Family Separation As Slow Death

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ESSAY

FAMILY SEPARATION AS SLOW DEATH

Stephen Lee*

During the Trump Administration, disturbing images of immigration officials forcibly separating parents from their children at the U.S.–Mexico border have rightly invited an onslaught of criticism. Voices across the political spectrum have called these actions immoral and insisted that this is not who we are. The underlying moral imperative of this critique is correct, but this Essay argues that it rests on a mischaracterization of our immigration system. In fact, the principle of “family separation” pervasively defines our entire immigration system. The law governing admissions, enforcement, adjustment of status, and remittances routinely leaves noncitizens waiting, marooned, left out, and helpless in their efforts to remain or reunite with their family members. In other words, a legal system predicated on principles of family separation captures precisely who we are. To make this argument, I borrow insights developed by scholars in the humanities and social sciences who have developed the theory of “slow death” or “slow violence.” Unlike acts of “spectacular violence” (a label for which border apprehensions and forcible separations certainly qualify) the process of slow death happens over time, offering no signs of impending ruination, a reality that frustrates the ability to generate momentum for change. Reframing the experience of migrants in terms of slow death can help recontextualize immigrant suffering in terms of family separation thereby drawing the public’s attention to the need for systemic, and not just episodic, change.

* Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Development, University of California, Irvine. For helpful conversations and comments, I am grateful to Kerry Abrams, Albertina Antognini, Sameer Ashar, Adam Cox, Jonathan Glater, Marc-Tizoc González, Deep Gulasekaram, Kaaryn Gustafson, Angela Harris, Hiroshi Motomura, L. Song Richardson, and Norman Spaulding. I am grateful to those who participated in workshops at the University of Arizona, Korea University, University of New Mexico, Pepperdine University, UC Irvine, the 2019 conference for the Law and Society Association, and the Grey Fellows Forum at Stanford Law School. Earlier versions of this Essay benefitted from discussions at Tulane Law School, Washington & Lee Law School, as well as at the annual Conference for the Law and Society Association, and the Grey Fellows Forum at Stanford Law School. Earlier versions of this Essay benefitted from discussions at Tulane Law School, Washington & Lee Law School, as well as at the annual Conference for Asian Pacific American Law Faculty. Viridiana Chabolla, Lovleen Purewal, and LiMei Vera provided indispensable research support and the UCI law librarians kept me on track as usual. Finally, I owe a debt to Tiffani Burgess and the other Columbia Law Review editors for their steady guidance throughout the publication process. All errors are my own.
INTRODUCTION

In May 2018, senior immigration officials in the Trump Administration announced a “zero tolerance” policy for border apprehensions. As then–Attorney General Jeff Sessions stated: “If you cross this border unlawfully, then we will prosecute you. It’s that simple. . . . If you are smuggling a child, then we will prosecute you and that child will be separated from you as required by law.”¹ This policy, of course, assumes the thing that officials have to prove: that an adult’s child companion is merely a ruse and not the recipient of guardianship. For migrants detained at the border seeking asylum, immigration officials began charging immigrants with child smuggling, thereby transforming a humanitarian and public-spirited case into a criminal and national security one.² An outcry followed. Predictably, immigrant rights advocates objected,³ but so did a slew of elected and former officials.

² This also allowed immigration officials to then intercede “on behalf of” children, who became “unaccompanied minors” in that process, thus justifying the separation of children from parents.
across the political spectrum, as well as the Chief Executive Officer of the Chamber of Commerce. From this chorus of critics, a common message emerged: This is not who we are. As time passed, a number of commentators began putting this most recent chapter of family separation in historical context showing how government officials have tolerated if not encouraged the disruption of family life among communities of color throughout much of country’s past. This Essay builds on

www.elcentrodelaraza.org/our-children-are-the-worlds-hope-for-justice-for-all/ [https://perma.cc/6ZMS-NY75].


this impulse but sets out to show that the past is not the past. Even a
cursory glance at our broader immigration system shows that this is
exactly who we are. Put more precisely, a great deal of our immigration
system thwarts or frustrates the ability of migrants to remain or reunite
with their family members.

In this Essay, I argue that our immigration system is pervasively
organized around principles of family separation. To make this case, I
borrow the insights of scholars writing within the traditions of the
humanities and social sciences who have developed the concept of “slow
death” or “slow violence.”8 Focused primarily on health-related harms,
these scholars use the notion of slow death to capture harms that
vulnerable communities experience but cannot always identify or
explain. Acts of slow violence stand apart from acts of “spectacular”
violence, the harms of which are immediately discernible. To use
somewhat reductive examples, while the destruction wrought by military
invasions like the 1991 Gulf War can be assessed in terms of body counts,
the leukemia and infertility linked to the use of uranium-depleted bombs
are not so easily assessed or quantified, and certainly not immediately.9
Similarly, few would find controversial the notion that natural disasters
like Hurricane Maria demand attention and resources to help console
and support the lives that might have been lost and ruined. But as days
passed into weeks and months, debates about the adequacy of the federal
response in Puerto Rico morphed into a discussion over how much
“excess” loss and ruin could be fairly attributed to Hurricane Maria.10 In
other words, the realities of space and time combined with political
realities and cognitive limitations can make it hard for members of the
public to appreciate the full range of harms flowing from points of
relative consensus.

[https://perma.cc/AAG7-Q9DH]; Mark Trahant, Indian Country Remembers the Trauma
of Children Taken from Their Parents, PRI (June 19, 2018), https://www.pri.org/
stories/2018-06-19/indian-country-remembers-trauma-children-taken-their-parents
[https://perma.cc/R8YG-6QQK].
8. Throughout this Essay, I use these terms interchangeably.
the Estimated Excess Mortality from Hurricane Maria in Puerto Rico 8–9 (2018),
https://publichealth.gwu.edu/sites/default/files/downloads/projects/PRstudy/Acertain
men%20of%20the%20Estimated%20Excess%20Mortality%20from%20Hurricane%20Mari
a%20in%20Puerto%20Rico.pdf [https://perma.cc/6SA3-M24L] (estimating that 2,975
“excess deaths” took place in the six-month period immediately following Hurricane
Maria); Arelis R. Hernández, Samantha Schmidt & Joel Achenbach, Study: Hurricane
Maria and Its Aftermath Caused a Spike in Puerto Rico Deaths, with Nearly 3,000 More
study-hurricane-maria-and-its-aftermath-caused-a-spike-in-puerto-rico-deaths-with-nearly-
3000-more-than-normal/2018/08/28/57d6d2d6-aa43-11e8-b1da-07faa680710_story.html
(on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The government of Puerto Rico on Tuesday
embraced the GWU estimate as the official death toll, ranking Maria among the deadliest
natural disasters in U.S. history.”).
In the immigration context, the recent outrage directed at family separation at the border stems from a broader principle on which there is some degree of consensus, namely that our modern admissions system should be committed to principles of family reunification—the opposite, and the rule to the exception, of family separation. But a holistic examination of the broader immigration system shows that the exception of family separations operates much more like the rule in at least four respects. First, while federal admissions policy does give preference to family-based relationships, extended wait times for immigrant visas leave many migrants waiting for years, sometimes decades, for a visa to become eligible.

Second, the harsh enforcement of immigration laws within the interior of the United States most obviously impacts mixed-status families through detention and removal policies, which isolate and expel non-citizens, leaving citizen and other authorized family members behind. For those unauthorized migrants not swept into the removal pipeline, border enforcement policy counterintuitively worsens this problem by raising the costs of leaving the United States. Many unauthorized migrants who might otherwise be inclined to leave—either to return home or to visit deported family members—choose to stay for fear that they won’t be able to reenter at the later date. Thus, enforcement policies leave many noncitizens and their family members marooned in the United States.

Third, limited opportunities to adjust status further exacerbate this dynamic. While marriage to a United States citizen remains a viable option for many unauthorized migrants who have overstayed their visas to obtain a green card, this process largely excludes those who have surreptitiously crossed a border. The vast majority of surreptitious border entrants are racialized as Latinx. By contrast, the majority of unauthorized Asian Americans and Africans—the second and third largest racial groups with unauthorized migrants—are visa overstayers, which means that adjustment of status remains a viable option to them in a way that it is not for unauthorized Latinxs. Allocating the benefit of adjustment of status in this way creates disparate impact harms thereby leaving many migrants left out of a process that is ostensibly designed to keep married couples together.

11. See Kerry Abrams, What Makes the Family Special?, 80 U. Chi. L. Rev. 7, 7–8 (2013) (“Family reunification . . . is enshrined as a key principle in international human rights law, and it is a right that should be recognized by the United States in the immigration law context . . . .”).

Fourth and finally, anti-money laundering laws impose what can feel at times like arbitrary limitations on the ability of migrants to remit wages—the vast majority of which go to family members. Residents of some countries, such as Somalia, are completely excluded from the transnational remittance market for reasons related to money laundering policies. But even residents of other countries without these concerns, such as Mexico or El Salvador, suffer from exorbitant transaction costs associated with remittances from the United States, leaving many migrants in the United States helpless to support family members abroad.

Theorizing our immigration system in terms of slow death helps us reconceptualize the types of separations that impact and shape immigrant lives. Some forms of separation are virtually indistinguishable from those that attach at the border. Detention and deportation, for example, create anguish through geographic and physical separation, which closely resembles the kinds of harms that border apprehension exacts upon families. Other types of separation, such as extended visa wait times, capture different types of harms visited upon immigrant families. Allowing mixed status couples to remain physically together but without meaningful opportunities to harmonize legal status denies them the “good life” that we assume flows automatically from the threshold decision to get married. Similarly, constraining remittance flows illuminates the importance of economic expressions of affinity within family life.

Slow death scholars seek to put things in their proper context, but not just for the sake of descriptive clarity. Much of this scholarship rests on an activist foundation. Pollution exacts on the poor the types of harms that unfold slowly and that fail to capture the broader public’s attention until the health of those who have been harmed becomes irreversibly compromised. The challenge for environmentalists, therefore, is “to convert into dramatic form urgent issues that unfold too slowly to qualify as breaking news—issues like climate change and species extinction that threaten in slow motion.” In the immigration arena, a clearer understanding of family separation can help broaden and better coordinate advocacy efforts across multiple contexts. With the “zero tolerance” policy currently enjoined by the federal courts and being reevaluated by the President, we might be tempted to believe that our moral obligation to address the harms of family separation has been discharged. But the reality is that the crisis at the border comprises a part of a continuum of family separation harms. Reconceptualizing family separation in terms of slow death shows that these are half measures designed to contain the spectacle of separating asylum seekers from their children at the border. A full commitment to eradicating or reducing the harms of family separation demands a more holistic approach that reforms the entire immigration apparatus.

I should also provide an important caveat. As a motif, family separation has defined large swathes of our nation’s history. To state the obvious, the United States has a long history of dehumanizing nonwhite populations, and separating and breaking apart families has often operated as a tool for dehumanization. The enslavement of Black Americans,14 the eradication of the first Americans,15 and the internment of Japanese Americans16 stand as just a few notorious examples of the law operating to keep those families apart. All of these stories could be retold in terms of family separation. And while there is value in situating modern immigration policy within the broader historical sweep of white supremacy,17 that is not the aim of this Essay. My primary interest is in giving the current political moment some context, which in turn might shape our understandings of which types of political action demand the most attention.

Part I summarizes the slow death paradigm. Part II then applies that paradigm to the rules governing our immigration system. Here, I show how migrants are waiting, marooned, left out, and helpless in our immigration system. While several immigration scholars have already drawn attention to the ways that our laws promote both reunification and separation principles, these treatments have largely focused on discrete parts of our immigration system with a particular focus on admissions and to a lesser extent on enforcement. My goal here is to

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14. See Wilma A. Dunaway, The African-American Family in Slavery and Emancipation 51–54 (2003) (explaining that interstate sales were a central cause of the forced relocation of slaves between states during the Antebellum Period in the United States); Thomas D. Russell, Articles Sell Best Singly: The Disruption of Slave Families at Court Sales, 1996 Utah L. Rev. 1161, 1166–67 (explaining that “[a]ntebellum courts routinely sold a great many slaves, and that “fifty-two percent of the slaves sold at court sales were sold individually,” rather than with their families).

15. See Marilyn Irvin Holt, Indian Orphanages 8 (2001) (“Numerous pieces of federal and state legislation, as well as court decisions, spoke to the mechanism of jurisdiction that allowed non-Indian intervention into domestic life. Jurisdiction could . . . allow actions under which Indian children became wards of the state, parents lost custody, or children were placed into non-Indian homes.”); David Wallace Adams, Fundamental Considerations: The Deep Meaning of Native American Schooling, 1880–1900, 58 Harv. Educ. Rev. 1, 8 (1988) (explaining that policymakers were motivated by the view that “the elimination of tribal sovereignty would facilitate the individual Indian’s entry into citizenship” and that “[o]nly when Indians were separated from the larger tribal unit . . . would they be truly fit for citizenship”).


17. See generally, e.g., K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1878 (2019) [hereinafter Park, Self-Deportation Nation] (situating the phenomenon of “self-deportation” within the broader history of “legal strategies [used] to pursue the mass removal of unwanted groups” in the United States, including “natives, American-born black people, and nonwhite immigrants”).
draw a fuller and more comprehensive picture of the role that family separation plays in our immigration system as a regulatory consequence, which means discussing not just admission and enforcement policies but also synthesizing adjustment of status and remittance policies. Broadening the discussion in this way shows how a wide array of laws work together to create conditions of hopelessness and suffering for millions of migrants residing in the United States.  

Part III revisits the example of family separation at the border. Here, I note that much of the discourse in this setting has revolved around crisis, individual choice, and flourishing. These framing choices allow migrants and their advocates to reframe discussions of immigrant detention on more favorable terms. Still, as I explain, one consequence of framing border detentions in terms of this type of spectacle is obscuring the larger reality of family separation. To be clear, my intent is not to discount the benefits created by these frames nor to diminish efforts undertaken by these migrants and their allies to reduce human suffering. My main point is to highlight that these benefits come with real costs, especially in terms of making it more difficult to engage in and seriously consider structural types of reform that might alleviate human suffering throughout our immigration system.

One final point: Although this Essay borrows heavily from the humanities, focusing on pragmatic solutions reveals the comparative advantage that legal scholarship offers. Pulitzer Prize–winning writer Viet Nguyen observes that while humanists can tell “powerful stories about individual people,” the telling of the story without more “[doesn’t] change the conditions that produce those refugees in the first place.” Legal scholarship and lawmaking offers a chance to fill in the ”more.” Thus, in Part IV, I address how the slow death concept might be translated into a useful intervention against a broader array of family separation harms than is currently being captured by border detentions. Central to this effort is creating discursive space for migrants themselves to describe the nature and importance of how family separation has affected their lives. Our goal should be not only to mitigate and remediate the harms of family separation produced by the Trump Administration, but also to alleviate the everyday suffering that defines immigrant lives and which flow from the pains of waiting, being marooned, left out, and helpless.

I. THE SLOW DEATH PARADIGM

The paradigm of slow death or violence captures the kinds of harms that happen slowly and over time, which can often go overlooked or unnoticed. Harms arising from exposure to lead paint or airborne pollutants are classic examples of such harms.\textsuperscript{20} So is the dumping of toxic waste in countries in the Global South.\textsuperscript{21} These types of harms stand in contrast to what slow death scholars call “spectacular” acts of violence, those that can be appreciated immediately in the moment.

As a body of work, slow death scholarship does not arise from a single, cohesive discussion. Rather, it is comprised of at least two overlapping conversations. One can trace its starting point to Lauren Berlant’s powerful essay, \textit{Slow Death (Sovereignty, Obesity, Lateral Agency)}.\textsuperscript{22} A humanist by training, Berlant focuses on the condition of obesity, which she observes is often a function of poverty and economic insecurity. This link to poverty helps to explain why obese people are blamed for their own obesity or, as she explains, “provide[s] an alibi for normative governmentality and justified moralizing against inconvenient human activity.”\textsuperscript{23} The concept of slow death, as Berlant explains it, refers to harms that are not only or even mostly caused by bad individual choices but stem from broader structural conditions leading to “the physical wearing out of a population and the deterioration of people in that population that is very nearly a defining condition of their experience and historical existence.”\textsuperscript{24}

In subsequent elaborations, Berlant poses slow death as a critique of cultural and psychological fantasies of “the good life.”\textsuperscript{25} Slow death is the answer to the question: “What happens when those fantasies start to fray—depression, dissociation, pragmatism, cynicism, optimism, activism, or an incoherent mash?”\textsuperscript{26} The “good life” is a façade and a distraction from the reality that the game is rigged and unwinnable for most people, especially poor people. This version of slow death—that is, as critique of “good life” fantasies—has produced its own generative line of scholarship reaching into the realms of queer theory,\textsuperscript{27} critical race studies,\textsuperscript{28} rural geography,\textsuperscript{29} and literary criticism.\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{22.} Berlant, Slow Death, supra note 18.
\textsuperscript{23.} Id. at 755.
\textsuperscript{24.} Id. at 754.
\textsuperscript{25.} See Lauren Berlant, Cruel Optimism 2 (2011) [hereinafter Berlant, Cruel Optimism].
\textsuperscript{26.} Id.
\textsuperscript{27.} See, e.g., Eithne Luibhéid, Queer/Migration: An Unruly Body of Scholarship, 14 GLQ 169, 190 n.44 (2008).
A second thread to this conversation comes from Rob Nixon, a humanist and an environmentalist, who uses the concept of slow violence to explain why it is so hard to amass the political will and emotional fortitude to stave off environmental disasters like climate change. We have short attention spans, Nixon explains straightforwardly enough. This is a relatively modern phenomenon, he posits, one that possesses some connection to the 9/11 attacks and the string of crises that have followed. With so many “bad” things swirling around in the news—many real, some manufactured—the public has difficulty focusing on any one particular type of crisis. But the larger impact, according to Nixon, is that information registers with the public only when it provides “a spectacular, immediately sensational, and instantly hypervisible image of what constitutes a violent threat.”

