country caps as well as those subject to numerical limitations.

Table 4 About Here

The majority of Mexican LPRs sponsored as parents are over age 50, but sizeable numbers of LPRs sponsored as siblings and adult children of U.S. citizens also are over age 50. During the 1980s, for example, of 29,000 Mexicans were sponsored as parents of U.S. citizens, but this changed after the mid-1990s, when the outsized IRCA cohorts began to qualify for family reunification entitlements . The number of parents sponsored by new LPRs nearly quadrupled between the early and late 1990s, and continued rising during the first decade of the 21st century [18] (Appendix Tables A-1 and A-2). Because the sibling and adult offspring of U.S. citizens are subject to country-specific caps, it is conceivable that higher shares will qualify as late-age migrants in the future as family members approved for admission age in the visa backlog queues. In 2010, for example, unmarried

[18] The last cohort covers four rather than five years, therefore it is likely that the total number of sponsored parents approached 100,000.

Mexican adult children sponsored by U.S. citizens had waited 18 years to receive their entry visa (Wasem, 2010, Table 4).

For China, India and the Philippines, the higher worldwide ceilings afforded by the 1990 Immigration Act permitted growth in the size of initiating cohorts. Furthermore, following the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, thousands of Chinese were offered refuge in the United States, which is evident in the nearly six-fold increase in the size of the 1991-1995 initiating cohort. The magnitude of the Asian country family unification migration multipliers is striking, especially for India, where index values approach 10 for LPRs admitted as family members of initiating immigrants of the 1980s. Substantively, the Indian multiplier values indicate that every 100 initiating Indians admitted during the 1980s would sponsor between 960 and 998 additional relatives, of which 240 to 265 were ages 50 and over. Although the multiplier index was nearly halved by the late 1990s, because the size of the initiating immigrant cohort had doubled, the scale of family unification increased as well. For this cohort each 100 initiating immigrants sponsored over 500 additional relatives, including approximately 169 late-age migrants.

Even as the number of relatives sponsored by Chinese, Indian and Filipino immigrants rose, so too did the share of late-age migrants; in fact, for each of these countries about one-third of relatives sponsored by the 1996-2000 cohort were ages 50 and over. For each of the top Asian source countries, the parent LPR cohorts grew steadily as earlier arrivals naturalized and petitioned for their parents. The only exception is a dip in the number of Filipino parent admissions during the late 1990s. Over the 30-year period the number of Asian LPRs admitted as sponsored parents increased 76 percent for China and 123 percent for India, with virtually all boosting the share of late-age migrants from these nations (Appendix Table A-1). Because siblings and adult children of U.S. citizens are subject to annual country caps, the number of family preference LPRs from Asia has remained fairly steady over the last three decades, but the shares admitted at ages 50 and over has risen steadily over time, likely due to the long queues for the oversubscribed visas

from China, India and the Philippines. Appendix Table A-2 reveals especially large increases in the share of late- age migrants from the Philippines, which more than trebled over the period, and India, which more than quadrupled since the early 1980s. More than likely, these relatives of U.S. citizens are aging in place until their visa number is called, which for the Philippines can involve a wait of over 20 years (Wasem 2010: 12).

Summary and Discussion

Our examination of regional and country variations in the age composition of U.S. immigrants since 1981 shows a rise in the prevalence of late-age migration over time and smaller regional differentials owing to convergence in the regional and country cohort-shares of new LPRs ages 50 and over. Moreover, the estimated family migration multipliers indicate further growth in late age migration both because the 1965 Amendments explicitly exempted parents from the numerically capped visas and because of the sizeable backlogs for numerically capped family visas from the top sending Asian and Latin American countries. Furthermore, continued growth in the size of initiating cohorts will increase the number of late-age migrants in the future even if the cohort shares stabilize, which is unlikely given population aging in the top source countries.

Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) did not examine the age consequences of family sponsorship nor could they derive a multiplier of family unification chain migration, and Bin Yu (2008) failed to consider the huge IRCA cohorts in his estimates of chain migration. Our study addresses both limitations of prior work and also extends the timeline for estimating the magnitude of family unification chain migration because we are able to consider whether, how and where the increase in employment visas after 1990 boosted family unification migration. Overall, our results are consistent with Jasso and Rosenzweig's (1989) claim that sponsorship of parents is an largely an Asian phenomenon, one largely attributable to the designation of employment preferences to highly skilled workers, but following the massive legalization program that disproportionately benefitted

Mesoamericans, it appears to have become a Mexican phenomenon as well. Jasso and Rosenzweig (1989) argue that both employment and government-sponsored immigrants have the highest sponsorship rates because they are unlikely to have many relatives in the host country. The implication is that immigrants legalized under the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act and other legalization programs such as the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act of 1997 are likely to produce a surge in family unification chain migration.

