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Durable Displacement and the Protracted Search for Solutions: Promising Programs and Strategies

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Executive Summary
In March 2022, the Center for Migration Studies of New York (CMS) released a request for papers (RFP) for a special issue of its *Journal on Migration and Human Security* (JMHS), devoted to identifying solutions to situations of protracted displacement. The co-editors selected 10 papers for this special issue by authors from a dozen countries, including two refugees. The papers cover several large populations in protracted displacement, as well as other less-publicized groups. The former include:

- Rohingya refugees in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh;
- Internally displaced persons (IDPs) living on the outskirts of Baku, Azerbaijan;
- Afghans in Pakistan since the 1970s;
- Syrians in Turkey since 2011;
- Syrian, Iraqi, Yemeni, Sudanese, Somali, and Iranian refugees in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon;
- IDPs and Venezuelan migrants in Colombia;
- Somali refugees in Ethiopia and Kenya;
- Central Americans seeking protection in Mexico and the United States; and
- IDPs in Northern Mexico who have been displaced and stranded due to violence, deportation, and US and Mexican asylum policies.

This paper introduces and integrates the themes and recommendations from this special issue. Section 1 provides a short overview of the scope, growth, and consequences of protracted displacement. Section 2 situates this phenomenon in a legal context and examines traditional and complementary solutions to displacement. Section 3 outlines topline findings, recommendations, and cross-cutting themes from the special issue. Section 4 offers conclusions and final reflections.

Keywords
protracted displacement, IDPs, refugees

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Introduction

Forced migrants typically flee conditions—war, the effects of climate change, and failed or predatory states—that cannot be resolved in a short timeframe. Complex, large-scale displaced populations invariably overwhelm host states and require them to build expertise, different forms of capacity, and multi-stakeholder support in what can be an attenuated and politically fraught process. In addition, it takes significant time for the forcibly displaced to find safe and secure conditions, much less a permanent situation (if they ever do), following their uprooting.

The traditional "durable" options—voluntary repatriation, local integration, and third country resettlement—are all in extremely short supply. Safe, voluntary return—the preferred option for most states and displaced persons—can be followed by further displacement, as frequently occurs when political instability or the causes of displacement persist (Kelley 2022, 201). Refugee-hosting countries increasingly oppose local integration and opportunities for resettlement have long failed to meet the needs of even a tiny percentage of the world's displaced. For these reasons, protracted displacement has become the norm for refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and others. For many, the only viable option seems to be "integration" into the limbo of camp communities or the margins of urban life.

Expanded solutions to displacement (discussed in Section 2) have focused on increasing access to existing durable solutions, such as through allowing refugees to access the formal labor market in countries of first asylum or through expanding opportunities for communities or individuals to sponsor refugees for resettlement to third countries. Complementary or additional pathways for persons in protracted displacement, such as expanded legal migration opportunities to study, work, or join family members, have materialized, but in modest numbers.[1] While there are efforts to expand and improve the three available solutions, particularly possibilities for moving elsewhere beyond traditional resettlement, there simply are not any new solutions.

Overall, solutions have not kept pace with the conditions giving rise to the combination of newly displaced populations and those in situations of protracted displacement, leading to a forcibly displaced population of 89.3 million in 2021 (UNHCR 2022a, 2022b) and over 100 million by mid-2022. In light of the failure of traditional durable solutions for most of the world's refugees and the absence of new solutions, the displaced struggle to make the best of their situations.

The papers in this issue analyze the causes and consequences of protracted displacement. One commentary discusses ethical considerations that should trigger state action to protect refugees. They lift up the essential needs of persons in protracted displacement, such as:

- Access to physical and mental health services;
- Removal of barriers to employment and movement;
- Safety and security;
- Expanded educational opportunities; and
- Housing.

They describe regional, state, and local initiatives that would facilitate and potentially expand the three traditional durable solutions, particularly integration into host communities. They identify laws and policies that would protect the rights of forcibly displaced populations. They make the case for formal and functional refugee regimes. They tout the benefits of development for those in protracted displacement, and the need to move from an encampment approach to more participatory and inclusive strategies. Several underscore the need for refugee initiatives that also benefit host communities and, thus, enjoy greater local support and sustainability.