In this way, spectacular violence presents a form of storytelling, one that is necessary for activists and decisionmakers to convey their point. Our country’s history, settled and recent, offers several examples of both the strategic deployment of disaster narratives to usher in broadscale change as well as brazen attempts to avoid such narratives to quell reform (and rescue) efforts. The point is that stories of spectacular violence, like all stories, rely on narrative choices, which means highlighting and intensifying some details while ignoring and muting others. Slow violence, according to Nixon, helps us see what is ignored and muted. Rather than “[f]alling bodies, burning towers, exploding heads, avalanches, volcanoes, and tsunamis,” slow violence captures “[s]tories of toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases, and accelerated species loss due to ravaged habitats”—harms which are also “cataclysmic, but . . . in which casualties are postponed, often for generations.”

Nixon’s work has spawned a significant body of work related to a range of environmental harms across disciplines. Legal and sociolegal

33. Nixon, supra note 9, at 3.
34. See, e.g., Chloe Ahmann, “It’s Exhausting to Create an Event Out of Nothing”: Slow Violence and the Manipulation of Time, 33 Cultural Anthropology 142, 146 (2018) (explaining how activists in the Curtis Bay neighborhood of Baltimore have used the concept of slow violence to campaign against industrial projects, which have slowly polluted the area); Shannon O’Lear, Climate Science and Slow Violence: A View from Political Geography and STS on Mobilizing Technoscientific Ontologies of Climate
scholars have extended Nixon’s concept of slow violence to other arenas. Criminal law scholars have used the concept to describe the banal and ordinary harms that criminal law actors and institutions exact upon communities of color. Aya Gruber, for example, observes: “Fast violence occurs when racist police officers kill unarmed black civilians, and slow violence occurs when the cumulative conditions of racialized inequality and disenfranchisement leave an island vulnerable to a hurricane.”35 Elsewhere, Gruber elaborates that entire categories of brutality evade detection because they happen at the hands of state actors, which also fits within a slow violence ethos. For example, she notes that the “routine” acts of violence committed by prison guards and police officers enjoy immunity under the law, which over time creates a social order that slowly kills vulnerable communities.36

Geoff Ward further develops this concept to help explain how state actors police and manage juveniles of color. Ward explains that, in contrast to “spectacular violence,” slow violence as experienced by Black Americans involves “subtler personal or structural violence contributing to dis-accumulation, collective under-development, and generational disadvantage.”37 Ward observes that “[m]ost common to Jim Crow juvenile justice was the structural violence of systematic malign neglect, a slow violence of individual and group underdevelopment.”38 Thus, he argues, dramatic and undoubtedly horrific acts of lynching and bombings comprise only a smaller part of a larger apparatus that sought to demean and control the bodies of Black youth through “state administered whippings . . . which white officials believed especially appropriate and efficient means of sanctioning descendants of slaves they did not intend to serve with rehabilitative ideals and resources.”39

In this way, both Gruber’s and Ward’s work fit comfortably alongside the work of critical race theorists and feminists who have been attuned to what Patricia Williams referred to as “spirit-murder” more than thirty years ago—that is, the real human cost of society’s refusal to recognize anti-Black racism as a legitimate form of suffering.40 Adrien Katherine Wing and Monica Nigh Smith build on this point and link it explicitly to

Change, 52 Pol. Geography 4, 4–5 (2013) (discussing the concept of slow violence as it pertains to climate narratives); Sirleaf, supra note 21, at 329–30 (“The concept of slow violence allows us to consider more forcefully the violence caused by environmental harms like toxic dumping.”).

38. Id. at 304.
39. Id. at 305.
the language of slow death: “Racism, sexism, and other forms of
discrimination can lead to the slow death of a person’s soul or psyche.”41
Thus, the various conversations focused on the concepts of slow death,
slow violence, and spirit-murder all operate as a critique of structural
forms of oppression, which aims to make visible harms that go
undetected by mainstream legal analytical frameworks.

The concept of slow violence provides descriptive clarity in two
important ways. First, it shrinks time. Unlike spectacular acts of violence,
certain harms cannot be appreciated in the moment. Such a dynamic
proves particularly challenging for those waging battle against large-scale
polluters. The temporal dimension of slow death affects how we perceive,
and therefore respond to, physical, psychological, and environmental
harms that we often associate with discrete events.42 As some political
geographers explain it, violence can be a “processual and unfolding
moment, rather than . . . an ‘act’ or ‘outcome.’”43 Although the arena of
environmental protection has witnessed its share of stunning
calamities—think Deepwater Horizon oil spill44—scores of other types of
harms, such as the global amassing of greenhouse gases, can go
unnoticed or disregarded for years or decades before reaching a tipping
point in our lives.45

Subordination in the form of slow death, then, obfuscates broader
structural conditions. Berlant makes this point in the context of obesity
and the array of health problems that it can generate: “Slow death
prospers not in traumatic events, as discrete time-framed phenomena
like military encounters and genocides can appear to do, but in temporal
environments whose qualities and whose contours in time and space are
often identified with the presentness of ordinariness itself . . . .”46 In

41. Adrien Katherine Wing & Monica Nigh Smith, Critical Race Feminism Lifts the
Veil?: Muslim Women, France, and the Headscarf Ban, 39 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 743, 777

42. See Nixon, supra note 9, at 3 (“We need to account for how the temporal
dispersion of slow violence affects the way we perceive and respond to a variety of social
afflictions—from domestic abuse to posttraumatic stress and, in particular, environmental
calamities.”).

43. Simon Springer & Philippe Le Billon, Violence and Space: An Introduction to
the Geographies of Violence, 52 Pol. Geography 1, 2 (2016).

44. See generally David Barstow, David Rohde & Stephanie Saul, Deepwater

45. Phenomena like “toxic buildup, massing greenhouse gases, and accelerated
species loss” are “cataclysmic, but they are scientifically convoluted cataclysms in which
casualties are postponed, often for generations.” Nixon, supra note 9, at 3. Such calamities
“are slow and long lasting” and “patiently dispense their devastation while remaining
outside our flickering attention spans—and outside the purview of a spectacle-driven
corporate media.” Id. at 6.

46. Berlant, Slow Death, supra note 18, at 759.
other words, slow death is by its very nature taken for granted. In a later treatment of this idea, Berlant refines this idea to critique popular obsessions with crises. She points out that if suffering for the poor is experienced as “the work of getting through it,” then humanists and advocates “require other frames for elaborating contexts of doing, being, and thriving.” People may be able to survive crises with enough time to recover and recalibrate for life as it returns to ordinary conditions, but poor people and especially people of color live “[u]nder a regime of crisis ordinariness,” which can make life feel “more like desperate doggy paddling than like a magnificent swim out to the horizon.” This “wash, rinse, repeat” quality of subordination can stymie even the most committed of activists and organizers. Slow death scholar Chloe Ahmann points to the impact that administrative delay can have on residents’ efforts to eradicate harms like the presence of a hazardous waste dump in their neighborhood: “I feel like our opponents own time . . . . And when we give into their timelines, we lose.”

A second way that slow death illuminates our understandings of inequality and subordination is that it pierces through cramped notions of individual or personal choice. Consider, again, the example of poor and malnourished people struggling against obesity. Blame is often placed at the feet of obese individuals rather than with supermarkets that refuse to open locations in blighted neighborhoods. In striving to create a healthier food system, elite food activists have become unproductively obsessed with obesity as the ultimate bogeyman that food policies should seek to eradicate. But this avoids other structural problems that might also exacerbate the harms of poverty, such as wage theft or the weakening of worker bargaining power.

47. See id.  
49. Id. at 117.  
50. Ahmann, supra note 34, at 159 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
51. See Alison Hope Alkon, Daniel Block, Kelly Moore, Catherine Gillis, Nicole Dinuccio & Noel Chavez, Foodways of the Urban Poor, 48 Geoforum 126, 127–28 (2013) (arguing that policy solutions ignore the role of community “cultural and social practices that affect food consumption”).  
52. See Julie Guthman, Weighing In: Obesity, Food Justice, and the Limits of Capitalism 5–6 (2011) (critiquing the fixation of food writers such as Michael Pollan on obesity).  
53. See Jennifer J. Lee & Annie Smith, Regulating Wage Theft, 94 Wash. L. Rev. 759, 766 (2019) (“Unsurprisingly, wage theft results in increased poverty rates. An Employment Policy Institute (EPI) study from 2017 found that workers who experience minimum wage violations are more than three times as likely to live in poverty as someone chosen at random in the eligible workforce.”); see also Stephen Lee, Policing Wage Theft in the Day Labor Market, 4 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 655, 656 (2014) (noting that wage theft often leaves workers in the informal labor economy without a meaningful remedy).  
reasoning, the way forward involves eating smarter or working harder, not reorganizing our nation’s workplace laws or creating affirmative entitlements for the poor. By focusing so singularly on people’s food choices, discussions about health lead to conclusions that those afflicted with obesity have made poor choices out of ignorance or a lack of self-restraint. In other words, their obesity is their fault. Again, as Berlant helpfully observes: “In an ordinary environment, most of what we call events are not of the scale of memorable impact but rather are episodes, that is, occasions that make experiences while not changing much of anything.” The problem is one of vocabulary, and our language of rights, choices, and options fails us.

In this regard, the concept of slow violence fits within a broader set of critiques designed to question the degree to which individual choice and personal worth should govern the ability to obtain relief under the law. While a variety of intellectual traditions speak to this dynamic, three are notable. One is Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of “symbolic violence,” which more or less refers to the internalization and normalization of social hierarchies. Such a formulation helps zero in on how social, economic, and legal institutions naturalize hierarchy and inequality. Anthropologists, like Seth Holmes, have observed that in the context of migrant-dominated workplaces like farms, ethnicity and immigration status often dictate one’s job assignment and pay. While observations about segregation in the farm work context are unsurprising, what is notable is the natural and unremarkable manner in which such segregation develops. Using the example of a berry farm in Washington, Holmes explains that the delegation of the most degrading work to indigenous Mexican migrants becomes justified because managers and coworkers over time come to believe that indigenous migrants “like to

55. Berlant observes that within our capitalist labor market, “sickness is defined as the inability to work.” Berlant, Slow Death, supra note 18, at 754.
56. Id. at 760.
57. See id. at 757; see also Dean Spade, Normal Life: Administrative Violence, Critical Trans Politics, and the Limits of Law 38–49 (Duke Univ. rev. and expanded ed. 2015) (2009) (discussing why the legal reform strategy born from trans rights discourse “fails to remedy the harms it claims to attend to, and actually can empower systems that maldistribute life chances”).
work bent over.”59 In other words, the belief that Oaxacan migrants have “chosen” to take on this work overrides a broader set of questions focused on the segregated nature of the workplace, which might in turn lead to legal or political action.

Indeed, with immigration enforcement authority insinuating itself into the lives of migrant families, work, and schools, Cecilia Menjívar and Leisy Abrego explain that migrant lives reflect a kind of “legally sanctioned social suffering.”60 Beyond physically disruptive acts like detaining and removing migrant families, Menjívar and Abrego insist that agencies and regulators enact policies that “are more subtle but equally damaging (in the short and long term).”61 In a separate article, Menjívar observes that “[t]he silent, yet equally damaging legal stipulations embedded in the law impinge greatly on families’ structure and organization, and can potentially affect a larger number of immigrants than the more traumatic separations through deportation.”62 All of this suffering becomes naturalized, and perversely, contributes to stereotypes about immigrant work ethic while obfuscating the human costs of this toil and exertion.63

A second related critique is Dean Spade’s theory of administrative violence. Noting that racist or transphobic harms happen pervasively and not just in discrete moments, Spade argues that remedies grounded in theories of antidiscrimination and equality cannot achieve meaningful reform with a focus on the “few bad apples.”64 He argues that “legal equality demands are a feature of systemic injustice, not a remedy.”65 Shelters, for example, serve as a crucial lifeline for homeless people. But because access to shelters requires beneficiaries to provide identification, trans homeless people—whose identification may misclassify their gender—remain largely excluded from these valuable resources.66 Unlike many legal scholars who focus on courts as sites of legal conflict and resolution, Spade trains his attention on the administrative state, which offers a clearer example of how legal categories destabilize people’s lives and warp the distribution of life chances throughout society. For Spade, individual rights are beside the point because, as he observes: “Legal systems that

59. See Holmes, Berry Farm Workers, supra note 58, at 58–60; see also Seth M. Holmes, Fresh Fruit, Broken Bodies: Migrant Farmworkers in the United States 170–72 (2013).
60. Menjívar & Abrego, supra note 58, at 1413.
61. Id. at 1400.
63. See Holmes, Berry Farm Workers, supra note 58, at 53.
64. See Spade, supra note 57, at 7.
65. Id. at 19.
66. See id. at 81 (“Trans women in need of shelter . . . often remain on the streets because they are unfairly rejected from women-only domestic violence programs and they know the homeless shelter system will place them in men’s facilities, guaranteeing sexual harassment and possibly assault.”).
have official rules of nondiscrimination still operate in ways that disadvantage whole populations—and this is not due solely, or even primarily, to individual bias.\textsuperscript{67}

A third and final intellectual sibling to the slow death paradigm is the well-established critique of neoliberalism. With “efficiency” firmly entrenched as a core principle guiding the allocation of government resources,\textsuperscript{68} the regulatory landscape has become hostile to the notion that the government is responsible for taking the lead in addressing and solving social and economic problems. The array and extent of public benefits have shrunk and become more punitive in nature.\textsuperscript{69} Critics of this type of shift in policy decry the overemphasis on personal choice and individual responsibility.\textsuperscript{70} As sociologist Lisa Sun-Hee Park offers: Within a neoliberal governance framework, “poverty is individualized as personal moral failings so that the solution centers on disciplining non-normative bodies to perform in ‘responsible’ and ‘entrepreneurial’ ways.”\textsuperscript{71} Park rejects the notion that poor people can climb out of poverty by simply making better choices. Environmentalists similarly spurn consumer-oriented strategies to fight global degradation and inequality.\textsuperscript{72} Arguing against the individual choice rhetoric, a growing number of legal scholars and advocates argue for structural changes that address root causes to social and economic suffering such as abolitioning rather than simply reforming institutions like the police.\textsuperscript{73}

All of these frameworks speak to the “taken-for-granted” nature of subordination within American life, which resonates with the slow death conception of the world. At the same time, slow death scholarship seeks

\textsuperscript{67} Id. at 9.

\textsuperscript{68} See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,771, 82 Fed. Reg. 9339 (Feb. 3, 2017) (“It is the policy of the executive branch to be prudent and financially responsible in the expenditure of funds, from both public and private sources.”); Exec. Order No. 13,563, 76 Fed. Reg. 3821 (Jan. 21, 2011) (“Our regulatory system must . . . identify and use the best, most innovative, and least burdensome tools for achieving regulatory ends. It must take into account benefits and costs, both quantitative and qualitative.”); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 1993) (“With this Executive order, the Federal Government begins a program to reform and make more efficient the regulatory process.”).


\textsuperscript{71} Park, Entitled to Nothing, supra note 70, at 9.

\textsuperscript{72} See George Monbiot, We Won’t Save the Earth with a Better Kind of Disposable Coffee Cup, Guardian (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/sep/06/save-earth-disposable-coffee-cup-green [https://perma.cc/X5NB-4PV8].