Our findings lend support to this claim as well. Because prior research about family chain migration did not include the legalized population and ignored those whom that population went on to sponsor, estimates of family migration multipliers are likely understated. The legalization program not only inflated the size of initiating cohorts, but also created a prolonged echo via sponsorship of family members, particularly those exempt from numerical limitations. Because they are not subject to annual country caps or worldwide ceilings, parents of U.S. citizens are the major source of late-age migration (Carr and Tienda, 2012); however, the numerically limited admission classes consisting of adult sons, daughters and siblings of U.S. citizens are increasingly also contributing to late-age migration because of the long visa queues for oversubscribed countries that include the top-sending Asian nations as well as Mexico (Wasem, 2010).

In passing the 1965 Amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, Congress neither contemplated nor envisioned radical changes in U.S. immigration policy because—or so proponents and skeptics believed—the checks and balances included in the compromise legislation would regulate both the size and ethnic composition of the flows. The imposition of labor controls in the third and sixth preferences and Hemispheric ceilings was expected to regulate future flows, but there was little discussion about the significance of maintaining exemptions from the Hemispheric ceilings for spouses and children of U.S. citizens authorized in the original INA, or of adding parents of U.S. citizens to the immigrants exempt from annual caps in the 1965 Amendments. Following the termination of the Bracero program in 1964, architects of the 1965 amendments were sensitive to

concerns about job competition between immigrants and domestic workers (Kennedy, 1966); however, reformers failed to understand the power of prior migrants' social networks in activating family chain migration, and they clearly underestimated the political will of immigration authorities to enforce laws consistently (Sanchez and Tienda, 2013).

In retrospect, detractors' worries about increases in the size and composition of future flows were well founded, but neither supporters nor critics understood the social mechanisms undergirding the favored family unification provisions. Neither could they foresee the volume of future refugee flows from Southeast Asia, Cuba, and Central America nor the surge in unauthorized migration from Mexico and the Caribbean. Social scientists predicted huge changes in U.S. immigration, including backlogs for Mexico, China and the Philippines as well as a large undocumented labor force, which were evident in the early 1980s, just over a decade after the 1968 reforms were enacted (Reimers, 1983:24). But as the Congressional appetite for immigration reform rises, and the prospect of comprehensive immigration reform looms on the political horizon, it is essential to reconsider family admission criteria in light of changes in the social and demographic composition of the United States since 1965.

In 1965 when Congress amended the Immigration and Nationality Act by adding parents to the exempt category and broadened the family sponsorship categories, the baby boom was unwinding. That same year Congress created Medicare and Medicaid by amending the Social Security Act. But times have changed in ways that warrant a major reconsideration of family admission categories because population aging and soaring Medicare costs are prominent policy concerns. Today immigration reform and health care costs are seldom discussed jointly, but if recent trends in the age composition of new immigrants continue, there may be reason to do so.

Except for the spouses and dependent children of U.S. citizens—immediate family members—it is unclear why extended family members (e.g., brothers and sisters, siblings and adult children) of U.S. citizens and permanent residents should be given priority in admissions over labor

needs or humanitarian considerations. The excess demand for the numerically capped visas has the unintended consequence of creating huge visa backlogs, which in turn are consequential for late-age migration because they exacerbate aging in place, particularly for the most prominent sending countries—China, India, the Philippines and Mexico. Parents are a different category, but unlike other major countries of immigration like Australia and Canada, the United States does not place an age cap on visas. It may be worthwhile considering the Australian solution, which greatly restricts visas for parents and for the majority of parent visas requires a fee $42,000 up front as a deposit for medical costs. Particularly during a period of tight fiscal constraints and population aging, decisions about the number and categories of family visas should be made with a clear grounding in evidence about the social and economic costs of late-age migration rather than sentimental predilections about reuniting extended families.