By necessity, persons in situations of protracted displacement must struggle to meet their basic needs and to work toward better, more permanent situations. Not surprisingly, then, building on the resourcefulness, agency and initiative of persons in

[1]The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) defines complementary pathways as "safe and regulated avenues for refugees that complement resettlement by providing lawful stay in a third country where their international protection needs are met," including "existing admission avenues that refugees may be eligible to apply to, but which may require operational adjustments to facilitate refugee access." (UNHCR 2019). It offers as examples humanitarian visas and admissions, community sponsorship, and legal migration opportunities.

protracted displacement is a recurring theme of this special issue, as a way to expand existing solutions, to identify potential new approaches, and simply to improve life in very trying circumstances. Several papers highlight the work of refugee-led organizations, which help to educate and improve the prospects of displaced persons, despite the lack of formal integration opportunities. The papers also feature youth leadership initiatives and community-centered research programs that offer skills and build on the agency of participants, whatever the future might hold.

Section 1: The Challenge of Protracted Displacement

While global attention gravitates to new large-scale movements of refugees—witness Ukraine in the first half of 2022—the fact is that most of the world's refugees and most of the world's IDPs have been displaced for years. These protracted displacement situations are the reasons for the unprecedented numbers of refugees and IDPs in the world. At the end of 2021, UNHCR (2022a) considered some 74 percent of the world's refugees to be in a protracted situation, defined as "25,000 refugees from the same country of origin [who] have been in exile in a given low- or middle-income country for at least five consecutive years" (p. 20). Moreover, this definition understates the incidence of protracted displacement, as it does not reflect the reality of refugees in groups of less than 25,000, including those who fall below this threshold each year or who have been displaced for less than five years, with no permanent solutions in sight.

Statistics on protracted IDPs are more difficult to come by, but it is likely that a similar percentage—around three-fourths—of IDPs are living in protracted situations. The UN Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement (HLP) defines IDP protracted displacement as "the situation of IDPs who, for a significant period of time, are prevented from taking or are unable to take steps to progressively reduce their vulnerability, impoverishment and marginalization and find a durable solution" (UNSG 2021, 83). But the HLP acknowledges the fact that there is no common definition based on the number of years an IDP has to be displaced to be considered protracted and it urges actors to come together to find a common definition (UNSG 2021, 84, fn12).

While the international community has always paid more attention to refugees than to IDPs—perhaps because by definition refugee protection is an international issue—protracted internal displacement has become the norm and solutions are scarce. In the case of IDPs, it is up to governments to enable IDPs to find solutions. Theoretically, solutions should be easier for IDPs as they are overwhelmingly citizens of their country of residence, which should facilitate their local integration or settlement elsewhere in the country. But obstacles abound and the political will needed to facilitate solutions is lacking. Kälin and Chapuisat (2017) argue that international agencies working in support of collective outcomes could break the impasse in finding solutions for IDPs.

The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) recognizes the impact of protracted displacement on host governments. Indeed, all four of the Compact's objectives focus on solutions which would primarily benefit refugees living in protracted situations: ease the pressures on host countries; enhance refugee self-reliance; expand access to third-country solutions; and support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity. While progress has been made in implementing the GCR, it has been overshadowed by new refugee flows, particularly from Ukraine in 2022.

Section 2: Traditional and Complementary Solutions to International and Internal Displacement

Solutions for refugees, IDPs, and other forcibly displaced persons are becoming more elusive. The 1951 Refugee Convention does not define solutions. However, the UNHCR's Statute mandates UNHCR to "seek permanent solutions for the problem of refugees by assisting Governments" and "to facilitate the voluntary repatriation of such refugees, or their assimilation within new national communities."[2]

Traditionally solutions for refugees have focused on three alternatives: voluntary return to the country

[2]U.N.G.A. Res. 428(V), at Ch. 1 ¶ 1 (Dec. 14, 1950). https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b66c39e1/statute-office-united-nations-high-commissioner-refugees.html.