\textsuperscript{73} See, e.g., Amna A. Akbar, Toward a Radical Imagination of Law, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 405, 415 (2018); Allegra M. McLeod, Envisioning Abolition Democracy, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1613, 1616 (2019).
to do more than unearth buried suffering. This body of work aims to capture a particular type of ethos, one that claims to be moving in one direction but is actually moving in the opposite direction. Slow death describes a world that is ostensibly committed to protecting people against sickness and poverty but offers a type of commitment that obfuscates life at the bottom, which reveals how social, political, cultural, and economic systems engender exactly those ills. Common remedies to poverty such as public benefits programs don’t actually cure poverty but merely prolong it. This leads to an unreflective consensus that when people are discarded, it is just a case of bad luck rather than the predictable consequence of structural disadvantage. Thus, slow death injects urgency into debates about legal reform by putting front and center what is at stake: the degree to which migrants struggle to avoid death for themselves and their loved ones. Slow death scholarship shows that in many industries, migrants are working themselves to death and that they continue to take these risks to help alleviate the slow violence of poverty their family members suffer here as well as in sending countries.

Finally, it’s worth noting that the slow death framework arises from an interventionist impulse. It is meant simultaneously to dramatize a dynamic that goes unnoticed and to teleport us to the “aha” moment, which typically happens much later with the benefit of hindsight. To avert disaster, scholars and activists must find ways to describe a form of “violence that is by definition image weak and demanding on attention spans.” The slow death framework offers no spoiler alerts and instead jumps right to the unsavory conclusion: Many people are not likely to ever enjoy “the good life” promised by those who exploit them. This then forces the question of what we, the reform-minded and justice-minded members of the public, must do to effectuate these structural changes.


75. See Nixon, supra note 9, at 205 (noting that the reasons given for discharging for military personnel for medical reasons can focus on the “catastrophic physical collapse” in ways that are “dissociated entirely from the environment of war”).

76. See Agricultural Safety, Nat’l Inst. for Occupational Safety & Health, https://www.cdc.gov/niosh/topics/aginjury/default.html [https://perma.cc/9SSW-P7M4] (last visited Aug. 19, 2019) (“Agriculture ranks among the most hazardous industries. Farmers are at very high risk for fatal and nonfatal injuries; and farming is one of the few industries in which family members (who often share the work and live on the premises) are also at risk for fatal and nonfatal injuries.”).

77. Nixon, supra note 9, at 276.

78. Berlant poses the difficult question: “What does it mean for thinking about the ethics of longevity when, in an unequal health system, the poor and less poor are less likely to live long enough to enjoy the good life whose promise is a fantasy bribe that justifies so much exploitation?” Berlant, Slow Death, supra note 18, at 764–65.
II. FAMILY SEPARATION AS SLOW DEATH

With the slow death paradigm firmly in hand, this Part begins examining how our immigration system creates and contributes to a range of harms that frustrate or outright prevent migrants from being reunited or remaining with their family members. Here, my aim is to place border detentions on a spectrum of family separation harms. I want to suggest that a variety of laws governing admissions, enforcement, adjustment of status, and remittances leave noncitizens waiting, marooned, left out, and helpless to be united with their family members. Some of the harms exacted upon immigrants within these contexts are nearly identical to those transpiring at the border. Detention and removal, for example, create geographic and physical barriers for family members, and these barriers subject migrants to difficult if not outright dangerous circumstances. Other times, the separation prevents migrants from affirming their affinity bonds or from fulfilling their social and emotional obligations. The precise nature of the family separation varies across these contexts but what connects these examples is the ordinariness of the violence that migrants experience. Moreover, it is the ordinary nature of the suffering experienced by these migrants that obfuscates how these harms differ from those at the border in degree and not in kind.

A. Waiting (Admissions)

In the immigration context, admissions refer to all instances in which a noncitizen effectuates an entry into the United States after inspection at a port of entry.79 This covers those instances in which a noncitizen seeks admission permanently (like for a green card) or temporarily (like as a tourist or a student). Both contexts permit a significant degree of family separation.

The story of permanent admissions begins with the Hart–Celler Act of 1965. As students and scholars of immigration law know, this statute reshaped our immigration admissions system. While white migrants had long enjoyed the right to sponsor and travel with spouses and children, migrants of color, especially from Asia, enjoyed no comparable right.80 The Hart–Celler Act, which amended the federal immigration code, was passed by the same Congress and signed into law by the same President that had created legislative monuments of egalitarianism, such as the Civil Rights Act, the Voting Rights Act, and the Fair Housing Act.81 The 1965 amendments, likewise, attempted to reorient immigration law

79. Noncitizens who do not effectuate an entry are referred to as those who have “entered without inspection” (EWIs).
around principles of equity by expanding the family reunification principle to make it broadly applicable no matter one’s national origin—to make universal what had been reserved for the few.82 For decades, residents of countries across the world, but especially those from Asia, were denied the opportunity to seek formal migration opportunities to the United States. The Hart–Celler Act changed this by allocating to each country the same number of visas.83

To implement this set of reforms, Congress expanded the existing immigration architecture, which was grounded in a system driven by sponsorship choices. Unlike other countries that require would-be migrants to apply directly to state agencies, most migration opportunities in the American context begin with a citizen or sometimes a lawful permanent resident submitting a petition on behalf of the intended beneficiary.84 Typically, petitioners can sponsor only those with a qualifying familial relationship.85 The system is supposed to work so that beneficiaries who qualify as “immediate relatives”—spouses, children, and parents86—gain the most preferential treatment. Congress did not create a cap on these types of immigrant visas, so in theory, these beneficiaries can always gain admission.87 Beneficiaries who qualify on the basis of other familial relationships—for example, adult sons, daughters, or siblings of citizens—must contend with a limited supply of visas that is doled out yearly on the basis of petition date.88

For much of the twentieth century, the harm of being separated from one’s family members did not fall evenly across the pool of petitioners and applicants, which was the point of the reforms in the first

82. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Rose Cuisin Villazor, Introduction to The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965: Legislating a New America 1, 1 (Gabriel J. Chin & Rose Cuisin Villazor eds., 2015) (explaining that the “principal consequence” of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 was “ending formal discrimination in immigration law”).


84. See Alan Hyde, The Law and Economics of Family Unification, 28 Geo. Immigr. L.J. 355, 359–60 (2014) (“About two-thirds of lawful immigration to the United States is authorized because of the immigrant’s relation to a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.”); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (“[Subject to certain exceptions,] any citizen of the United States claiming that an alien is entitled to classification by reason of a relationship . . . or to an immediate relative status . . . may file a petition with the Attorney General for such classification.”).

85. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1154(a) (classifying “immediate relatives” as aliens not subject to direct numerical limitations and detailing the procedure for filing a petition).

86. See id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).

87. Like all those who seek admission, whether on a permanent or temporary basis, “immediate relative” visa holders can still be excluded from the United States on the basis of inadmissibility or deportability. See id. §§ 1182, 1227 (admissibility and deportability); see also Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131 (2015) (explaining that a consular office may deny the visa of an “immediate relative” on inadmissibility grounds).

place. Among the many goals that President Lyndon Johnson hoped the Hart–Celler Act would realize was the end to arbitrary family separation. In his signing statement, President Johnson noted:

Under [the previous] system the ability of new immigrants to come to America depended upon the country of their birth. Only 3 countries were allowed to supply 70 percent of all the immigrants. Families were kept apart because a husband or a wife or a child had been born in the wrong place.89

This equality narrative links the origin story of our admissions system to the civil rights era of lawmaking. But in setting aside the same number of visas for each country, the immigration code left very little room to account for the unequal demand for visas across countries. While the reordering of admissions opportunities certainly had a “liberating” effect on migration from Europe and especially from Asia,90 the 1965 amendments stifled and significantly curtailed migration opportunities for those seeking admission from Central and South American countries and especially from Mexico.91 The year before the Hart–Celler Act, Congress terminated the Bracero Program, which had provided significant formal (albeit temporary) opportunities for Mexican workers to enter and leave the United States.92 The combined elimination of temporary admissions opportunities and consolidation of permanent admissions opportunities into family-based channels contributed to, if not directly caused, the first major flow of illegal or unauthorized migration into the United States from Mexico.93

Fast-forwarding half a century brings us to our present admissions system, one defined by long wait times for family-based petitions. The system seems fair enough. As with other government-created benefits, immigrant visas come in limited supply, which means that a certain degree of family separation is inevitable. In this regard, visas resemble other publicly created goods of limited quantity, such as admission to a magnet high school or a public university or a government contract for goods or services. But students and contractors who miss out on the opportunity to secure those goods often move on with their lives and seek opportunities elsewhere—at other schools or with other economic partners. The nature of immigration makes it harder for visa applicants

90. See Ngai, supra note 80, at 262–63.
91. See id. at 263; see also Zolberg, supra note 81, at 334–35.
to move on. The *reason* a migrant seeks admission to the United States is often because of a preexisting familial relationship, which simply can’t or shouldn’t be replaced on terms comparable to other public goods.\textsuperscript{94} While common perceptions of immigration can paint migrants as simply seeking out economic opportunities, this reductive and stripped-down view of migration gets complicated when reintroducing the emotional elements of familial relationships that provide the context for a migrant’s search for work. In many instances, family provides the impetus,\textsuperscript{95} the means,\textsuperscript{96} and the reward\textsuperscript{97} for seeking admission into the United States. And extended wait times can keep families apart.

Even where visas are available, as is the case with citizens seeking to sponsor “immediate relatives,” petitioners still face the possibility of separation when a particular petition touches upon national security concerns. Recently, the Supreme Court has been forced to revisit whether and how much the Constitution protects marital relationships involving noncitizens.\textsuperscript{98} Fauzia Din, a U.S. citizen, married her husband, Kanishka Berashk, who is a citizen of Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{99} When the State Department denied her husband’s visa application with little explanation, she argued to the Supreme Court that this denial violated her right to due process.\textsuperscript{100} While Din lost before the Court—five Justices concluded that she received all the process she was due under the Constitution—the opinions laid bare the anxieties related to affirming the full range of marital rights for citizens married to noncitizens.

Justice Scalia wrote on behalf of himself, Chief Justice Roberts, and Justice Thomas, concluding that Din simply had no right that was protectable under the Due Process Clause.\textsuperscript{101} By contrast, Justice Kennedy concurred on behalf of himself and Justice Alito but without reaching a conclusion as to whether Din’s right to be with her noncitizen

\begin{itemize}
\item Migrants seeking admissions into the United States might not have family members here or might have family members across many developed nations. In those instances, an immigrant visa to the United States might be seen as interchangeable with similar admission opportunities in other destinations.
\item See Joanna Dreby, Divided by Borders: Mexican Migrants and Their Children 203 (2010) (explaining that parents in Mexico “weigh the costs and benefits of migration” and choose to leave their children behind in order to “move to a place where they can earn more for their labor”).
\item See Hyde, supra note 84, at 359–60 (“Together, the immediate relatives and those admitted in the family preference categories make up about 65% of lawful migration to the United States.”).
\item See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2420 (2018) (noting that the Court’s “inquiry into matters of entry and national security is highly constrained”).
\item Kerry v. Din, 135 S. Ct. 2128, 2131 (2015).
\item Id.
\item Id. at 2138 (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion).
\end{itemize}
spouse was a protectable interest. Instead, he affirmed the denial of the visa application on the grounds that the process Din received was sufficient for due process purposes—that is, a bare assertion by the State Department denying the petition was all that the Due Process Clause demanded on those facts.102 In dissent, Justice Breyer, writing on behalf of himself and Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan, would have held that Din both possessed a protectable interest in being with her spouse in the United States and was entitled to greater process than what she received.103 On the question of whether being with one’s spouse amounted to a protectable interest, no opinion garnered a majority of the Court.

*Din* illustrates how longstanding doctrines of deference continue to permit family separation even for the most favored status of migrant, namely the spouses of U.S. citizens. Put differently, *Din* suggests that family reunification is at best a subconstitutional principle that offers a limited degree of certainty even to U.S. citizens.104 As a point of comparison, consider *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, on which the *Din* Court relied. In *Mandel*, a Marxist scholar was denied admission into the United States to participate in an academic debate.105 While the Court upheld this denial, it recognized that the U.S. citizen academics had an associational interest in engaging with Mandel.106 Only four justices in *Din* found that marriage entailed a constitutionally protected interest to be with one’s spouse.107 Moreover, *Mandel* considered whether technological innovations like the telephone might serve as a substitute to protect the interests of the professors who wished to participate in the event with Professor Mandel.108 The Supreme Court rejected this argument, recognizing that “technological developments” could not replace the experience of actually being in someone’s physical presence.109 Meanwhile, during the pendency of her case, Din reported staying in

102. Id. at 2139 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
103. Id. at 2141–42 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
104. See Kerry Abrams, Family Reunification and the Security State, 32 Const. Comment. 247, 278–80 (2017) (suggesting that following *Din*, that it is “impossible to predict with any certainty how [the] Supreme Court would view a challenge” to an immigration policy which “impacted families with cognizable family reunification claims”).
106. See id. at 765.
107. See *Din*, 135 S. Ct. at 2138–39, 2142.
109. See id.
touch with phone cards, which was the only way she could maintain her connection given her fear of visiting her husband in Afghanistan.

Family separation principles also circumscribe temporary admissions, although in a less obvious way. In the context of transnational families, temporary visas offer an important legal device for allowing loved ones to share important life-defining events for periods of time. Family separation is one of the consequences of the Trump Administration’s travel ban, which restricted the ability of migrants from several countries to enter the United States because those countries failed to utilize sufficiently demanding screening procedures. In Trump v. Hawaii, the President argued that these screening deficiencies meant that migrants from those countries—almost all of which are predominantly Muslim—posed a threat to national security.

The Supreme Court ultimately upheld the substance of the travel ban, focusing much of its analysis on the authority of the Executive to set policy to effectuate national security goals. Here again, an important consequence of the travel ban was to thwart the ability of American citizens and residents to connect with relatives in the affected countries. A whole host of life-defining events including the birth of a child, a wedding, a graduation, or the death of an elder might prompt someone—a citizen or a green card holder—to seek the company or comfort of an overseas relative, which the travel ban categorically prohibits in most cases. A part of the imagined good life involves celebrating or mourning significant moments with one’s affinity community. But for those with loved ones in Libya, Syria, or any of the other affected


111. See id.


114. See id. at 2418–23 (noting that “the admission and exclusion of foreign nationals is a ‘fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments’” and concluding that “the Government [had] set forth a sufficient national security justification to survive rational basis review” (quoting Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977))).

115. This is an argument I develop with other law professors in an amicus brief for that case. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae Immigration, Family, and Constitutional Law Professors in Support of Respondents, Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (No. 17-965), 2018 WL 1585891.
countries, the travel ban serves as a reminder that the “good life” has long been, almost by definition, a fantasy that excluded Muslims.116

The example of the travel ban once again illustrates how the Court’s deferential attitude toward the political branches has exacerbated problems of family separation even in fairly routine admissions contexts. The test that the Court used in Trump v. Hawaii to evaluate the constitutionality of the travel ban derives from a long line of cases in which the Court largely defers to the admissions decisions made by immigration officials.117 Specifically, the Court explained that when an immigration official provides a “facially legitimate and bona fide reason” courts will not second-guess the motivations of the executive branch.118 As is the case for judicial review under a “rational basis” test, ambiguities get resolved in favor of the executive branch. Unlike the rational basis test, which has been used in certain instances to invalidate laws motivated by animus,119 the outcome in Trump v. Hawaii reaffirms the suspicion that the “facially legitimate” test functions more as a rubberstamp than as a meaningful check on arbitrary decisionmaking or executive overreach, even with significant evidence of anti-immigrant sentiment.

The Court has also exhibited a willingness to defer to the executive outside of the national security context. Consider again the challenge of backlogs. These backlogs can pose specific problems for child beneficiaries of these immigration opportunities. Certain immigration opportunities are reserved for “children,” defined by the immigration code as those who are under twenty-one years of age.120 Because the admissions process can take so long, children who are eligible for a visa at the start of the process (that is, are under twenty-one years of age) may not be at the end of the process once a visa actually becomes available. Congress addressed this problem with the Child Status Protection Act (CSPA).121 In cosponsoring the bill that eventually became the CSPA, Congresswoman Sheila Jackson Lee explained that the bill “supports the underlying premise of the immigration policy in this country, which is a reunification of families.”122

116. More to the point, in the modern United States, the travel ban means that anti-Muslim sentiment doesn’t appear only as hot flashes of violence like hate crimes but also in the quieter moments of living and dying. See Edward W. Said, Orientalism 1 (1978) (“The Orient was almost a European invention, and has been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings, haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences.”).