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Table 1
New Legal Permanent Immigrants Admitted by Region of Origin, Age at Admission and 5-Year Cohort, 1981-2009 (Total admitted)

Region of Origin/ Age at Admission	5-Year New Immigrant Cohort					
	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006-2009[a]
Europe	(321,133)	(385,150)	(670,698)	(518,750)	(679,782)	(449,391)
0-16	**19.8**	**17.7**	**19.4**	**20.3**	**19.2**	**14.2**
17-49	**67.6**	**70.0**	**64.6**	**64.2**	**67.3**	**69.2**
50+	**12.6**	**12.3**	**16.0**	**15.5**	**13.6**	**16.6**
Meso-America[b]	(881,648)	(2,239,907)	(2,397,916)	(1,499,658)	(1,729,727)	(1,506,105)
0-16	**26.4**	**16.2**	**16.5**	**25.7**	**18.6**	**18.9**
17-49	**65.4**	**74.8**	**75.6**	**60.9**	**67.4**	**64.4**
50+	**8.2**	**9.0**	**7.9**	**13.4**	**14.0**	**16.7**
South America[c]	(198,576)	(286,757)	(300,662)	(276,410)	(398,739)	(468,442)
0-16	**23.4**	**19.4**	**20.6**	**21.1**	**17.3**	**15.7**
17-49	**67.2**	**68.6**	**67.3**	**65.3**	**68.2**	**67.9**
50+	**9.4**	**11.9**	**12.1**	**13.6**	**14.6**	**16.4**
Asia	(1,350,448)	(1,414,772)	(1,661,277)	(1,253,290)	(1,658,069)	(1,618,588)
0-16	**25.1**	**21.1**	**19.6**	**19.5**	**15.7**	**15.9**
17-49	**61.0**	**61.6**	**62.5**	**61.7**	**67.4**	**64.3**
50+	**13.9**	**17.3**	**17.8**	**18.8**	**16.9**	**19.7**
Africa	(76,989)	(115,261)	(160,012)	(221,103)	(311,362)	(437,013)
0-16	**13.9**	**11.8**	**16.5**	**19.1**	**16.9**	**18.2**
17-49	**80.5**	**81.6**	**75.1**	**71.8**	**73.5**	**69.8**
50+	**5.6**	**6.6**	**8.5**	**9.1**	**9.6**	**12.0**
Worldwide	(2,828,794)	(4,441,847)	(5,190,565)	(3,769,211)	(4,777,679)	(4,479,539)
0-16	**24.5**	**18.0**	**18.1**	**22.2**	**17.4**	**17.0**
17-49	**64.1**	**70.0**	**69.5**	**62.6**	**67.9**	**65.8**
50+	**11.5**	**12.0**	**12.4**	**15.3**	**14.8**	**17.3**

Source: *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ, *Immigrants Admitted to the United States, 1981-2000*, 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010.

[a]The 2006-2009 admission cohort represents four rather than five years. Percentages may not sum to 100% due to rounding.

[b] Consists of Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean and Canada

[c]Includes Oceania

Table 2
Summary of Family Migration Multipliers by Region of Origin, Age at Admission, and 5-Year Initiating Immigrant Cohort, 1981-2000

Initiating Cohort	Initiating Immigrants (n)	Family Migrants (n)	*Family Migration Multipliers by Age at Admission*[a]			
			<17	17-49	50+	All
Europe						
1981-1985	128,235	228,878	0.44	1.13	0.22	1.78
1986-1990	178,928	208,684	0.33	0.70	0.14	1.17
1991-1995	308,902	373,634	0.38	0.66	0.17	1.21
1996-2000	215,868	359,383	0.46	0.89	0.32	1.67
Mesoamerica[b]						
1981-1985	221,260	765,742	1.09	1.98	0.39	3.46
1986-1990	1,497,026	921,425	0.18	0.34	0.10	0.62
1991-1995	1,380,413	1,329,522	0.30	0.52	0.15	0.96
1996-2000	312,381	1,313,381	1.23	2.22	0.75	4.20
South America[c]						
1981-1985	37,758	195,245	1.30	3.07	0.81	5.17
1986-1990	101,633	224,133	0.58	1.32	0.31	2.21
1991-1995	88,967	284,426	0.84	1.86	0.49	3.20
1996-2000	61,239	325,445	1.21	3.02	1.09	5.31

Asia						
1981-1985	472,080	1,044,320	0.55	1.16	0.51	2.21
1986-1990	403,160	1,033,399	0.66	1.40	0.51	2.56
1991-1995	526,489	1,222,461	0.58	1.28	0.46	2.32
1996-2000	301,427	1,192,213	0.87	2.03	1.06	3.95
Africa						
1981-1985	29,967	66,377	0.43	1.49	0.32	2.24
1986-1990	**57,603**	**86,784**	0.32	0.94	0.24	1.51
1991-1995	70,866	117,934	0.41	1.01	0.24	1.66
1996-2000	88,261	201,708	0.59	1.27	0.42	2.29

Source: *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by the U.S. Dept. of Homeland Security 2010.