Table 1. Forcibly Displaced Population, Refugees, and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs): Durable Solutions.

Year	Forcibly displaced population	Refugees	IDPs	Returned refugees	Returned IDPs	Resettlement arrivals	Naturalization
2010	26,082,608	10,548,835	24,981,940	197,579	2,923,233	98,719	11,515
2011	26,773,006	10,403,937	22,441,240	531,868	3,245,804	79,727	4,253
2012	29,108,882	10,497,017	26,387,120	525,902	1,545,486	88,918	5,163
2013	36,786,722	11,698,233	33,340,830	385,651	1,356,182	98,359	22,882
2014	48,453,612	14,384,289	37,877,320	126,767	1,822,591	105,148	32,114
2015	56,827,908	16,110,276	40,451,900	201,387	2,317,314	106,997	31,934
2016	56,540,934	17,184,286	40,220,850	552,219	6,511,144	172,797	22,911
2017	62,148,589	19,940,566	39,934,042	384,887	4,228,971	102,709	73,325
2018	67,879,297	20,359,553	41,312,940	519,321	2,312,926	92,348	62,537
2019	71,648,374	20,414,669	45,667,305	317,181	5,343,793	107,729	54,941
2020	77,266,313	20,661,846	48,027,950	250,951	3,184,118	34,383	33,746
2021	81,672,451	21,327,285	53,165,720	429,234	5,265,622	57,436	56,585

Note. The forcibly displaced population includes refugees (including persons in refugee-like situations), asylum seekers, IDPs (including persons in IDP-like situations), and others in need of international protection. Refugees include: persons recognized under the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees; its 1967 Protocol; the 1969 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa; the refugee definition contained in the 1984 Cartagena Declaration on Refugees as incorporated into national laws; recognized refugees in accordance with the UNHCR Statute; individuals granted complementary forms of protection; and those with temporary protection. UNHCR's definitions of these fields and additional information can be found at https://www.unhcr.org/refugee-statistics/methodology/definition/.
Source. UNHCR, Refugee Data Finder. Date extracted: 01/13/2023. Please note that the figures for IDPs are based on the Internal Displacement Monitoring Center (IDMC) data. UNHCR and IDMC year-end statistics for 2022 are expected to be available in the Spring of 2023.

of origin, local integration in the country of asylum, or resettlement to a third country. These solutions are state-centered in the sense that they focus on ways to achieve broad solutions to a state "problem," rather than on the needs and aspirations of refugees themselves (Bradley 2019, 2).

In contrast, solutions for IDPs are considered to be achieved when "IDPs no longer have any specific assistance and protection needs that are linked to their displacement and can enjoy their human rights without discrimination on account of their displacement" (IASC 2010). The *Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Framework for Durable Solutions* emphasizes that achieving solutions is a process, not a result that occurs at a fixed point in time (Ferris 2020a).

Central to most discussions of solutions is the assumption that displacement is a short-term phenomenon. However, it is time to let go of that assumption and accept that displacement is part of the new normal. As Oroub El-Abed, Watfa Najdi, and Mustafa Hoshmand note, the term "permanently temporary" may be a more accurate characterization of their situation (Fabos and Brun 2022). Adam Lichtenheld (2016, 13) argues that UNHCR's approach to durable solutions emphasizes a return to the status quo—perpetuating the notion that displacement is a temporary phenomenon and reflecting a "sedentary bias." But as he and others point out, displacement is a coping mechanism and a tried and true survival strategy and protracted displacement has become the norm.