118. See id. at 2419 (quoting Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769 (1972)).


Ambiguities in statutory text have forced advocates, agencies, and the courts to embrace competing interpretations of these provisions all the while negotiating the contours of doctrines of deference such as those lodged in *Chevron*.123 This issue arose a few years ago in *Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio*, which wrestled with key provisions in the CSPA.124 The immigration code allows citizens (petitioners) to sponsor a noncitizen family member (principal beneficiary).125 If those beneficiaries have a child, then the child is also eligible for a visa as a derivative beneficiary.126 Because the visa process can take years, timing matters. A two-year-old might have been eligible for a derivative beneficiary visa when the initial petition was filed but be twenty-two once the visa finally becomes available thus aging out of the visa process. This aging-out problem forces the question of whether that twenty-two-year-old must start the process all over again because of the realities of time. The CSPA tries to solve this problem by requiring that in those scenarios “the alien’s petition shall automatically be converted to the appropriate category and the alien shall retain the original priority date issued upon receipt of the original petition.”127

The *Cuellar de Osorio* decision illustrates the temporal elements of family separation in the admissions context. The substance of the decision focused on an agency decision, *Matter of Wang*,128 which interpreted a key provision of the CSPA.129 Under the CSPA, Congress appears to have created two interconnected benefits for the “aged-out” population.130 One is that petitions can seamlessly jump tracks if the would-be beneficiary lost eligibility as a child over time. This is the clause requiring that the petition “automatically” shift to the “appropriate category.”131 A second is that the noncitizen does not have to get back into line as she awaits a visa under this new category. This is the “shall retain the original priority date” clause.132

*Cuellar de Osorio*’s precise holding is that the agency’s interpretation of the immigration code’s automatic conversion provision was entitled to deference under the *Chevron* doctrine.133 But as a “slow death” decision, the case also illustrates how time functions as a public good, which can be maldistributed in nonobvious ways that harm immigrants. Writing for

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126. See id. §§ 1153(d), 1153(h)(2).
127. Id. § 1153(h)(3).
130. Id. at 2213 (noting that § 1153(h)(3) is “self-contradictory”).
132. Id.
133. See *Cuellar de Osorio*, 134 S. Ct. at 2213 (“This is the kind of case *Chevron* was built for.”).
the plurality of the Court, Justice Kagan noted the role of time in the immigration process:

All of this takes time—and often a lot of it. At the front end, many months may go by before USCIS approves the initial sponsoring petition. On the back end, several additional months may elapse while a consular official considers the alien’s visa application and schedules an interview. And the middle is the worst. After a sponsoring petition is approved but before a visa application can be filed, a family-sponsored immigrant may stand in line for years—or even decades—just waiting for an immigrant visa to become available. . . . And as the years tick by, young people grow up, and thereby endanger their immigration status.\footnote{Id. at 2199 (Kagan, J.) (plurality opinion).}

Time is often understood as an objective phenomenon over which individuals have no control. The agency’s view of the CSPA most clearly reflects this view. The Board of Immigration Appeals characterized aging out as a “natural consequence” of the admission process.\footnote{In re Wang, 25 I. & N. Dec. 28, 38 (2009).} Again, a hallmark of slow death is the obfuscation of structural context. And because time functions not just as an objective phenomenon but also as the reflection of political compromises,\footnote{See Elizabeth F. Cohen, The Political Value of Time: Citizenship, Duration, and Democratic Justice 103 (2018).} telling the story of the CSPA in terms of the “natural” phenomenon of growing older minimizes the role that judges play in interpreting and giving content to legal provisions born of political compromises.

For her part, Justice Kagan recognized that time could reflect different social meanings leading to different legal consequences. On her reading, the purpose of the CSPA was to “prevent an alien from ‘aging out’ because of—but only because of—bureaucratic delays: the time Government officials spend reviewing (or getting around to reviewing) paperwork at what we have called the front and back ends of the immigration process.”\footnote{Cuellar de Osorio, 134 S. Ct. at 2200–01 (Kagan, J.) (plurality opinion).} By contrast, time that an immigrant spends waiting for a visa to finally become available “is a day he grows older, under the immigration laws no less than in life.”\footnote{Ibid.}

In her dissent, Justice Sotomayor zeroed in precisely on the constructed nature of the CSPA’s time provisions:

Congress could have required aged-out children like Ruth Uy to lose their place in line and wait many additional years (or even decades) before being reunited with their parents, or it could have enabled such immigrants to retain their place in line—albeit at the cost of extending the wait for other immigrants by some shorter amount. Whatever one might think of the policy...
arguments on each side, however, this much is clear: Congress made a choice.\(^\text{139}\)

Justice Sotomayor’s dissent is a lucid statement of the trade-offs Congress wrestled with and ultimately resolved (in her mind at least) in favor of family reunification. It also illustrates how the Court can minimize or obfuscate its role in exacerbating the separation of transnational families. A majority of the Court effectively reduced the categories of derivative beneficiaries who might qualify for the automatic conversion of a visa application, with prolonged separation as the predictable result. And the Board of Immigration Appeal’s rule derives from an organic statute that was amended to eliminate, or at least minimize, family separation for arbitrary reasons.

B. Marooned (Enforcement)

Limited opportunities for formal admission often mean that migrants must resort to entering the United States or overstaying their visas without authorization, subjecting them to a sprawling immigration enforcement apparatus. Enforcement policies, then, work in tandem with limited admissions opportunities to also break apart immigrant families that have formed ties within the United States. The most obvious example is deportation, which makes it difficult if not impossible for family members to visit those who have been expelled from the United States. Deportation-related policies such as mandatory detention also disrupt families by severely constraining the ability of family members to visit and spend time with detained populations.

Again, these are obvious examples of the physical separation of migrant families flowing from our immigration policies. These types of harms are merely degrees removed from the forcible separations at the border. In both cases, physical and geographic barriers prevent migrants from exploring and living their lives together as families. One way that family separation in the deportation context differs from the border context is that the non-deported family members retain some mobility. Remaining family members can follow deported individuals back to sending countries—and some do. My point is that a part of the cruelty and harshness stems from uprooting family members from a place where a family has strong community ties, which is often the case with parents of U.S.-born children.\(^\text{140}\)

\(^{139}\) Id. at 2228 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).

Enforcement policies create problems of family separation in other, less obvious ways. These types of family separation concern the ability of migrants in the United States to connect and reunite with loved ones who never left the sending countries in the first place. A significant literature has documented that many migrants have no intention to permanently settle in the United States. Rather, their preferred relationship to the United States is one of circular migration. Enforcement policies disrupt this in a migration stream that runs within the context of transnational families. Today, for a variety of reasons, migrants live within transnational families—that is, “families in which members of the nuclear unit (mother, father, and children) live in two different countries.”

The separation of families across national boundaries is often (though not always) on account of parents leaving behind children. And once these migrants are in the United States, border enforcement policies raise the costs of leaving and returning across the border, leaving adult migrants effectively marooned in the United States and separated from their children.

142. Id. (noting that the absence of migrant family members is “decreasingly ‘temporary’” due to “mounting physical and political barriers to border-crossing” which prolong family separation).
144. See Dreby, U.S. Immigration Policy, supra note 140, at 246 (noting that “parent-child separations are fairly typical during international migration”); see also Michaela Vanore, Valentina Mazzucato & Melissa Siegel, ’Left Behind’ but Not Left Alone: Parental Migration & the Psychosocial Health of Children in Moldova, 132 Soc. Sci. & Med. 252, 252 (2015) (noting that an estimated “31 percent of all children aged 0–14” in Moldova “had one or both parents abroad”). The reasons for separation are usually (though again not always) for the purposes of seeking out economic opportunities to support family members. See Joanna Dreby & Tim Adkins, The Strength of Family Ties: How US Migration Shapes Children’s Ideas of Family, 19 Childhood 169, 171 (2011) (“Like children whose parents migrate for work, parents in transnational families often leave their children in order to better provide for them economically.”); see also Ester Hernandez & Susan Bibler Coutin, Remitting Subjects: Migrants, Money and States, 35 Econ. & Soc’y 185, 202–03 (2006) (noting the “worldwide growth in remittances,” which has been “made possible by a lack of opportunities in [migrants’] home countr[ies]”).
145. More than thirty years ago, the federal government began expressly incorporating deterrence rationales into enforcement policies, and while regulatory strategies have become more punitive over the years, very little suggests that these policies have done much to deter unauthorized migration into the country. See generally Zolberg, supra note 81, at 382–451 (“While a number of anti-immigration measures were enacted at the state and federal levels, none of them substantially reduced either the legal or the illegal flow, and as the twentieth century approached its close, the wave rolled on, largely undisturbed.”).
The informal and tenuous nature of work is critical to understanding the slowly violent nature of migrant experiences in the United States.\textsuperscript{146} Since 1986, federal immigration laws have regulated access to formal workplace opportunities.\textsuperscript{147} Across presidential administrations, immigration officials have alternated between deploying audits of business records or “silent raids,” which penalized employers for failing to keep their paperwork in order (as officials did during the Obama Administration)\textsuperscript{148} and rounding up workers en masse for deportation, which punished the migrants themselves for working in defiance of the immigration code (as officials have done under the Bush and Trump Administrations).\textsuperscript{149} But whether immigration officials enter workplaces announcing an audit or wielding a warrant, their broader impact has been to remove migrants from employer records, not out of the country.

When regulators announce a pending audit, employers have a chance to get their house in order by asking for workers to verify or reverify their work authorization status. In many instances, workers without that authorization simply leave work or never show up.\textsuperscript{150} But they typically don’t leave the country. Even if a handful of employers get audited,

\textsuperscript{146} By “informal,” I mean work for which employers do not create a transactional record on hours worked, taxes withheld, and wages dispersed. Almost a quarter-century ago, Saskia Sassen explored the close and indelible relationship between the informal economy and immigrants, and in doing so, she highlighted the important role that economic structures play in fostering such economic activity. She observed: “Although immigrants, insofar as they tend to form communities, may be in a favorable position to seize the opportunities presented by informalization, immigrants do not necessarily \textit{create} such opportunities. Instead, the opportunities may well be a structured outcome of the composition of advanced economies.” Saskia Sassen, The Informal Economy: Between New Developments and Old Regulations, 103 Yale L.J. 2289, 2990 (1994).


\textsuperscript{150} See Leslie Berestein Rojas, More ICE Work Site Audits Underway in LA as Enforcement Steps Up, KPCC (Feb. 24, 2018), https://www.scpr.org/news/2018/02/24/81055/more-ice-work-site-audits-underway-in-la-as-enforc/ [https://perma.cc/R7BQ-QBM6] (“Advocates say the visits led to some immigrants walking away from their jobs. Fearful they could be arrested, they don’t show up to work, essentially firing themselves.”).
resource\textsuperscript{151} and political constraints\textsuperscript{152} mean that thousands of other employers remain more or less active and willing to hire that same worker.\textsuperscript{153} This is how a line cook at a national food chain like Chipotle ends up working in the back of the house at a smaller “mom and pop” store.\textsuperscript{154} Thus, the primary consequence of focusing immigration enforcement resources into the workplace has been simply to change the type of work that immigrants can do.

Border enforcement strategies exacerbate this dynamic. The cruelty that surrounds the Trump Administration’s zero tolerance policy fits within a broader set of border enforcement policies. In some ways, it is remarkable that advocates secured a victory against the zero tolerance policy given that even broad delegations of power to the President and

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  \item[151.] During the Obama Administration, the DHS claimed it had enough resources to remove no more than 400,000 immigrants in any given year, a figure it met with some regularity. See Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 188 (5th Cir. 2015) (King, J., dissenting) (“[F]or the last several years Congress has provided the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) with only enough resources to remove approximately 400,000 of those aliens per year.”); Stef W. Kight & Alayna Treene, Trump Isn’t Matching Obama Deportation Numbers, Axios (June 21, 2019), https://www.axios.com/immigration-ice-deportation-trump-obama-a72a0445f04dab667ac65cf726f61.html[https://perma.cc/DDU8-EJGR] (“[T]otal ICE deportations were above 385,000 each year in fiscal years 2009-2011, and hit a high of 409,849 in fiscal 2012.”). In 2017, the first year of the Trump presidency, the DHS claims to have removed 226,119 illegal aliens. See By the Numbers FY 2017, ICE (2017), https://www.ice.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Document/2017/iceByTheNumbersFY17Infographic.pdf[https://perma.cc/8GPP-LPZ7].
  \item[153.] Moreover, while immigration laws prohibit the hiring of unauthorized migrants, that prohibition becomes murkier and less certain when applied to informal employment relationships, such as those involved in independent contract work. See Michael Mastman, Note, Undocumented Entrepreneurs: Are Business Owners “Employees” Under the Immigration Laws?, 12 NYU. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 225, 228 (2008) (observing the difficulty of determining whether immigrant business owners are “hired for employment” under federal law).
  \item[154.] See Steve Raabe, Chipotle Reluctantly in Spotlight as Immigration Investigators Increase Their Focus on Employers, Denver Post (May 6, 2011), https://www.denverpost.com/2011/05/06/chipotle-reluctantly-in-spotlight-as-immigration-investigators-increase-their-focus-on-employers/ [https://perma.cc/BL85-YCQ2] (reporting that in the wake of federal investigations into Minnesota-area Chipotle restaurants, “450 workers were either fired or never returned to work after being asked to submit new verification”). This is also how that line cook is forced to swap a clear path toward management for a more precarious set of workplace protections. See Ruth Gomberg-Muñoz, Labor and Legality: An Ethnography of a Mexican Immigrant Network 69 (2011) (quoting from an interview with an undocumented worker who says that “[i]t’s just the whole point that you have no papers and they can fire you at any minute”); Shannon Gleeson, Labor Rights for All? The Role of Undocumented Immigrant Status for Worker Claims Making, 35 Law & Soc. Inquiry 561, 581–86 (2010) (discussing interviews with undocumented workers who describe constant fear of management and frequent difficulty obtaining privileges normally available to employees).
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agencies at the border are routinely upheld by courts. By way of example, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) empowers the Secretary of Homeland Security to build a physical barrier at or near the U.S. border. Ordinarily, as a matter of environmental policy, when an agency wants to take action, it must first assess any potential environmental consequences of that proposed action. But the IIRIRA allows the DHS to opt out of this process empowering the Homeland Security Secretary to waive certain legal requirements that the Secretary deems “necessary to ensure expeditious construction.” This is precisely what the DHS did in September 2017, when it began identifying stretches of land covering the U.S.–Mexico border for infrastructural improvement. Environmental protection groups challenged the agency’s use of this waiver and lost on appeal in the Ninth Circuit. This both reflects the idea that it is perfectly constitutional for Congress to delegate broad authority to unelected officials in making policy and also evinces the reality that the federal government’s power to regulate migration is at its zenith at the border and ports of entry—which may be why federal officials felt so confident that its zero tolerance policy would withstand challenge and experienced surprise when it was invalidated. The counterexample of the construction of a barrier at the border also tends to affirm the power that the family separation frame offers given that it is one of the few times a judicial challenge was able to defeat executive prerogative in this context.

Indeed, border enforcement is one area where the political branches have found a consistent degree of agreement. Congress and the President have steadily poured resources into border enforcement policy
with the hopes of deterring surreptitious entries and future unauthorized migration generally.\textsuperscript{161} Thus, while circular migration remains the preference among unauthorized migrants, the intensification of border enforcement ultimately dissuades those migrants from returning to their home countries for fear of the costs associated with reentering the United States down the road.\textsuperscript{162} Taken together, interior and border enforcement strategies work to create oppressive conditions that achieve a degree of ordinariness in the lives of migrants.\textsuperscript{163}

One response might be that these policies haven’t been punitive enough. Some might argue that a knock at the door by the police, or for that matter, threats by landlords and other private actors to call ICE,\textsuperscript{164} would do more to scare migrants out of the country than a letter from a government accountant.\textsuperscript{165} This is how some justified the use of zero tolerance enforcement policies as a means for deterring migrants from undertaking the journey in the first place thereby realizing the goals of compliance while avoiding the human costs that come with deportation once families have developed ties to the United States. From this perspective, the solution is a matter of wattage: Increase the energy we pour into this endeavor, and a depletion of the migrant population will follow.

But increases in enforcement resources have not yielded positive results for the regulatory goal of shrinking the pool of unauthorized migrants. The last several decades have shown that interior enforcement strategies have created only a modest benefit in terms of decreasing the

\textsuperscript{161} See Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law, 2 U.C. Irvine L. Rev. 1, 7 (2012) [hereinafter Cuéllar, Political Economies] (describing how “the institutional realities of modern immigration law have served up a constant ratcheting up of border security resources”).

\textsuperscript{162} See id. at 72 (“[T]he border buildup appears to have dramatically changed migrants’ willingness to attempt returning to Mexico as part of a pattern of circular migration.”).


\textsuperscript{164} Park, Self-Deportation Nation, supra note 17, at 1932–33 (explaining “self-deportation” policies, which encourage private citizens to behave hostilely to undocumented migrants to encourage them to leave the United States).