[a]Calculations assume a **9-year lag between permanent residency and naturalization, which is a condition for sponsoring numerically exempt immediate relatives and some family preference migrants. The $_3$S, $_3$C, $_3$P, and $_4$F cohorts are advanced by nine years to reflect this lag, and the 1981-1985 initiating cohort corresponds to 1990-1994 $_3$S, $_3$C, $_3$P, and $_4$F family admissions, etc.**

[b] **Consists of Mexico, Central America, the Caribbean and Canada**

[c]**Includes Oceania**

Table 3

New Legal Permanent Immigrants by Age at Admission: Top Four Sending Countries by 5-Year Cohort, 1981-2009 (Total admitted)

Origin Country/ Age at Admission	5-Year New Immigrant Cohort					
	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006-2009
China	(126,689)	(135,923)	(222,430)	(n=177,277)	(250,964)	(289,748)
0-16	**15.7**	**13.2**	**12.1**	**16.5**	**12.3**	**10.5**
17-49	**55.5**	**54.2**	**64.5**	**60.2**	**65.0**	**66.8**
50+	**28.8**	**32.6**	**23.4**	**23.3**	**22.7**	**22.7**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
India	(117,608)	(134,510)	(173,176)	(n=189,005)	(343,618)	(246,044)
0-16	**17.2**	**16.1**	**17.2**	**16.0**	**11.8**	**12.7**
17-49	**65.6**	**62.6**	**62.6**	**63.2**	**73.1**	**65.6**
50+	**17.1**	**21.3**	**20.1**	**20.8**	**15.1**	**21.7**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Philippines	(219,319)	(255,750)	(280,475)	(n=211,425)	(266,637)	(260,174)
0-16	**21.5**	**21.4**	**21.9**	**19.7**	**18.9**	**19.3**
17-49	**56.5**	**57.6**	**57.7**	**57.9**	**60.9**	**56.4**
50+	**22.0**	**20.9**	**20.4**	**22.4**	**21.2**	**24.3**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Mexico	(334,507)	(1,320,175)	(1,488,140)	(n=757,593)	(875,719)	(575,561)
0-16	**26.9**	**12.8**	**11.4**	**29.0**	**18.0**	**18.4**
17-49	**67.6**	**79.6**	**82.3**	**57.3**	**67.2**	**63.6**
50+	**5.6**	**7.6**	**6.3**	**13.8**	**14.8**	**18.1**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Source: *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ, *Immigrants Admitted to the United States, 1981-2000*, 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010.

Notes: **The 2006-2009 admission cohort represents four rather than five years. Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding. IRCA amnesty immigrants for China, India, and the Philippines are suppressed because of small numbers.**

Table 4
Summary of Family Migration Multipliers by Age at Admission and 5-Year Initiating Immigrant Cohorts: Top Four Sending Countries, 1981-2000

Initiating Cohort	Initiating Immigrants (n)	Family Migrants (n)	*Family Migration Multipliers by Age at Admission*			
			<17	17-49	50+	All
China						
1981-1985	16,197	124,139	0.89	3.86	2.91	7.67
1986-1990	14,048	118,369	1.05	4.67	2.71	8.43
1991-1995	79,134	173,466	0.37	1.18	0.65	2.19
1996-2000	32,521	202,944	1.06	3.15	2.03	6.24
India						
1981-1985	12,825	127,998	1.78	5.55	2.65	9.98
1986-1990	15,370	147,538	1.61	5.59	2.40	9.60
1991-1995	29,086	169,794	1.05	3.30	1.49	5.84
1996-2000	36,162	184,830	0.81	2.62	1.69	5.11
Philippines						
1981-1985	36,569	217,329	1.38	3.11	1.45	5.94
1986-1990	47,110	180,656	0.93	1.92	0.99	3.84
1991-1995	51,059	206,017	1.00	2.08	0.96	4.04
1996-2000	39,568	200,769	1.08	2.33	1.66	5.07
Mexico						
1981-1985	124,385	233,377	0.60	1.06	0.22	1.88
1986-1990	**1,093,752**	**316,008**	0.07	0.15	0.07	0.29
1991-1995	1,084,947	686,966	0.18	0.34	0.11	0.63

1996-2000	102,647	654,398	2.01	3.25	1.12	6.38

Source: *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010.