Voluntary return is almost always considered the best solution for both refugees and IDPs. Governments of host countries are quick to see return as the only solution for refugees and Security Council resolutions on displacement rarely mention solutions other than return (Ferris and Weerasinghe 2011). But returns are simply not happening in sufficient numbers. In fact, there have been far fewer returns of either refugees or IDPs than of new displacements. UNHCR reported 1.7 million newly displaced

refugees in 2021 and only 429,300 returns; 14.4 million new IDPs and 5.3 million returns (UNHCR 2022a, 4–5). In fact, only 7 percent of the nearly 82 million forcibly displaced population in 2021 received a durable solution of any kind; that is, a refugee or IDP return, resettlement or naturalization in the host country (Table 1).

Less than 10 percent of refugees have returned to their countries of birth most years over the last 60 years, and far lower percentages have returned in recent years (Kelley 2022, 163). Since 2010, annual rates of return of IDPs have been well below 10 percent (Table 1). As conflicts and displacement drag on, return becomes less likely. The longer displacement lasts, the less likely either refugees or IDPs are to return to their communities of origin. Although there is not much research on spontaneous refugee returns, it seems likely that these are more likely to occur when refugees despair of living in protracted displacement and other opportunities are scarce. For those in protracted situations, there is also the question of the voluntariness of returns when there are not many alternatives. As a recent UNHCR report noted, "voluntariness from a refugee perspective is more about a scale of imperfect options in an environment of constrained choice" (UNHCR 2022c, viii). It may be more difficult for authorities to promote or facilitate return among refugees who increasingly live outside camps and are dispersed in largely urban areas, than among those residing in camps. Too often, returning refugees cannot return to their homes and they join the ranks of their home countries' IDP population. Indeed, a recent evaluation of UNHCR's (2022c) work with repatriation identifies the many shortcomings in the reintegration of returnees, noting that UNHCR is much better at facilitating repatriation than reintegration.

Returning refugees and IDPs can also be a de-stabilizing force in fragile post-conflict settings. As Lichtenheld (2016, 15) notes, in Uganda, the number of land disputes surged after refugees and IDPs returned to their communities. Governments of post-conflict countries face a range of challenges, from reconstruction of infrastructure to de-mobilization of combatants; large-scale returns of refugees and IDPs are additional pressures and require additional human and financial resources.

The other two traditional solutions—local integration and resettlement—are both limited alternatives for protracted refugees. Host governments are reluctant to admit that refugees are more than temporary guests in light of economic, social, and political pressures and the perceived failure of international assistance to share the responsibility for refugees. Indeed, the GCR has as one of its main objectives "easing the burden on host countries." The gold standard of local integration—refugees acquiring citizenship—seems increasingly out of reach for refugees (Table 1). Local integration for IDPs often runs into difficulties in acceptance by host communities and access to services. Pressures to return can create additional problems, as evidenced in Northern Iraq where after the defeat of ISIS in 2017, IDPs were expected to return to their communities of origin, even when their homes and livelihoods had been destroyed (Al-Shami, David, and Woodham 2022).

Resettlement to third countries has never been a solution for more than a tiny percentage of the world's refugees. US resettlement and humanitarian parole numbers are increasing, largely as a result of changing US policies, following an administration that sought to decimate the US resettlement infrastructure (Kerwin and Nicholson 2021). Positive changes are occurring in the world of resettlement, with new models of private sponsorship pioneered by Canada and the United States. Yet resettlement will remain at best a possibility for only several hundred thousand refugees—and for none of the world's 53 million IDPs.

Resettlement has often reflected the foreign policy interests of resettlement countries. As Bradley (2019, 7) points out, "while resettlement is, in theory, to be made available first and foremost to those with pressing protection concerns, most of the new resettlement places created in recent years have been allocated to refugees from politically high-profile situations such as Syria or the Yazidis from Iraq—or, in the case of private sponsorship programs, to those with family ties or other transnational connections." The recent decision by the Biden administration to offer entry into the United States to certain nationalities under humanitarian parole requires sponsorship by someone already living in the United States and does not necessarily lead to permanent residence.