\textsuperscript{165} Those making this argument might point to statistical data suggesting that while the unauthorized migrant population has remained mostly stable, there has been a slight but noticeable decline from its peak of 12.2 million in 2007. See Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, U.S. Unauthorized Immigrant Total Dips to Lowest Level in a Decade, Pew Research Ctr. (Nov. 27, 2018), http://www.pewhispanic.org/2018/11/27/us-unauthorized-immigrant-total-dips-to-lowest-level-in-a-decade/ [https://perma.cc/Y5P9-Y8UR].
unauthorized immigrant population.\textsuperscript{166} Despite considerable efforts to remove unauthorized migrants, the unauthorized population remains fairly stable at roughly 10.5 million.\textsuperscript{167} The impact of these policies has not been to compel migrants to leave but simply to generate suffering within the interior of the United States.\textsuperscript{168} These efforts have been costly.\textsuperscript{169} President Obama was labeled by some as the “deporter in chief” given the number of immigrants DHS removed under his leadership.\textsuperscript{170} But despite the focused attention removal has received in the last ten years, the unauthorized population has declined only modestly.\textsuperscript{171}

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\textsuperscript{166} The primary impact of more than three decades of workplace enforcement policies have not pushed immigrants out of the country so much as they have pushed them out of the formal economy and into the informal one. See supra notes 146–154 and accompanying text; see also Hernan Ramirez & Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, Mexican Immigrant Gardeners: Entrepreneurs or Exploited Workers?, 56 Soc. Probs. 70, 70 (2009) (“Concentrated numbers ofLatin[x] immigrant workers are now working in unregulated, informal economy jobs in U.S. suburbs and cities.” (citation omitted)). Whether employers pay workers through the modern economic machinery of banking and automatic payments or through the premodern vestiges of a cash economy, immigrants continue to plant roots in the United States and engage in productive behavior. See, e.g., id. (“Throughout the twentieth century and into the present era, Latin[x], and particularly Mexican immigrant gardeners, have transformed the landscape of Los Angeles, enabling the lush, leafy, suburban visual character of the city and surrounding areas.”).
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\textsuperscript{167} See Jens Manuel Krogstad, Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, 5 Facts About Illegal Immigration in the U.S., Pew Research Ctr. (June 12, 2019), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/11/28/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-in-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/H9FN-8AWB]. This includes both those migrants who were admitted and inspected at a port of entry and who overstayed their visas as well as those who crossed the border surreptitiously. The population of migrants who are removable includes migrants in this pool as well as those with some form of lawful status but who committed some kind of post-entry conduct (like criminal activity) rendering them removable.
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\textsuperscript{168} The Pew Research Center did note that the unauthorized population has declined since its peak at 12.2 million in 2007. Id. But even with this decline, the unauthorized population has shown remarkable consistency over the last ten years. See id. (finding that the number of unauthorized immigrants in the United States had declined from 12.2 million in 2007 to 10.5 million in 2017).
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\textsuperscript{170} See Muzaffar Chishti, Sarah Pierce & Jessica Bolter, The Obama Record on Deportations: Deporter in Chief or Not?, Migration Policy Inst. (Jan. 26, 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/obama-record-deportations-deporter-chief-or-not [https://perma.cc/BD7E-B5B] (noting that critics within both the immigrants’ rights community and anti-immigration community were unhappy with President Obama’s immigration policies).
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All of this means that many unauthorized migrants are stuck here. In most cases, they are unable to change or adjust their status through family-based petitions because of lengthy wait times. And their lives, while difficult, seem better compared to the possibility of leaving the United States without a meaningful way back. For many unauthorized migrants, the realities of being stuck are so severe that the fantasy of a green card focuses not on the formal recognition of belonging but rather the instrumental value of having the freedom to move across boundaries. Like those noncitizens subject to the travel ban, unauthorized migrants must routinely forego opportunities to reaffirm their affinity bonds with loved ones in their home countries.

In a world where families opt to have some members migrate to the United States to provide financial support for those left behind, U.S. enforcement strategies in the interior and at the border effectively prolong family separation. This is consistent with statistical data that suggests that the percentage of long-term residents within the pool of unauthorized migrants has steadily grown over the last fifteen years. Around sixty percent of the unauthorized population has resided in the United States for at least ten years. Thus, enforcement policies will continue to play an outsized influence in the lives of migrants so long as opportunities to regularize status remain scarce. In the meantime, long-

remained relatively constant in recent years). Another study suggested that the unauthorized migrant population in 2016 was estimated to be 16.7 million. See Mohammed M. Fazel-Zarandi, Jonathan S. Feinstein & Edward H. Kaplan, The Number of Undocumented Immigrants in the United States: Estimates Based on Demographic Modeling with Data from 1990 to 2016, PLoS ONE, Sept. 21, 2018, at 1, 2. For skepticism on these findings, see Randy Capps, Julia Gelatt, Jennifer Van Hook & Michael Fix, Commentary on “The Number of Undocumented Immigrants in the United States: Estimates Based on Demographic Modeling with Data from 1990-2016,” PLoS ONE, Sept. 21, 2018, at 1, 2.

172. See Park, Self-Deportation Nation, supra note 17, at 1937 (“The more dangerous, economically difficult, and insupportable life elsewhere remains, the less likely people will be to self-deport, and the more likely it is that the policy’s effects will stop at its mechanism—subordination.”).

173. See Jennifer M. Chacón, Citizenship Matters: Conceptualizing Belonging in an Era of Fragile Inclusions, 52 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1, 29–33 (2018) [hereinafter Chacón, Citizenship Matters] (“Many respondents suggested that one of the most troubling dimensions of their unauthorized status was their inability to travel to their country of origin to visit family members or dying loved ones.”).


term unauthorized residents will continue waiting for a green card that is not yet available and perhaps never will be. So long as this remains the case, these migrants neither have the opportunity to bring family members to the United States nor will be able to afford the costs and dangers of visiting family in sending countries.\(^{176}\)

Despite the increased allocation of resources into border enforcement, federal agencies have tried to accommodate limited forms of departure and re-entry in other, limited ways. The clearest example followed from the DACA program. DACA did not confer lawful status, offering instead temporary “de-prioritization” statuses renewable on a two-year basis. This arrangement left DACA beneficiaries in a state of long-term uncertainty or liminality.\(^{177}\) Many DACA beneficiaries, like other immigrants, have family members in sending countries but feared visiting them because doing so could potentially mean being unable to return. To accommodate this concern, the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) permitted DACA beneficiaries to apply for advance parole, a sort of travel certificate allowing them to be admitted back into the United States despite their otherwise tenuous legal status.\(^{178}\) USCIS considered applications and would grant them on a limited number of bases including for humanitarian reasons related to ailing or deceased family members.\(^{179}\) While providing a tremendous benefit for DACA beneficiaries, such a regulatory approach created uncertainty in that such applications were adjudicated on a case-by-case basis.\(^{180}\)

While advance parole created a kind of equitable benefit for DACA beneficiaries, the program also typified the nature of relief in an era of immigration hyper-enforcement in which such programs exist at the pleasure of the Executive, as evidenced by the USCIS’s rescission of the program under President Trump.\(^{181}\) This provides important context for

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176. A similar dynamic operates in the domestic penological context. Family members of the incarcerated often live a great distance from prisons, creating obstacles and costs for families interested in visiting loved ones in prison. See Megan Comfort, Tasseli McKay, Justin Landwehr, Erin Kennedy, Christine Lindquist & Anupa Bir, The Costs of Incarceration for Families of Prisoners, 98 Int’l Rev. Red Cross 783, 795 (2016). In some ways, the burden runs the opposite direction in the migration context. The family stays put in the sending country while the migrants leave for the United States.


179. See id. (explaining, at question fifty-seven, the circumstances in which parole might be granted).

180. Id.

181. See Kate Linthicum, Another Thing Trump Stripped from ‘Dreamers’: A Loophole that Helped 40,000 of Them Get Green Cards, L.A. Times (Sept. 7, 2017),
agency actions undertaken during the Trump Administration, which have eliminated the few opportunities for movement by unauthorized migrants and have intensified the problem of being marooned. President Trump has continued the Obama-era DHS policy of focusing on the removal of “criminal aliens,” but parts ways by broadening the types of immigrants who might be deemed a high priority.

C. Left Out (Adjustment of Status)

Limited and discriminatory admissions opportunities prevent migrants from being reunited with their family members in the United States, while punitive and far-reaching enforcement policies restrict the ability of migrants to visit or be visited by their family members who remain in sending countries. While these two dynamics do a lot to explain the prolonged state of isolation in immigrant communities, a third dynamic helps round out the picture. One of the reasons citizenship and lawful permanent resident (LPR) status are so important to migrants is the chance they offer to reconcile the tension between a commitment to life in the United States for reasons of economic necessity and a desire to remain connected to family members spread across the globe. Again, while many unauthorized migrants might dream about citizenship for affective and emotional reasons of feeling accepted by the law, many also crave the more pragmatic benefits of freedom of movement. A key legal device for achieving this is adjustment of status, which refers to the process by which noncitizens can obtain or change their immigration status. A core benefit of adjustment of status rules is


183. See id. §§ 5(a)–(b), at 8800 (including additional categories of individuals to consider high priority). For example, Executive Order 13,768 instructs DHS officers to prioritize those who have been “convicted” of or “charged” with “any criminal offense;” have “committed acts that constitute a chargeable criminal offense;” or anyone who “[i]n the judgment of an immigration officer, otherwise pose[s] a risk to public safety or national security.” Id. §§ 5(a)–(c), (g), at 8800. For a more detailed comparison of the Obama and Trump Administrations’ immigration enforcement priorities, see generally Lazaro Zamora, Comparing Trump and Obama’s Deportation Priorities, Bipartisan Policy Ctr. (Feb. 27, 2017), https://bipartisanpolicy.org/blog/comparing-trump-and-obamas-deportation-priorities/ [https://perma.cc/7X9N-LJTF].


that they unburden the noncitizen of having to apply for a status change at overseas embassies, which is the default process for doing so.  

The adjustment of status process is relatively straightforward for those who are in the United States on temporary visas and still within status. But for those who have long been out of status—which is the majority of unauthorized migrants—the process can pose serious complications or simply exclude them altogether. Adjustment of status allows unauthorized migrants to circumvent adverse immigration consequences that are triggered once a noncitizen leaves and attempts to be admitted (or in this case, readmitted) into the United States. Under the immigration code’s enforcement provisions, unauthorized migrants are barred from seeking entry for a period of three or ten years depending on the duration of unlawful presence. The immigration code provides a workaround to this dilemma. Because the “3/10 year bar” is triggered only at the point of entry, a noncitizen who never leaves the country never has to seek readmission.

Adjustment of status covers many situations in which a noncitizen can obtain a more permanent form of lawful status, but perhaps the most well-known situation is the noncitizen attempting to secure a green card through marriage. In this scenario, adjustment of status allows many unauthorized immigrants to avoid a difficult choice: Either move overseas with their citizen spouse and wait out the three- or ten-year penalty or remain in the United States married but without the immigration benefits marriage typically confers. The 3/10-year bar perversely penalizes the noncitizen precisely at the moment when their ties to the United States are greatest. In other words, the adjustment of status helps to avoid or mitigate the harms of family separation by allowing a newly formed transnational family to continue building a new life in the United States without interruption. The immigration code effectively waives the cost of travel and time away from the United States, which is the default procedure, provided the basis for adjustment of status is marriage to a citizen.


188. See id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I)–(II).

189. See id. § 1255.

190. See David A. Martin, Waiting for Solutions, 24 Legal Times (May 28, 2001) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“The bars carry real consequences only when individual aliens are finally poised for immigration benefits. At that point, they invariably have U.S. citizens or permanent residents deeply invested in their staying. It is exactly the moment when enforcement will seem maximally cruel and controversial.”).
The family separation arising within the context of adjustment of status is different than the kind that is embedded within admissions and enforcement policy. The uneven distribution of adjustment of status opportunities does not lead to the physical separation of family members. Rather, the separation is one measured in terms of status differentials. It concerns U.S. citizens who are empowered to sponsor spouses for green cards, but only if they are willing to leave the United States for three or ten years first. In this context, family separation is about the failure—or refusal—of law to deliver the good life that marriage promises. This benefit is mostly limited to those who have been “inspected and admitted or paroled into the United States.” In other words, the procedural route of adjustment of status is limited to those migrants whose lack of authorization stems from a visa overstay, not a surreptitious border entry.

On its face, the visa overstay–surreptitious entry distinction is a neutral basis for allocating adjustment of status benefits. But in this context, facial neutrality hides the deeply inegalitarian consequences of this design choice. A snapshot of the unauthorized immigrant population shows that it is comprised of both those who have entered the United States lawfully but have overstayed or violated the terms of a temporary visa, like one that is issued to tourists or students, as well as those who have effectuated a surreptitious entry across a border. And while exact figures remain elusive, rough estimates suggest that the overstay pool represents a significant portion of the entire unauthorized pool. Over the years, the stream of overstayers has increased while the

191. “Why do people stay attached to conventional good-life fantasies—say, of enduring reciprocity in couples, families, political systems, institutions, markets, and at work—when the evidence of their instability, fragility, and dear cost abounds?” Berlant, Cruel Optimism, supra note 25, at 2.

192. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a). For a period of years, Congress opened up the adjustment of status benefit to those whose lack of status was on account of a surreptitious border entry, but it has since allowed that benefit to lapse. See id. § 1255(i) (allowing those who were in the United States without authorization to adjust their status despite their initial surreptitious entry into the United States).

193. See Spade, supra note 57, at 9–10 (noting that “systems that administer life chances through purportedly ‘neutral’ criteria . . . are often locations where racist, sexist, homophobic, ableist, xenophobic, and transphobic outcomes are produced”).

194. See Robert Warren, US Undocumented Population Continued to Fall from 2016 to 2017, and Visa Overstays Significantly Exceeded Illegal Crossings for the Seventh Consecutive Year, Ctr. for Migration Studies (Jan. 16, 2019), https://cmsny.org/publications/essay-2017-undocumented-and-overstays/ [https://perma.cc/FXZ5-G4C] (“Of the estimated 515,000 [unauthorized] arrivals in 2016, a total of 320,000, or 62 percent, were overstays and 190,000, or 38 percent, were [those who entered without inspection].”).

195. See Robert Warren & Donald Kerwin, The 2,000 Mile Wall in Search of a Purpose: Since 2007 Visa Overstays Have Outnumbered Unauthorized Border Crossers by a Half Million, 3 J. on Migration & Hum. Security 124, 130–31 (2017) (estimating that in 2014, the overstay pool constituted 42% of the undocumented population residing in the U.S.); Neil G. Ruiz, Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, Higher Share of Students than
stream of border crossers, or entries without inspection (EWIs) has diminished.196

Importantly, these groups break down along specific racial and ethnic lines. The racial groups with the largest unauthorized migrant populations identify as Asian Pacific American (APA) or as Latinx.197 The vast majority of unauthorized APAs are visa overstayers. Most unauthorized APAs presumably travel to the United States directly from Asia, which explains this data point.198 By contrast, the unauthorized Latinx migrant population reflects more of a mix between visa overstayers and border crossers, which means by extension that the vast majority of border crossers identify as Latinx. In concrete terms, this difference in status means that adjustment of status through marriage remains a viable downstream option for most unauthorized APAs while the unauthorized Latinx experience reflects greater unevenness in terms of the ability to capitalize on similar legal benefits.

This legal distinction, combined with other enforcement practices, contributes to the racialization of Latinxs as outsiders in the context of immigration.199 Legal scholars have focused on how various immigration enforcement programs 200 as well as criminal procedure doctrine 201

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196. See Warren, supra note 194.
199. See Jennifer M. Chacón & Susan Bibler Coutin, Racialization Through Enforcement, in Race, Criminal Justice, and Migration Control: Enforcing the Boundaries of Belonging 159, 168–69 (Mary Bosworth, Alpa Parmar & Yolanda Vazquez eds., 2018) (describing how enforcement decisions have led to the construction of Latinx identity).
contributes to the racialization of Latinxs. Disparate opportunities to adjust status show that immigration benefits programs also contribute to this racialization project. Of course, as a historical matter, immigration law has played a central part in racializing Asian Americans202 and Black Americans203 as well. But to the extent that the law continues to racialize those groups, such racialization largely operates outside of the context of adjustment of status on the basis of spousal visas.

More generally, it is important to remember that marriage is having a moment in the United States right now. There is now a constitutional right to same-sex marriage.204 Yet, despite this affirmation of marriage as a life-enhancing commitment, the full benefits of this institution remain out of reach for many unauthorized migrants. It shows that “life building” exercises can also “wear people down.”205 Thus, adjustment of status laws not only exclude migrants precisely at the moment that their commitment to the United States is greatest, but they also ensure that the act of committing oneself to married life with a U.S. citizen will inevitably lead to diminishment.206 For those whose lives in the United States can be traced to a surreptitious entry, marriage will not offer the same degree of belonging.


202. See Lim, supra note 198, at 9 (noting that “U.S. immigration law has racially constructed Asian Americans as ‘perpetual foreigners’”); Leti Volpp, The Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 1575, 1576–86 & n.2 (2002) (describing how immigration law facilitates racial profiling, which in turn contributes to the racialization of “persons who appear ‘Middle Eastern, Arab, or Muslim,’” a category that includes South Asians).