Notes: Calculations assume a **9-year lag between permanent residency and naturalization, which is a condition for sponsoring numerically uncapped immediate relatives and some family preference migrants. The $_3$S, $_3$C, $_3$P, and $_4$F cohorts are advanced by nine years to reflect this lag, and the 1981-1985 initiating cohort corresponds to 1990-1994 $_3$S, $_3$C, $_3$P, and $_4$F family admissions, etc.**

Table A-1

Sponsored Parent ($_3$P) New Legal Permanent Immigrants by Age at Arrival: Top Four Sending Countries by 5-Year Cohort, 1981-2009

(Total Admitted)

Country of Origin/ Age at Admission	5-Year New Immigrant Cohort					
	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006-2009
China	(22,229)	(27,742)	(33,695)	(26,619)	(36,949)	(39,062)
0-16	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**
17-49	**2.9**	**2.1**	**2.7**	**3.2**	**1.2**	**1.8**
50+	**97.1**	**97.9**	**97.3**	**96.8**	**98.8**	**98.2**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
India	(17,127)	(23,988)	(27,627)	(26,907)	(32,201)	(38,071)
0-16	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**
17-49	**4.6**	**5.4**	**5.9**	**5.0**	**3.7**	**3.8**
50+	**95.4**	**94.6**	**94.1**	**95.0**	**96.3**	**96.2**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Philippines	(39,710)	(41,451)	(38,767)	(29,642)	(31,427)	(40,136)
0-16	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**
17-49	**4.5**	**4.3**	**5.2**	**4.8**	**3.4**	**3.7**
50+	**95.5**	**95.7**	**94.8**	**95.2**	**96.6**	**96.3**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Mexico	(10,023)	(19,576)	(22,342)	(87,215)	(115,261)	(89,769)
0-16	**0.1**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**	**0.0**
17-49	**16.7**	**12.9**	**13.3**	**10.4**	**13.5**	**13.2**
50+	**83.2**	**87.1**	**86.7**	**89.6**	**86.5**	**86.8**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Source: *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010.

Notes: **The 2006-2009 admission cohort represents four rather than five years. Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.**

Table A-2

Family Preference ($_2$D, $_4$F) New Legal Permanent Immigrants by Age At Arrival: Top Four Sending Countries by 5-Year Cohort, 1981-2009 (Total Admitted)

Country of Origin/ Age at Admission	5-Year New Immigrant Cohort					
	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006-2009
China	(76,439)	(81,311)	(61,370)	(62,150)	(62,378)	(59,250)
0-16	**22.3**	**19.3**	**18.4**	**19.5**	**17.6**	**18.9**
17-49	**66.6**	**66.0**	**66.0**	**61.8**	**59.2**	**58.3**
50+	**11.0**	**14.7**	**15.7**	**18.7**	**23.2**	**22.8**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
India	(78,156)	(79,319)	(80,381)	(81,264)	(70,719)	(58,028)
0-16	**21.3**	**22.2**	**27.0**	**25.8**	**20.0**	**22.1**
17-49	**74.7**	**71.7**	**63.7**	**59.7**	**57.4**	**58.4**
50+	**4.1**	**6.1**	**9.3**	**14.5**	**22.7**	**19.5**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Philippines	(78,969)	(78,745)	(79,360)	(73,371)	(75,007)	(57,639)
0-16	**24.9**	**25.1**	**26.0**	**26.4**	**27.2**	**27.3**
17-49	**67.8**	**67.2**	**62.6**	**56.0**	**50.2**	**49.3**
50+	**7.3**	**7.7**	**11.4**	**17.6**	**22.6**	**23.4**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Mexico	(92,065)	(83,699)	(186,143)	(369,372)	(289,247)	(188,654)
0-16	**36.6**	**29.9**	**41.5**	**42.4**	**30.4**	**29.1**
17-49	**61.1**	**67.1**	**53.4**	**52.5**	**63.9**	**64.9**
50+	**2.3**	**3.0**	**5.1**	**5.2**	**5.7**	**6.1**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Source: *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010.