In recent years, complementary pathways—in which refugees move to other countries through (often temporary) labor migration programs—have emerged as possible solutions beyond traditional resettlement programs. In fact, recruitment of refugees to meet labor needs was a primary solution for refugees in the aftermath of World War II (Shephard 2012; Long 2013). In addition, wealthy states regularly experience upticks in legal migration from residents of nations whose conditions are deteriorating, in anticipation they will worsen. This occurred, for example, with Venezuelan nationals in the early and mid-2010s (Gallardo and Batalova 2020). However, these residents typically possess the foresight, means, and legal options to migrate. States have not, however, dramatically expanded standard legal migration pathways, such as to work or to reunify with family members, to nationals from states in the midst of refugee-producing crises.

Today, the idea of complementary pathways aligns well with the needs of both receiving states and refugees. Refugees want and need to work. In addition, they view the ability to work as a strength of the US resettlement program, although they want to work in jobs that reflect their skills and credentials (Kerwin and Nicholson 2021, 10). US resettled refugees also identify employment as an important metric of integration and a means to facilitate other "factors in their integration" (Jany et al. 2022, 29). In addition, there is increasing evidence that resettled refugees equal or exceed the overall population by standard integration metrics (Kerwin 2018, 216–18), and that receiving communities benefit greatly from their labor (Resstack, Zimmer, and Clemens 2022).

But for refugees, priority in complementary pathway initiatives has been given (at least so far) to those with specific skills (such as nursing), education, and language abilities. While these are good and important initiatives, we should not delude ourselves that they will provide solutions for more than a fraction of the world's refugees.

Mobility as a Solution

Mobility as a solution for refugees has received relatively little attention in the literature and points to a central paradox in migration governance; that is, that the truly desperate either cannot migrate or must resort to irregular migration, with all its perils, to escape untenable situations. A significant literature documents how supranational organizations and developed states have employed externalized and border enforcement strategies since the early 1980s to restrict the mobility of displaced persons, often further endangering them (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011; Kerwin 2015; Frelick, Kysel, and Podkul 2016).

Yet Bradley (2011) looks at the "successful" solutions found for Central Americans displaced by the wars of the 1980s and finds that in spite of the impressive efforts to develop a comprehensive strategy and the collaboration between development and humanitarian actors, most of the displaced found their own solutions, often through undocumented migration. Long (2015) has also argued that mobility for refugees needs to be considered as a solution for displacement and has written extensively on the historical evolution of the concept of "refugees" as distinct from "migrants," arguing that in the move to single out refugees for preferential treatment, in fact solutions became more difficult. She recommends removing refugee-specific barriers to existing labor migration pathways, utilizing broad cooperation frameworks such as free movement protocols to develop new channels and providing temporary migration opportunities in line with labor market needs. The New York Declaration, she argues, seems to point to mobility through complementary pathways as a "fourth solution" for refugees.

The International Organization for Migration (IOM 2016) has often identified migration as a solution for displaced populations and includes migration in its Framework for the Progressive Realization of Solutions. Aleinikoff (2017, 2019) has argued for giving refugees travel documents, akin to League of Nations "Nansen passports" from 1922 to 1938, that would allow them to move to places where there are available solutions.

In looking at the role of mobility in providing solutions to refugees, we can also consider the important role played by remittances and indeed the diaspora (Lindley 2007), particularly in supporting local integration. Remittances can provide start-up capital for starting businesses (Katsiaficas et al

2021, 3). Omata (2012) found in a Liberian refugee camp in Ghana that access to remittances from overseas was a central economic resource for refugees.

Work Permits, Self-Reliance, and Entrepreneurship

For at least 10 years, refugee advocates have turned to work permits as integral to local integration of refugees. As Schuettler (2017) and more recently Ginn et al. (2022) point out, even in countries where refugees are legally entitled to work, there are often barriers to exercising these rights. Ginn et al. (2022), for example, found that 62 percent of refugees in 51 countries surveyed have the legal right to work, but 55 percent live in countries that legally restrict refugees' labor rights in practice.