203. See Eleanor Marie Lawrence Brown, The Blacks Who “Got Their Forty Acres”: A Theory of Black West Indian Migrant Asset Acquisition, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 27, 36–45 (2014) (discussing how restrictions on Black migration have led to particular perceptions of Black migrants); Devon W. Carbado, Racial Naturalization, 57 Am. Q. 633, 637 (2005) (discussing how “the law has structured . . . the racial terms of . . . naturalization”).


[As workers do what they need to do to live, to pursue their desires, their American Dreams, they simultaneously undermine their own lives. Immigrants who come to the US seeking work, money to send home to families, to provide a better life for their kids, subject themselves to the simultaneous attrition of their own lives, health, and well-being. Usually, capitalists deny the attrition side of the dialectic; but here there is no pretense that the lives of those subject to attrition are valued and thus attrition can be an explicit strategy.

Id.

206. See Martin, supra note 190.
D. *Helpless (Remittances)*

A final example of how the law can foment slow death in immigrant communities is the regulatory structure surrounding remittance channels. Remittances are wages or earnings sent overseas from the United States. Remittances are closely tied to immigrant communities because migrants frequently remit wages to loved ones living outside of the United States. The remittances help with child support, buy basic personal and household items, serve as seed money for new businesses, and sometimes enable upward mobility. This is a key part of the story surrounding the “transnationalization” of families. For a migrant population that remains physically cut off from their relatives in sending countries, remittances offer the foreign-born population in the United States a way to stay connected to members of their family. In the context of remittances, family separation is measured, not in terms of geographic distance (as is often the case in admissions) nor in terms of nonrecognition (as is the case with surreptitious entrants for adjustment of status purposes). Rather, family separation in this context is about

207. See Ezra Rosser, Immigrant Remittances, 41 Conn. L. Rev. 1, 3 (2008) (describing the function of remittances and their role as a potential tool to alleviate poverty). For a discussion of the economic effects of remittances, see generally Charles B. Keely & Bao Nga Tran, Remittances from Labor Migration: Evaluations, Performance and Implications, 23 Int’l Migration Rev. 500 (1989) (finding that labor supply data from Europe and the Middle East do not demonstrate increased dependence, instability, or economic decline from remittances).


213. See Dreby, Honor and Virtue, supra note 143, at 45 (explaining that the most common Mexican transnational family is really a separated one, in which the father is often the one to immigrate to the United States, remit money to their loved ones, and occasionally make return visits).
having the financial means to support family members subject to unreviewable exercises of discretion to advance national security goals. Central to this account is the insight that remittances are economic expressions of affinity. In the same way that many Americans consider saving for their children’s college tuition or paying for their parents’ end-of-life hospice care to be acts of love, the act of wiring money to those residing in sending countries moves over the same type of emotional landscape.214

Remittances are heavily impacted by anti-money laundering laws.215 In important ways, the impact that such laws have on the remittance economy parallels, in design and effect, the impact of interior and border enforcement policies on the ability of migrants to be physically reunited with their families. Anti-money laundering laws aim to disrupt the financing of criminal and terrorist activity216 by enlisting the help of banks, which are required to create and maintain a program for identifying economic transactions to further law enforcement and other crime-fighting objectives.217 These “know your customer” schemes put pressure on financial institutions to take broader goals of public safety and integrity seriously by making it harder for criminals and terrorists to shuffle around ill-gotten profits anonymously or through false identities.

As is true in the immigration context, some of the broadest delegations of authority to the Treasury Secretary in the anti-money

214. See Hung Cam Thai, Insufficient Funds: The Culture of Money in Low-Wage Transnational Families 33 (2014) (noting that “economic distribution within the transnational family is a crucial, if not the most important, measuring stick for conferring affection and emotional depths”); Leah Schmalzbauer, Searching for Wages and Mothering from Afar: The Case of Honduran Transnational Families, 66 J. Marriage & Fam. 1317, 1325–28 (2004) (noting that many Honduran migrants “believe that sending what they can to family and sacrificing in order to keep family and kin well is the ‘right thing to do,’ and ‘the only way para seguir adelante, to move ahead’”).


217. See 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (2010) (setting out reporting obligations by financial institutions for transactions greater than $10,000); 31 C.F.R. § 1020.220 (2018) (requiring banks and other financial institutions to gather customer information).
laundering context stem from the Patriot Act. Across contexts, concerns with terrorism animate policies governing the interior, the border, and our banks. Regulators in these parallel fields even employ identical vocabulary. The Treasury Secretary can exercise their broad authority to shut down remittance corridors to fight overseas terrorism.

To be clear, remitters reflect a diverse cross section of immigration and citizenship statuses. Citizens and green card holders as well as temporary and unauthorized migrants all participate in and bolster the remittance economy. So the slow death harms generated by the enforcement of these laws can be experienced differently across statuses. Those who have the legal sanction and financial means to come and go from the United States (as U.S. citizens and green card holders typically do) won’t be impacted the same way as those who are marooned here (as temporary and unauthorized migrants usually are). Still, legal status and resource differentials do not completely immunize these migrants against the helplessness that the enforcement of these laws can create. Two types of broader considerations can affect remitters irrespective of personal resources.

One is the basic infrastructure and remittance-distribution channels in the receiving country. Consider this example: Concerned with terrorist groups like al-Shabab, the Treasury Department during the Obama Administration issued cease and desist letters to U.S. banks facilitating the transfer of cash to Somalian customers. Thus, Somali migrant-serving money transmitters, which gathered and bundled remittances, increasingly


219. Just as advocates for partnerships with local law enforcement agencies use the language of force multiplication, financial regulators in this context use similar language and logic of partnerships and collaboration. As one regulator observed:

So, even in this new era of terrorist financing, banks must continue to be vigilant partners in protecting the global financial system from being infiltrated by terrorist groups and their facilitators. They can and must continue to be force multipliers, including by helping us as we work to identify new typologies of abuse, sharing that knowledge with their colleagues and the government, and implementing effective risk management strategies to address current and forthcoming terrorist financing threats.


220. See id.

struggled to find banks to facilitate international money transfers. And as more and more banks refused to wire money to Somalia, the remittance flow to Somalia dried up leaving remitters with only costly transfer channels such as paying couriers to physically carry cash into the country.

Many Somali migrants and their advocates opposed this policy, pointing to the widespread poverty of that nation. Moreover, while money laundering unfolds through informal channels, the informality of an economic transaction doesn’t always stand as proxy data for criminal behavior. Many countries rely on informal economic relationships grounded not in Anglo American principles of offer and acceptance but rather by a commitment to a principle of reciprocity and clan affiliation. These sorts of transactions are unregulated by law and therefore tend to lack formal enforcement mechanisms. This is consistent with the critique that, more than anything, “anti-money laundering laws turn some innocent conduct into guilty conduct, allowing prosecutors to have more tools with which to secure convictions.” The relevant economic unit for many immigrants is the family rather than the individual. A common assumption is that an individual immigrant’s lawful status correlates to the family’s economic security. But the Somali example shows how

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224. By some estimates, 40% of the Somali population relies on remittances to meet basic needs such as food and shelter. See Katy Migiro, Somalis Panic as Cash Flow Dries Up After U.S. Remittance Lifeline Cut, Reuters (Feb. 19, 2015), http://news.trust.org/item/20150219075507-ve4r8/ [https://perma.cc/8XBB-CL42]. Critics of this policy have argued that regulators have things backward: Remittances, they argue, are all that stand between impoverished family members and the swift fall toward recruitment into terrorist activities. See Keith Ellison, Opinion, Don’t Block Remittances to Somalia, N.Y. Times (Apr. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/11/opinion/dont-block-remittances-to-somalia.html [https://perma.cc/CR42-ZEQB].

225. See, e.g., Menjívar et al., supra note 209, at 98 (noting that for Filipino immigrants, “the decision to remit... [does] not take place in a social vacuum, as social ties bind immigrants with relatives back home into relations of trust and mutual obligation”); Bernard Poirine, A Theory of Remittances as an Implicit Family Loan Arrangement, 25 World Dev. 589, 606 (1997) (concluding that implicit loan theory best explains South Pacific migrants’ remittance behaviors); Khalid M. Medani, Financing Terrorism or Survival? Informal Finance and State Collapse in Somalia, and the US War on Terrorism, Middle E. Rep., Summer 2002, at 2, 6 (“While hawwalat transfers are not regulated by formal institutions, they are regulated by norms of reciprocity embedded in sub-clan affiliation and familial relations.”).

226. These transactions usually transpire on an intraclan basis, which is why some scholars argue that, should a broker in Somalia ever fail to do right by his broker counterpart in the United States, law is beside the point. Interest in maintaining standing and authority within the clan will do much of the work we typically expect the law to do. See Medani, supra note 225, at 6.

transnational realities and broader enforcement powers in the anti-terrorism context can complicate this narrative.

A second dynamic that can render migrants helpless is broader shifts in political climate. Anti-money laundering laws cast a shadow over the U.S.–Mexico remittance corridor, which is the largest remittance flow streaming out of the United States. In his search to make good on his campaign promise to build a wall at the U.S.–Mexico border, President Trump outlined a plan to curtail access to the transnational remittances market for Mexican migrants. This plan involved traditional immigration enforcement measures like increasing visa fees and cancelling visas outright, but it also involved a proposed expansion to the regulation of banking services. Focusing on statutory authority to compel financial institutions like banks to reveal the identities of their customers, then-candidate Donald Trump promised to expand this “know-your-client” rule to money transfer services like Western Union to exclude unauthorized workers from international transfer services, a key part of the infrastructure supporting the remittances economy.

III. CRISIS ON A CONTINUUM

In this Part, I revisit the example of family separation at the border. Here, I show how the slow death framework helps explain the parameters defining the legal and political discourse on this topic. Concepts tied to crises, choice, and flourishing all help explain the justifications immigration officials have offered and arguments that advocates have deployed. They all reflect examples of stories organized around acts of spectacular violence, which helps to focus the public’s attention on the harms caused by the Trump Administration’s zero tolerance policy. At the same time, these exchanges have obfuscated the broader structural reasons that generate migration to the United States. While these narrative choices are understandable and laudable, they fail to capture the ordinary and
routine acts of family separation exacted upon immigrants standing just beyond the reach of the border.

A. Crisis as a Weapon

The example of forcible separation at the border illustrates the importance of crisis narratives to generating political momentum. The slow death framework suggests that forcible separation is an act of violence, sharp and disorienting. But even with the formal end to the policy of forcibly separating families at the border, both advocates and government officials continue to shape discussions around border enforcement in terms of crises. In this way, crises are malleable and can operate as weapons within highly contested political exchanges.

The “crisis” that unfolded at the U.S.–Mexico border during the summer of 2018 was about federal detention policy—specifically about whether and to what extent the government has to show that a parent is “unfit” before separating that parent from their child.232 This is the key finding that justifies the separation and allows the government to characterize and charge adult arrivals as smugglers.233 In the lawsuit challenging this practice, detainees argue, among other things, that the government never made the requisite finding justifying the separation.234 This type of “spectacular” harm naturally and easily invites public outrage. Crafting a “crisis” narrative is central to the work that advocates do. Lawyers, in particular, must draw a court’s limited attention to critical or dispositive facts that fit within preexisting legal scripts and that permit sympathetic judges to minimize inconvenient facts.

Family separation provides a compelling frame for blunting the force of government overreach. For many advocates, the key to prevailing is constructing a disaster that highlights the harms that plaintiffs, like immigrant detainees, experience on account of some set of bad actors far removed from the site of disaster, such as President Trump and his

232. See Ms. L. v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1161–67 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (discussing whether due process rights are violated when the government separates families without a showing that the parents are unfit).


234. In her complaint, Ms. L. alleged that she was separated from her child without “a finding (or even any accusation) that Ms. L. was abusing or neglecting S.S., or that she is an unfit parent.” Complaint at 2, Ms. L., 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149 (No. 18CV0428 DMS MDD), 2018 WL 1310160.
political proxies in Washington, D.C. For example, Michele Landis (now Dauber) explains that the key to developing plausible claims for relief from disaster is to draw a causal connection between the event and some remote actor. Otherwise, claimants run the risk of carrying the blame themselves. As she observes:

It is not enough to identify a need or loss. In fact, the loss is always a potential embarrassment to a claim, because it is necessarily closely linked to the victim. The most easily available candidate for blame, after all, is the claimant himself or herself, who can too easily slip from victim to malfeasor.

Dauber expresses some ambivalence toward claims rooted in disaster narratives, and the example of family separation intimates why this is so. Much of judge-made law in this arena is so deferential to executive and agency discretion that courts must rely on the finest of distinctions—that adult migrants were detained with their children—in order to justify an intervention. But entire communities stricken by family separation remain hidden within those distinctions.

Consider the district court’s decision in Ms. L. to sustain the challenge to the government’s policy of separating migrants from their children at the border. In denying the government’s motion to dismiss the claim, the district court focused on the timing of the separation to distinguish the current family separation from other examples. The government relied on Aguilar v. ICE, a circuit decision in which detained migrants argued that their separation from their children violated their substantive due process rights to family integrity. That case involved migrants who were identified, apprehended, and detained during a worksite raid. The district court in Ms. L. observed: “However, unlike Plaintiffs in this case, none of the plaintiffs in Aguilar were detained with their children. Instead, the plaintiffs in Aguilar appear to have been detained at the worksite while their children were elsewhere in the community.” This exemplifies the slow death critique: The ability to state a legally cognizable claim for family separation is tied to the timing of the detention. The focus is on whether or not the state was the “but for” cause of the separation. But if our concern is protecting individuals against the harms of familial disintegration, this kind of narrow focus leaves many families beyond the reach of the law. A migrant parent who

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236. Id.
237. See Dauber, supra note 32, at 225 (“For disaster victims it is enough to show blameless loss; for others, it is not enough even to show great need if blamelessness is in question.”).
238. See Ms. L., 302 F. Supp. 3d at 1160–67.
239. See id.
240. 510 F.3d 1, 18–19 (1st Cir. 2007).
is at work without their children may be detained immediately, even if the consequence is for children to fend for themselves at home, at school, and through the various legal proceedings that are triggered by enforcement proceedings against a parent.242

For the government, the border also represents a crisis, but one that stems from insufficient resources to carry out its ambitious enforcement strategy. Many political appointees and elected officials blame Congress for the crisis, pointing to its refusal to allocate enough funding to support the transfer of migrants into long-term ICE detention. 243 Conceding that the current conditions are “risking the lives of children every day,” former Acting Homeland Security Secretary Kevin McAleenan reframed the enforcement challenges in terms of public safety: “To address this crisis, Mexico must take significant action to secure their southern border, stop the unlawful flow of migrants across their territory, and attack the criminal groups preying on vulnerable migrants and profiting from these smuggling enterprises.”244

Again, the use of crisis as a descriptor is telling. As Berlant explains:

Often when scholars and activists apprehend the phenomenon of slow death in long-term conditions of privation they choose to misrepresent the duration and scale of the situation by calling a crisis that which is a fact of life and has been a defining


fact of life for a given population that lives it as a fact in ordinary time.245

Shaping events in terms of crises serves the interests of advocates. As Berlant continues:

[The] deployment of crisis is often explicitly and intentionally a redefinitional tactic, a distorting or misleading gesture that aspires to make an environmental phenomenon appear suddenly as an event because as a structural or predictable condition it has not engendered the kinds of historic action we associate with the heroic agency a crisis seems already to have called for.246

Baselines matter for evaluating the scope of harm wrought by family separation. President Trump has brought a formal end to the zero tolerance policy.247 But even assuming that children can be reunited with their parents—a policy outcome that appears doubtful248—as I explained earlier, immigration law’s infrastructure will continue to thwart the ability of families to remain together. Commenting on the state of unauthorized migration generally, Cecilia Menjívar and Leisy Abrego explain that “the definition of a successful migration today, compared to 15 years ago, has been reduced to simply surviving the trip.”249 In other words, the problem is that de-escalating a crisis to achieve normal conditions ignores the harsh realities of the new “normal.” The law cannot repair all of the harm that has already been exacted upon these families. This is precisely the point that members of the American Psychological Association emphasized in imploring President Trump to abandon his mandatory separation policy at the border: The migrants who experienced family separation at the border are likely to experience long-lasting trauma, anxiety, and depression.250

With formal family separation at an end, advocates have moved their attention to the generally deplorable conditions of the immigrant detention system near the border. By design, the Border Patrol is

245. Berlant, Slow Death, supra note 18, at 760.
246. Id.
249. See Menjívar & Abrego, supra note 58, at 1381.
empowered to oversee the short-term detention of migrants apprehended or processed at the border. The responsibility of managing long-term detention belongs to ICE. But with such a large influx of migrant arrests, border facilities have exceeded their capacity, causing dangerous conditions. Both advocates and government officials have framed this in terms of a crisis. A 2019 report produced by the DHS’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) describes in great detail the horrid conditions in which migrants are being detained. All of the Border Patrol’s detention centers reflect conditions of prolonged detention in facilities designed for short-term, temporary stays. According to the report, nearly all detention centers struggle with problems of overcrowding, conditions which were documented in disturbing photographs included in the report. One was of migrants of all ages sitting and lying down with no room to move. This photograph showed migrants using crinkly, reflective solar blankets. The design marvel of these reflective sheets—they can keep astronauts warm in the cold and cool in the heat—shows that agencies can marshal their resources for uplifting and oppressive missions alike. More to the point, migrants, including children, have died under these conditions. Official DHS statistics tally the number of deaths at twelve since the beginning of April 2018, and other sources suggest at least twenty-four deaths since the start of the Trump Administration. At least one of these deaths was by suicide.