Notes: **The 2006-2009 admission cohort represents four rather than five years. Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.**

Table A-3

Government-Sponsored ($_0$G, $_0$G', and Selected $_1$D) Legal Permanent Immigrants by Age at Admission: Top Four Sending Countries by 5-Year Cohort, 1981-2009 (Total Admitted)

Origin Country/ Age at Admission	5-Year New Immigrant Cohort					
	1981-1985	1986-1990	1991-1995	1996-2000	2001-2005	2006-2009
China	(5,672)	(3,540)	(8,918)	(3,644)	(9,097)	(88,617)
0-16	**4.3**	**3.5**	**20.5**	**27.1**	**12.8**	**9.7**
17-49	**29.3**	**18.4**	**68.5**	**66.5**	**74.5**	**80.4**
50+	**66.3**	**78.1**	**11.1**	**6.4**	**12.7**	**10.0**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
India	(968)	(1,237)	(4,587)	(2,990)	(8,637)	(16,175)
0-16	**69.2**	**61.4**	**46.3**	**24.6**	**23.0**	**20.9**
17-49	**28.1**	**30.1**	**49.8**	**68.6**	**67.4**	**68.7**
50+	**2.7**	**8.5**	**3.8**	**6.9**	**9.6**	**10.4**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Philippines	(2,059)	(7,345)	(11,773)	(1,572)	(1,119)	(1,529)
0-16	**85.7**	**35.2**	**30.7**	**23.4**	**29.9**	**44.2**
17-49	**10.8**	**56.5**	**66.5**	**61.6**	**49.2**	**37.9**
50+	**3.5**	**8.3**	**2.8**	**15.0**	**21.0**	**17.9**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**
Mexico	(63,489)	(1,025,489)	(1,149,897)	(14,879)	(22,543)	(22,040)
0-16	**44.6**	**10.8**	**5.8**	**17.3**	**6.7**	**5.8**
17-49	**48.9**	**81.7**	**88.8**	**76.6**	**84.9**	**83.1**
50+	**6.5**	**7.5**	**5.3**	**6.0**	**8.5**	**11.2**
Total	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**	**100.0**

Source: *Immigrants Admitted to the United States 1981-2000* data files (USDOJ 2007) and Special Tabulations provided by U.S. Department of Homeland Security 2010.

Notes: **The 2006-2009 admission cohort represents four rather than five years. Percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.**

Figure 1

Legal Permanent Residents Admitted from Asia and Latin America, 1976-2011



Sources: *1986 and 1999 Statistical Yearbooks of the Immigration and Naturalization Service; 2011 Statistical Yearbook of the Department of Homeland Security Office of Immigration Statistics.*

Figure 2

Regional Origins of The U.S. Foreign Born Population, 1960-2010: Total and Persons Ages 65+



Sources: *US Census Bureau, Current Population Surveys, March 2000; Ruggles, et. al. 2010 (IPUMS 1% sample, 1960; IPUMS-USA 2010 ACS sample; IPUMS 5% sample, 1980).*

FIGURE 3

Major Class of Admission by Reunification Migration Phase

Family Unification Phase		Major Class of Admission
Initiating Immigrants		
Phase 0	**Initiating Immigrants**	**$_0$E Employer-sponsored initiating employee immigrants (excluding dependents)** **$_0$G Government-sponsored initiating immigrants (excluding dependents, excluding IRCA).** **$_0$G' IRCA amnesty immigrants (special government sponsored initiating immigrants)** **$_0$S Initiating spouse immigrants (sponsored by *native-born* citizen spouses)**
Family Unification Immigrants: Accompanying and Sponsored		
Phase 1	**Accompanying Family Dependents of Initiating Immigrants**	**$_1$D Dependents (spouse or minor children) who accompany initiating immigrants at migration**
Phase 2	**Numerically-Limited, Later Following Family Dependents of Initiating Immigrants** ***Sponsored by LPRs under numerically-limited family 2nd preference admissions categories***	**$_2$D Numerically-limited, later-following dependents (spouses, minor children, unmarried adult offspring) of previously migrated initiating immigrants**
Phase 3	**Numerically-Unlimited Immediate Relatives of U.S. Citizens** ***Sponsored by citizens under numerically-exempt admissions categories***	**$_3$S Spouses of *foreign-born* U.S. citizens (sponsored by naturalized citizen spouses)** **$_3$C Children of U.S. citizens** **$_3$P Parents of U.S. citizens**
Phase 4	**Numerically-Limited Preference Relatives of U.S. Citizens** ***Sponsored by citizens under numerically-limited 1st, 3rd and 4th preferences***	**$_4$F Adult sons, daughters, and siblings, with associated dependents, of adult U.S. citizens**

Source: Carr and Tienda, 2012.