Being able to work and support oneself is key to refugee well-being, dignity, protection, and integration. As the USA for UNHCR website states: "After fleeing war or persecution, one of the most effective ways people can rebuild their lives with dignity and in peace is through the opportunity to work and earn a living."[3] Having employment tends to increase access to social services and refugee children's access to education. Secure livelihoods are also a key component of protection. When refugees are unable to find work, they are more at risk of exploitation by both employers and criminal elements. Dependence on humanitarian assistance for long periods can have negative consequences for refugees' self-esteem, for host community perceptions of refugees, and for the international community (Scalettaris 2009). Enabling refugees to be self-reliant is in the interests of refugees, the host community and government, and international humanitarian actors.

Supporting self-reliance can be a key component of local integration. Increasingly, though, it seems to be seen as a fourth solution. As Easton-Calabria (2022) notes, refugee self-reliance is not a new concept; in fact, it has been a key feature of response to refugees since the 1920s. In the past decade, however, the push for refugee self-reliance has intensified as a result of growing numbers of refugees, the increasingly protracted nature of displacement, and a growing realization that the three traditional solutions for refugees were no longer available to most of the world's refugees.

While most refugees themselves want to be self-sufficient, rather than dependent on uncertain and fluctuating humanitarian aid, critics have pointed out that the emphasis on refugee self-reliance fits into Western governments' efforts to contain refugee movements in other regions (and minimize pressures for them to seek asylum in their countries.) And supporting self-reliance offers hope that the seemingly constant financial demands of supporting a growing number of refugees will diminish in the future. Similarly, Hunter (2009) notes that self-reliance is a strategy for donors focused on the reduction of material assistance due to budgetary concerns. As Skran and Easton-Calabria (2020) ask, is self-reliance just an exit strategy for donors? While it is important to keep critical perspectives in mind, the reality is that most refugees want to be self-reliant. Although humanitarian aid is usually critical for newly arriving refugees, refugees want to be able to provide for their families without relying on this aid (which is any event is rarely sufficient and often uncertain.

UNHCR maintains that self-reliance supports durable solutions, particularly repatriation or local integration. In any event, support for livelihoods —key to self-reliance initiatives—has become increasingly central in humanitarian response across the sector,[4] although it raises once again the thorny issue of why development actors are not taking more initiative in this field. These initiatives have not always produced the desired results. Crawford et al. (2015, 2) found that with respect to "direct interventions to support self-reliance and livelihoods such as vocational training and income generating projects supported by grants and loans, the research literature reveals a panoply of small-scale uncoordinated and unsustainable interventions, mostly implemented by the humanitarian arms of aid agencies, with inadequate technical and managerial expertise, poor links to markets and short-term and unreliable funding."

In recent years, there have been important initiatives to support self-reliance initiatives. Amy

[3]USA for UNHCR website: https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/livelihoods.html.

[4]See for example: UNHCR (n.d.); US Department of State (n.d.); World Bank (2017); Norwegian Refugee Council (n.d.)

Slaughter describes the emergence of a self-reliance program in Kenya, where refugees are generally not permitted to work in the formal sector. The program is based on the case management model of US refugee resettlement, which emphasizes the need to work in order to achieve economic self-sufficiency, but that also assists with health, education, housing, and counseling. Although yielding generally positive results, it is a labor-intensive process (Slaughter 2020) and as has been argued elsewhere, even self-reliant refugees are often living on the edge of falling back into poverty (Ferris 2018).

Spearheaded by Refuge Point and the Women's Refugee Commission, the development of the Refugee Self-Reliance Index was the result of a multi-stakeholder three-year process. It offers specific indicators for measuring self-reliance. In another Kenyan initiative, the Kalobeyi refugee settlement was established to provide a model for refugee self-reliance in a camp setting and to enable better host-refugee relationships (Betts, Omata, and Sterch 2020).

Self-reliance initiatives depend on refugee entrepreneurship to help refugees rebuild their lives and support their local integration. Networks play a significant role in supporting refugee entrepreneurs to start new businesses. At the same time, while networks are essential, policies and practices are needed that enable, rather than hinder refugee self-reliance, including the "right to work, to own a business, open a bank account, access finance and live outside of camps" (Katsiaficas et al. 2021, 1). Strong relationships between refugees and host communities are also essential, as Abdirahman A. Muhumad and Rose Jaji (2023) point out. In today's increasingly digital world, self-employment and entrepreneurship may thrive (ibid.). But not all refugees are natural entrepreneurs.