253. Id. at 5 fig.3.


Again, advocates and government officials largely agree that existing enforcement realities imperil the lives of migrants, children and adults alike. But treating family separation as a crisis risks missing the harms that are waiting in the immediate future as we pass into a period of postcrisis. Whether we move forward by abating mandatory detention (which advocates demand) or by expanding detention center capacity (which the government prefers), a full and accurate accounting of harms exacted upon migrants is crucial to shaping the scope of relief, be it a court-ordered remedy, statutory enactment, or administrative fix.

B. No Choice but to Migrate

A part of the objection to the punitive nature of the family separations at the border was that these migrants were precisely the wrong type of migrant to penalize. As advocates argued, this is because many of these migrants were fleeing violence and other forms of persecution making them plausibly eligible for asylum or some other form of humanitarian relief. In simpler terms, these people had no choice but to migrate. The political urgency of the “crisis” frame combined with the moral innocence of “asylum seekers” allows advocates to highlight the cruelty of family separation policies. (And the critique is right: The cruelty is the point of the Trump Administration’s immigration policies.) But the machinery that enables cruelty in the form of family separation runs throughout our immigration system. And those types of family separation—of the waiting, marooned, left out, and helpless variety—do not translate so easily into asylum claims.

The content and context of asylum law help explain the broader fixation on choice and individual responsibility. Those defending the interests of migrants often insist that the migrants who are being detained are seeking asylum, which is not a decision to migrate


motivated purely or even partly by a desire for self-enrichment but rather for survival and the right to exist.261 Migrants, these advocates might insist, are being unfairly punished and are entitled to protection for the bad luck of residing in a dangerous place.262 In many ways, then, notions of choice set the parameters of public debate. In the public’s mind, there is a difference between a migrant who effectuates an unauthorized entry into the United States “merely” for the purposes of seeking a better life for their family and a migrant who has fled a country for fear of death and persecution. Many constituencies might bristle at those who are pulled into the United States by a fantasy but relent when those arriving at borders have been pushed by circumstances beyond their control.

The absence of choice is crucial to winning over skeptics who might have a hard time accepting the “slow motion” version of family separation. After all, what stands out in the slow death version of family separation is that migrants have “chosen” to come to the United States and have “chosen” to stay.263 If the pain of separation is truly unbearable, some might argue, then migrants can always return to their countries of origin.264 Just as migrants have chosen to come to the United States, they may choose to leave.265 This type of reasoning—that migrants have “chosen” to come to the United States, thereby assuming the risks of their choice—runs through immigration law debates.266 Asylum law is

261. See Complaint, supra note 234, at 1 (alleging that the plaintiff fled her native country of Congo “fearing near certain death”).
262. In the context of health care policy, Allison Hoffman has called this the “Brute Luck” account of health care. Under this version of health care, insurance policies should cover hereditary diseases or random and unavoidable injuries but not the “harms resulting from an insured’s own acts or choices, such as the costs of setting a broken leg from a rock climbing accident.” See Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1873, 1926 (2011).
263. See E. Tendayi Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 1509, 1512–23 (2019) (arguing that distributive justice demands the admission of third-world “economic migrant[s],” a term “typically reserved for [those] whose movement is popularly and legally understood to be a matter of [choice],” as remediation for “the failures of formal decolonization”).
265. Some, like those in favor of self-deportation policies, might even embrace this position with relish. For a summary of the rise of modern self-deportation policies, see generally Park, Self-Deportation Nation, supra note 17, at 1911–20.
266. In a similar fashion, a migrant’s decision to come to the United States negates and displaces any discussion over whether migrants are coerced into remaining in the United States. A handful of important laws passed pursuant to the Thirteenth Amendment protect migrants against coercion, but obtaining relief under those laws can be difficult and is limited. See Kathleen Kim, Beyond Coercion, 62 UCLA L. Rev. 1558, 1568–69
uniquely designed to get around this, much the way excuse or justification operates in other areas of the law to mitigate or neutralize culpability.

To be clear, as a matter of law, a lack of choice is not enough to secure passage into the United States. Those who are lucky enough to obtain asylum or refugee status comprise only a small fraction of those propelled to the United States under duress. Indeed, the content of asylum law itself has arguably contributed to the chaos. As legal scholar Jaya Ramji-Nogales astutely observes, asylum law, and the broader principle of non-refoulement that it embodies, contributes to the construction of crises within the immigration law context. As she explains, the U.S. immigration system "lures migrants with the promise of lawful status if they can enter territory and prove themselves to be refugees" even while it pours greater resources into "powerful externalized border controls" that increase the dangers of this journey.

As a result, public discourse avoids the harder question of whether categories that were established more than half a century ago are still up to the task of allocating benefits to migrants seeking safe passage into the United States. While Ramji-Nogales questions the continuing relevance of asylum categories, as Part II demonstrates, the relevant categories throughout our immigration system bear the signs of ossification. What the "no choice but to migrate" framing hides is that the choices facing immigrants are bad.

Recent litigation related to the Temporary Protected Status (TPS) program further illustrates the pervasiveness of the "no choice but to migrate" logic in the context of immigration-related disputes. The TPS program offers humanitarian relief akin to asylum—albeit, as the name of the program suggests, on a limited and renewable basis. By statute, the Executive has the authority to grant TPS to migrants who are unable to return to their home countries because some unforeseen set of
circumstances imperils them.\textsuperscript{271} The Executive may revisit TPS designation from time to time to ensure that the underlying circumstances justifying the relief continue to exist.\textsuperscript{272}

In October 2017, then-acting Homeland Security Secretary Elaine Duke began to issue notices of the agency’s intent to terminate TPS designations for a number of countries.\textsuperscript{273} Litigation ensued and a district court enjoined the implementation of this policy.\textsuperscript{274} In doing so, Judge Edward Chen explained:

TPS beneficiaries who have lived, worked, and raised families in the United States (many for more than a decade), will be subject to removal. Many have U.S.-born children; those may be faced with the Hobson’s choice of bringing their children with them (and tearing them away from the only country and community they have known) or splitting their families apart.\textsuperscript{275}

Slow death scholarship encourages a healthy dose of skepticism toward arguments grounded in notions of individual choice, and the examples of border detentions and TPS show why. Focusing on the migrant’s choice to come to the United States and their choice to stay unburdens the state of any responsibility. Indeed, the state appears magnanimous. As anthropologists Ester Hernandez and Susan Bibler Coutin observe, the allure of remittances derives from its ability to allow those within the United States to paint themselves as “benevolent providers of resources” while simultaneously allowing them to “elide their own roles in producing global inequalities in the first place.”\textsuperscript{276} This is how misery and dread become naturalized and how “mistreatment” comes to be treated as “not only possible but uneventful, familiar, and legal.”\textsuperscript{277}

\textsuperscript{271} See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(1). This provision was passed as a part of the Immigration Act of 1990. See Susan Bibler Coutin, Temporary Status Means Permanent Uncertainty: Salvadorans and TPS, Soc. Just. (Feb. 12, 2018), \url{http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/temporary-status-means-permanent-uncertainty/} (“TPS was created through the 1990 Immigration Act as a remedy for foreign nationals who are in the United States when their country experiences a national disaster or political conflict that makes it dangerous for them to return.”); see also Madeline Messick & Claire Bergeron, Temporary Protected Status in the United States: A Grant of Humanitarian Relief that Is Less than Permanent, Migration Policy Inst. (July 2, 2014), \url{https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/temporary-protected-status-united-states-grant-humanitarian-relief-less-permanent} (describing the origins of and current debates about TPS).

\textsuperscript{272} See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a(b)(3).

\textsuperscript{273} The countries include Haiti, Sudan, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1092 (N.D. Cal. 2018).


\textsuperscript{275} Id. at 1089 (emphasis added).

\textsuperscript{276} Hernandez & Coutin, supra note 144, at 201.

\textsuperscript{277} Menjívar & Abrego, supra note 58, at 1414.
Debates about individual culpability and moral hazards offer little, if any, promise to find a way forward. One familiar example is the debate over creating a mass legalization program, which often focuses on how to calibrate benefits in a way that both deters future migration flows and avoids “over-rewarding” those who have already entered the United States by “cutting in line.” This type of debate misses the larger structural elements to migration. The analogy to climate change points to the need for a multinational or global response to migration. Exactly what this response should look like is something that legal scholars have explored in a limited fashion, but again, as Ramji-Nogales brilliantly explains, the existing international law structure that manages the refugee population is hopelessly outdated and in many ways culpable for the modern fixation on emergencies. Characterizing the international legal regime as “a generally fragmented and weak field,” Ramji-Nogales notes, “This awkward structure plays a central role in constructing migration emergencies. Migrants have few options but to take risky journeys to seek asylum inside the borders of destination states, whatever their reason for moving.”

Crisis conditions that leave migrants with no choice but to seek safety in the United States point to the importance of moral innocence and deservingness in remedying harms of family separation. Asylum and TPS both offer varying degrees of legal relief and signify a form of insider or membership status. Moral innocence is central to modern formulas for distributing membership benefits. Critiquing this type of membership, Professor Muneer Ahmad argues: “Echoing the social construction of welfare recipients, this is a pathological understanding of undocumented immigration. Such an ‘individual responsibility’ approach ignores the structural features of migration and unfairly allocates the entirety of the moral burden for undocumented immigration to immigrants themselves.”


279. For two exceptions, see Hiroshi Motomura, The New Migration Law: Migrants, Refugees, and Citizens in an Anxious Age, 105 Cornell L. Rev. (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 4–6) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (laying out a roadmap for an ambitious “reset” of migration law by abandoning the old limitations imposed by a civil rights conception of what the law is supposed to achieve); Ramji-Nogales, supra note 268, at 612–16 (laying out a blueprint for a new immigration legal regime that does not, through its own structure, create the migration crises it is purported to solve).

281. Id. at 644–45.

Michele Dauber’s work on early conceptions of federal benefits and relief programs again helpfully provides broader context: “Ultimately, whether or not an event was a ‘calamity’ deserving of federal intervention turned upon the ability of claimants to argue that they, like those who previously received aid, were innocent victims of fate rather than irresponsible protagonists in their own misery.”283 A similar story might be told about asylum seekers who had no choice but to undertake the journey north.

In sum, the observation that a migrant had no choice but to migrate depends on a threshold construction of crisis. The notion of a crisis belongs in the same universe as terms like “act of God” and “disaster” for their ability to capture terrible events for which no one bears responsibility. Categories of “crisis” and “disaster” are worth studying because, even though they “may at first appear intuitively natural and unproblematic,” those categories reveal “precisely what is at stake in many contests over the allocation of resources.”284 Doing so reveals how the allocation of state benefits has as much, if not more, to do with the framing of state beneficiaries’ circumstances than it does with the circumstances themselves.285

C. Obstacle to Flourishing

So far, I have tried to make the point that the sociolegal frames of “crisis” and “moral innocence” help advocates invalidate family separation policies at the border. They create a sort of “moral punctation” in which an advocate or government actor is able to “[eschew] the delays of political caution and the painstaking work of scientific certainty” in the pursuit of an urgent goal.286 At the same time, these frames make it harder to generate momentum to challenge other types of family separation. Here, let me take seriously the most plausible and legitimate justification for the zero tolerance policy at the border: protecting children against predatory adults.

From the government’s perspective, child smuggling and human trafficking present a legitimate and compelling set of enforcement targets. Some border patrol officials argue that the critiques of family separation sweep too broadly by ignoring those officials who are genuinely interested in protecting children. Defenders of the border patrol emphasize how difficult a task it is to determine a bona fide parent or guardian relationship on the basis of imperfect and fleeting

283. Landis, supra note 235, at 271.
284. Id. at 262.
285. See id.
information such as the verbal and nonverbal cues of children. Against this backdrop, one might argue that the enforcement of anti-smuggling and anti-trafficking laws is a legitimate exercise of power.

In this regard, the zero tolerance policy is an extension of other enforcement programs designed to protect migrant children. The most obvious example of this dynamic is the Special Immigrant Juvenile Status (SIJS) program. Migrant children who cannot be cared for by their parents for personal safety reasons can obtain a green card provided that migrant child forgoes the right to seek to sponsor that parent at some later time. All of this establishes a foundational logic to effectuating the zero tolerance policy at the border. For children seeking refuge in the United States—at least from the perspective of immigration officials sizing up a migrant child's chances—traveling as a family actually hinders a migrant child's chances for a new life in the United States. Indeed, by treating as criminals adults who seek to smuggle children into the United States as cover for entry, immigration officials are interceding on the children's behalf to secure their safe passage into the United States. By enforcing immigration laws at the border in this manner, the government is ostensibly acting on the child's behalf.

What is notable about the Trump Administration's approach to interceding on behalf of children is the extent to which it did so. In Ms. L. v. ICE, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1149, 1163 (S.D. Cal. 2018) (noting the government’s reliance on “cases where interference with the right to family integrity was upheld in furtherance of identified safety or other penological interests”), the government was trying to keep minors safe the way that the state does in criminal settings, such as when the state prevents children from visiting incarcerated parents for safety reasons. See, e.g., Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126, 129, 133 (2003) (holding that restricting a prisoner’s access to nonincarcerated family members in order to protect children against “harmful conduct” does not violate due process and other constitutional rights).
L. v. ICE, the district court enjoined the government’s practice of separating families.\textsuperscript{291} The plaintiffs in that case did not challenge the government’s ability to intercede on behalf of migrant children whose parents were found to be unfit. Rather, their argument focused on the fact that the government had not made the requisite finding of unfitness at all before proceeding to separate families.\textsuperscript{292}

As a reminder, slow death describes the failed pursuit of security, prosperity, and contentment.\textsuperscript{293} This is the promise of the “good life,” or what Berlant calls a form of “cruel optimism.” Berlant’s critical insight is that “cruel optimism exists when something you desire is actually an obstacle to your flourishing.”\textsuperscript{294} A number of programs and policies seek to protect migrant children but do so on an in loco parentis basis. That is, state actors step into a guardian role to confer immigration-related benefits to minors, who must agree to give up any claim or legal relationship to their family. In these arrangements, a migrant minor’s family is treated as an obstacle to that minor’s flourishing.

Consider, again, the SIJS program. In the abstract, the SIJS category reflects a sensible instance of immigration officials intervening on behalf of the child against incompetent, insidious, or injurious parents. In practice, SIJS has been implemented with mixed results. The underlying mechanisms can be overbroad in their exclusionary impact. Moreover, SIJS categorically prevents child beneficiaries from eventually sponsoring any parents even if only one parent was responsible for the abuse of the child, or worse, directed abuse at the child and the other parent.\textsuperscript{295} The program also suffers from screening problems. Noncitizen children in the child welfare or foster system represent the paradigmatic example of potential SIJS beneficiaries, and yet many commonly slip through the cracks because state officials—both the bureaucrats who manage and oversee the state child welfare, as well as the judges who must provide the underlying factual findings—often lack the expertise to identify SIJS as a potential source of relief to children.\textsuperscript{296} The dearth of lawyers with expertise in both (federal) immigration and (state) family law issues can

\textsuperscript{291} 310 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (S.D. Cal. 2018).
\textsuperscript{292} Id. at 1141.
\textsuperscript{293} See supra notes 45–56 and accompanying text.
\textsuperscript{294} Berlant, Cruel Optimism, supra note 25, at 1.
place SIJS benefits further out of reach.\textsuperscript{297} Despite the well-documented nature of SIJS’s shortcomings, a slow death analysis intimates that such defects will not deter immigration officials from considering SIJS applications. Both the SIJS program and antismuggling laws give immigration officials critical tools for providing migrant children with their preferred version of a good life: a fresh start in the United States free from parental danger.

Immigration officials might say that critics have it exactly backward. The problem isn’t that immigration policy treats families as an obstacle to child migrants from flourishing in the United States. Rather, it is all of the migrants seeking a life in America that prevents families from remaining intact within sending countries. One can imagine immigration officials wondering to themselves (or even aloud): “If only migrants would \textit{stay put}, then there would be no families to detain and forcibly separate at the border.”\textsuperscript{298} In this formulation, it is migration channels that stand in the way of migrants realizing the fantasy of an intact and geographically consolidated family experience—\textit{in the sending country}. And again, none of this is meant to critique the broader commitment to eradicating child and human trafficking. Our legal system should create mechanisms for eradicating such harms. \textit{Of course it should}. But the slow death analytical framework provides a more nuanced approach to identifying the destructive elements of aspirational and morally unimpeachable political and legal commitments. The disregard of basic procedural protections by immigration officials\textsuperscript{299} and the counter-messaging issued by high-ranking officials\textsuperscript{300} made it easy to see a “best interests of the child” argument as an attempt to secure political cover for what appear to be punitive goals.

In this regard, the sociolegal landscape surrounding debates over the zero tolerance policy bears some resemblance to the landscape underriding debates over DACA. At first glance, this connection seems odd given that DACA is one of President Obama’s signature immigrant-
inclusive legacies. This program has played—and continues to play\textsuperscript{301)—a central part in the process of normalizing and demystifying the presence of large numbers of unauthorized immigrants. In modern history, this began with the Supreme Court’s 1982 decision in \textit{Plyler v. Doe},\textsuperscript{302} and continued on to debates over the DREAM Act, and then to DACA. The through line connecting all of these debates has been the perceived moral innocence of childhood arrivals—that is, the view that children should not be penalized under the law because they did not \textit{choose} to enter or overstay without authorization.

At the same time, DACA treated the parents of Dreamers on different terms. This is the reality that sits in the other hand: Everyone else who chose to violate our nation’s immigration laws deserves no such relief. Parents didn’t “earn” anything. In fact, they are the lives against whom Dreamers are measured. Both SIJS and DACA illustrate how the law seeks to absorb migrant children into the law’s protections, but only at the cost of devaluing their parents and the rest of their family members. In some important ways, these programs reflect legally-sanctioned violence through obfuscation. Both of these programs are presented as humanitarian and equitable expressions of immigration law, but the effort to protect (in the case of SIJS) and praise (in the case of DACA) migrants detracts from the fissures that such programs can create within transnational families.

\textbf{IV. Why Slow Death?}

The Trump Administration’s zero tolerance policy has fixed the public’s attention on the problem of family separation. It has cut through the malaise created by our immigration system to cull an idea that presents the possibility of generating momentum for reform. Objections that people might ordinarily have toward unauthorized migration soften and relent when the price of clinging to these objections is the forced separation of children from parents and the generational damage that comes with it.

The reports from border detention centers—the stories of children caring for infants and women being told to drink from toilets\textsuperscript{303)—spark what Judith Butler calls ethical outrage, an anger born of Americans

\textsuperscript{301} See, e.g., Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 485–86 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted, 139 S. Ct. 2779 (2019) (“It is no hyperbole to say that Dulce Garcia embodies the American dream . . . . [She] appears no different from any other productive . . . young American. But one thing sets her apart. Garcia’s parents brought her to this country in violation of United States immigration laws when she was four years old.”).

\textsuperscript{302} 457 U.S. 202, 210–16 (1982) (holding that noncitizens “may claim the benefit of the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection”).

\textsuperscript{303} See Kanno-Youngs, supra note 251; see also Memorandum from Jennifer L. Costello to Kevin K. McAleenan, supra note 252, at 5–6 (describing the overcrowding at Border Patrol facilities in the Rio Grande Valley).
taking stock of the harms that we have exacted on others. Ethical outrage emerges when disturbing images capturing America’s crimes engenders “a sense of ethical outrage that is, distinctively, for an Other, in the name of an Other.” For advocates, then, the temptation is clear: to produce more reports and to procure more images that can foster more outrage to spur lawmaking that will eradicate family separation as a part of detention policy at the border.

I want to suggest that we need more than just outrage to motivate change because outrage, even of the ethical variety, has its limits. As Viet Nguyen explains, ethical outrage “continues to reassert the centrality of the person feeling that emotion, which justifies viewing the other as a perpetual victim.”

Nguyen continues:

As much as I also feel Butler’s ethical outrage, it appears to me that seeing the other only as a victim treats the other as an object of sympathy or pity, to be idealized or patronized. Existing as the object of or excuse for one’s theory or outrage, the other remains, at worst, unworthy of study, and, at best, beyond criticism.

Nguyen’s critique illuminates the limitations of theorizing family separation as an episodic crisis afflicting our border infrastructure. While this most recent chapter of family separation has provided compelling insights into how our immigration laws and infrastructure fail migrants, it provides only a glimpse into the harms of family separation. In this final Part, I explain both why I believe slow death scholarship provides a useful set of insights for developing a more comprehensive account of family separation and how this scholarship might grow and evolve in response to the case study of migration to the United States.

In some ways, the proposition I lay out in this Essay is straightforward: Family separation as a phenomenon is much more pervasive than is commonly perceived. So why slow death? Why not simply show that migrants are waiting, marooned, left out, and helpless and leave it at that? What slow death scholarship provides is the chance to structure a productive conversation around the immigrant body and specifically focus on what that body is allowed to feel and the life it is allowed to lead under our laws. Without this mooring, conversations about family separation risk getting subsumed by episodic crises. Slow death theory can reintroduce context that is critical to exploring the elasticity of principles like family reunification.

At the highest level of abstraction, slow death refers to a form of widespread suffering that deserves condemnation but evades meaningful detection. The concept of slow death implies that affected parties meet a

306. Id. at 76.
premature demise. Some might argue that the harms exacted by obesity, and certainly cancer, feel different than longing to see one’s family. Some might ask: Doesn’t slow death mean actual death and demise?

While death, demise, and suffering are universal experiences, the expression of those experiences are not universal. For example, unauthorized workers commonly know that their immigration status cannot be used against them in a labor enforcement proceeding, yet they often decline to pursue claims anyway, choosing instead to bear the costs of wage theft and dangerous working conditions. Shannon Gleeson calls this a form of health capital that unauthorized workers are aware that they possess. The result is that migrants lose their wages (which are economic capital), but they maintain their standing in the workplace as tough and resilient immigrant workers through the strategic spending of their “health capital.” Notice the broader insight: a legal structure and culture that normalizes a workplace in which workers are taxed in the form of injuries and slights.

Assumptions about immigrant workers as tough and resilient are caricatures and stereotypes. Treating migrants as superhuman, subhuman, or something other than human operates to hide the pain that circumscribes these lives. Focusing on the capacity of migrants to tolerate pain draws attention to their fortitude and minimizes the pain. The skills and traits that predispose indigenous migrant workers to weeding crops ignores the ways that this work literally breaks their backs. Highlighting the work ethic of dishwashers and cooks in the restaurant industry ignores the reality that these workers pay for this reputation in the form of health capital—that is, they are willing to ignore the burns and lacerations they endure in order to demonstrate their value as workers. The sounds and images of migrants being held in cages are horrific and morally outrageous, which helps to create their “viral” quality and has drawn comparisons to the treatment of Iraqi prisoners at the hands Blackwater military contractors. This comparison isn’t necessarily wrong, but the comparisons don’t end there. Slow death theory shows that the mental and physical harms that migrants experience in connection to our immigration system run well into the interior of the

308. Id.
United States even if they are hiding behind cultural and racialized tropes of migrant perseverance and superhuman strength.

Still, slow death scholarship has undertheorized the types of maladies and injuries that might qualify as a form of slow death. Family separation provides a helpful opportunity to clarify these boundaries. A part of what makes family separation at the border so noteworthy, and therefore capable, of generating momentum for social change, is the palpable nature of the anguish created by the image of losing track of one’s child. Losing a child to government separation feels like losing a child to death, which can adversely affect one’s health.\textsuperscript{312} But in what ways does this experience impact health?

For this reason, legal scholars might find common cause with those public health scholars interested in identifying and measuring the health consequences of immigration policies. While public health scholarship hasn’t explicitly engaged the work of slow death scholars, there is plenty to suggest that a synergy is possible. Public health scholarship often focuses on “acute” and “chronic” harms, which more or less tracks the difference between harms created by spectacular violence and those incubated over time through slow violence.\textsuperscript{313} Slow death scholarship can help organize a growing body of empirical work tracking the health consequences of immigration enforcement. Social scientists have documented how the long-term separation\textsuperscript{314} imposed by immigration-related detention policies negatively impacts the entire family, especially children.\textsuperscript{315} Enforcement policies in this context not only impose a mark

\textsuperscript{312} See, e.g., Catherine H. Rogers, Frank J. Floyd, Marsha Mailick Seltzer, Jan Greenberg & Jinkuk Hong, Long-Term Effects of the Death of a Child on Parents’ Adjustment in Midlife, 22 J. Fam. Psychol. 203, 206–07 (2008) (finding that parents who have lost a child suffer from higher levels of depressive symptoms and more cardiovascular health problems).

\textsuperscript{313} See, e.g., Florencia Torche & Uri Shwed, The Hidden Costs of War: Exposure to Armed Conflict and Birth Outcomes, 2 Soc. Sci. 558, 558 (2015) (“Recent research focuses on chronic stress resulting from persistent, continuous or cumulative difficult or demanding exposures. This attention is certainly warranted. Chronic stress has been shown to be harmful to health . . . . However, acute stress may also be harmful . . . .”); Florencia Torche & Andrés Villarreal, Prenatal Exposure to Violence and Birth Weight in Mexico: Selectivity, Exposure, and Behavioral Responses, 79 Am. Soc. Rev. 966, 973 (2014) (studying the “effect of acute exposure to local homicides on birth weight”).

\textsuperscript{314} See Joanna Dreby, The Burden of Deportation on Children in Mexican Immigrant Families, 74 J. Marriage & Fam. 829, 839–41 (2012) (suggesting that although the removal of a parent obviously disrupts the lives of children, even the constant threat of removal can negatively impact children); Dreby, U.S. Immigration Policy, supra note 144, at 247–49 (discussing the consequences on U.S. citizen children when their parents are deported).

\textsuperscript{315} See Caitlin Patler & Nicholas Branic, Patterns of Family Visitation During Immigration Detention, 3 Russell Sage Found. J. Soc. Sci. 18, 33 (2017) (noting that “detainees with undocumented children receive fewer face-to-face visits,” that less visitation may “lead to increased despair and reduce family cohesion in immigrant families,” and that “the immigration detention experience mirrors criminal incarceration in many ways”). For additional perspectives on the impact of imprisonment on families,
of inferiority, they reduce the number of life chances available to migrants\textsuperscript{316} and can contribute to emotional and physical harms\textsuperscript{317} such as depression\textsuperscript{318} and alcohol abuse.\textsuperscript{319}

At the same time, the paradigmatic examples of slow death harms are obesity and cancer, which are given expression in the form of physical symptoms in the body. Identifying examples in the immigration context can help push the slow death conversation to consider harms beyond these examples. How do psychic and mental harms figure into this universe? Does slow death require actual death and demise or do harms that are unseen but felt also count? A growing body of work has focused on the developmental disorders linked to immigration enforcement.\textsuperscript{320} Much of the mental anguish that immigrants feel can manifest itself in physical ways as well. To the extent that physical deterioration is

\textsuperscript{316} See Spade, supra note 57, at 5.

\textsuperscript{317} See Yao Lu, Household Migration, Social Support, and Psychosocial Health: The Perspective from Migrant-Sending Areas, 74 Soc. Sci. & Med. 135, 141 (2012) ("[A]dults left behind by internal migrants tend to be more prone to stress-related health conditions and psychological distress."); see also Feinian Chen, Hui Liu, Kriti Vikram & Yu Guo, For Better or Worse: The Health Implications of Marriage Separation Due to Migration in Rural China, 52 Demography 1321, 1336–39 (2015) (finding from a comparative study of married couples living apart due to migration in China that such couples suffered greater negative emotional and health consequences exacerbated by the duration of the separation).

\textsuperscript{318} Yao Lu, Rural–Urban Migration and Health: Evidence from Longitudinal Data in Indonesia, 70 Soc. Sci. & Med. 412, 417 (2010) (concluding from a study of the health of migrants who moved compared to those who stayed behind in rural areas that family separation has an adverse effect on psychological health through a measurement of depressive symptoms).

\textsuperscript{319} See Miguel Angel Cano, Mariana Sanchez, Mary Jo Trepka, Frank R. Dillon, Diana M. Sheehan, Patria Rojas, Mariano J. Kanamori, Hui Huang, Rehab Auf & Mario De La Rosa, Immigration Stress and Alcohol Use Severity Among Recently Immigrated Hispanic Adults: Examining Moderating Effects of Gender, Immigration Status, and Social Support, 73 J. Clinical Psychol. 294, 302 (2017) (finding a statistically significant relationship between higher immigration stress and higher alcohol use severity among recent Hispanic immigrants, an effect that was also stronger in men than in women); see also Frank R. Dillon, Mario De La Rosa, Mariana Sanchez & Seth J. Schwartz, Preimmigration Family Cohesion and Drug/Alcohol Abuse Among Recent Latino Immigrants, 20 Fam. J. 260, 263 (2012) ("[H]igher preimmigration family cohesion was linked with lower levels of engagement in illicit drug use, less harmful/hazardous alcohol use, and lower frequency and quantity of alcohol use . . . .").

\textsuperscript{320} See Edward Vargas & Viridiana L. Benitez, Latino Parents’ Links to Deportees Are Associated with Development Disorders in Their Children, 47 J. Community Psychol. 1151, 1160 (2019).
required in order to establish slow death, public health scholars have focused on whether and how stress and emotional abuse affect the body.\textsuperscript{321}

Using family separation as a basis for evaluating the harms that the entire immigration system exacts upon migrants can help keep discussions about immigration reform to a manageable scale. The dysfunction that defines our immigration system can seem intractable, and the suffering that this system causes can seem unimaginable. Immigration law operates within a complex political economy.\textsuperscript{322} These realities, combined with general problems of cognitive overload,\textsuperscript{323} can lead to citizens and residents of the United States struggling to grapple with the “bigness” of the nation’s immigration “problem.” In the related context of climate change-induced migration, legal scholars often describe the challenges of formulating a response to an existential problem meriting a global response. Maxine Burkett argues that existing categories animating migration law are wholly inadequate to deal with climate change-induced migration.\textsuperscript{324} Entire areas of the law are predicated on climate stability, Burkett observes.\textsuperscript{325} But uncertainty has become a defining feature of the climate change challenge. Much of the global migration system that addresses humanitarian relief is grounded in the notion of crisis. Thus, the notion of crisis “is inadequate and inaccurate as it connotes a temporary or isolated incident.”\textsuperscript{326} Such a regime cannot meet head on the migration challenges wrought by climate change as it is neither “temporary nor simple.”\textsuperscript{327}


\textsuperscript{322} See generally Cuéllar, Political Economies, supra note 161, at 5 (describing “the existence of three interlocking political economies that shape modern immigration law: statutory compromises rooted in the political economy of lawmaking, organizational practices reflecting the political economy of implementation, and public reactions implicating the responses of policy elites and the larger public to each other”).


\textsuperscript{325} Id.

\textsuperscript{326} Id. at 473.

\textsuperscript{327} Id.
scale of the phenomenon renders the challenge posed by climate change a sort of singularity, a problem that fundamentally differs from other problems facing our legal system.\textsuperscript{328} In a similar fashion, the transnational scope of migration can paralyze debates over reform as all sides quickly get overwhelmed by the scale of the challenge. Family separation gives all stakeholders a specific problem to solve. The slow death framework encourages us to commit to eradicating all forms of family separation while we have everyone’s attention.

CONCLUSION

In this Essay, I have tried to make three points: (1) that slow death offers a paradigm that helps identify unspectacular and therefore hard-to-notice acts of family separation such as those that occur within the context of immigration admissions, enforcement, adjustment, and transnational banking; (2) that current debates over enforcement policy at the border illustrate how justifications and solutions offer very little insight into broader structural causes of exploitative migration conditions; but (3) that broadening debates to account for slow death introduces the opportunity to better understand how the law contributes to and normalizes immigrant suffering.

In trying to develop an account of slow death, I don’t mean to diminish the human toll of family separation of the spectacularly violent variety. I want to emphasize that my goal was not to browbeat or lecture people out on the front lines trying to stop the family separations at the border. Rather, I offer a perspective that I hope can contribute to a conversation about how to eradicate family separation across our entire immigration system. It is imperative that we teach ourselves to recognize the kinds of insidious harms that migrants experience on a daily basis. The right against family separation is here, there, everywhere, and at all times. Immigrants and their allies have fought heroically against the policies put forth by the Trump Administration. But realizing a lasting and sustainable type of change requires acknowledging the toll exacted by this fight. As slow death scholar Chloe Ahmann observes through the weary words of one Baltimore resident fighting against the presence of a hazardous waste dump in his neighborhood: “It’s exhausting to create an event out of nothing.”\textsuperscript{329}

\textsuperscript{328} See Eric Biber, Law in the Anthropocene Epoch, 106 Geo. L.J. 1, 6–7 (2017).

\textsuperscript{329} Ahmann, supra note 34, at 146 (internal quotation marks omitted).