Achieving self-reliance is particularly difficult in countries where refugee rights to work are restricted. In the past decade, UNHCR and donors have pushed governments of refugee-hosting countries to open their labor markets to refugees. For example, under the 2016 Jordan Compact, between the European Union and the Jordanian government, Jordan agreed to issue work permits to 200,000 refugees and received multi-year funding and concessional loans from the international community (Meral 2020; Kridis 2021). And yet in spite of pressures to allow refugees to work legally in host countries, most refugees are still unable to do so and find employment only in the informal sector where conditions are often bad and exploitative.

Section 3: Topline Findings, Recommendations, and Cross-Cutting Themes From the Special Issue

The special issue offers a valuable mix of findings and recommendations, as well as background information on situations of protracted displacement and the first-hand accounts of displaced persons. A short summary of the papers and a brief discussion of crosscutting themes follow.

Papers in the Special Issue

Jennifer S. Wistrand (2023) examines protracted displacement through the lens of the nearly five million Azerbaijan IDPs displaced by conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the region of Nagorno-Karabakh. She argues for greater investment in development programs for IDPs given their rising numbers—from 27.5 million to 53.2 million between 2010 and 2021 (ibid.). She points out that the objectives of humanitarians, "saving lives and alleviating suffering in conflict, disaster and related situations," can put them at odds with national governments, which may have caused or contribute to the suffering of displaced persons (ibid., 25).

Development actors, however, "cannot be at odds with national governments, because" their work "is based on supporting changes to institutions, governance systems, regulatory systems, and social practices" (ibid., 26). In situations of protracted displacement, the development community's work for permanent solutions—in collaboration with multiple stakeholders, including government—assumes central importance.

Wistrand's research focused on IDPs who had been displaced 15 years, in a community with second and third generation members, who were living in a "temporary, turned long-term 'collective center'" in

the greater Baku (Azerbaijan's capital) area (ibid.). She found it particularly difficult for the youth living in a dormitory used for IDPs and attending IDP schools to develop connections with the host community and to find work (ibid.). As a result, IDP youth overwhelmingly indicated they felt depressed, anxious and stigmatized. Many did not apply themselves in school and projected apathy.

The paper's recommendations speak to the need for greater, long-term investment to resolve situations of internal displacement and, thus, greater understanding of IDPs by policymakers, researchers, and scholars (ibid.). To that end, Wistrand proposes the development of academic courses and degree-granting programs on IDPs, akin to those on refugees (ibid.). She recommends a case-study approach focused on solutions to specific IDP populations (ibid.).

Hidayet Siddikoglu and Ali Zafer Sagiroglu (2023) offer a comparative analysis of how Pakistan and Turkey have responded to the protracted displacement (respectively) of Afghans and Syrians. They identify three essential ingredients in addressing protracted refugee situations: "political will, institutional infrastructure, and engagement with regional and international regimes" (ibid., 51) Turkey hosts the largest number of refugees in the world (3.7 million) and Pakistan the third largest (1.5 million). Although not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention, Pakistan adopted an open-door policy to Afghans who began arriving in large numbers in 1970s. General Zia-ul Haq, then Pakistan's President, referred to the Afghans as *Muhajirin* (refugees under Islamic law). Yet the authors conclude that strategic and political objectives, rather than religious conviction, have consistently driven Pakistan's policies and diplomacy regarding Afghans (ibid.). In the early 1990s, Pakistan developed an assisted voluntary return program that led to the repatriation of 1.4 million Afghans. However, the number of Afghan refugees in Pakistan subsequently increased due to civil war, the rise of the Taliban, and US sanctions.

Turkey, a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, initially welcomed Syrian refugees as "temporary guests." After the protracted nature of the Syrians' stay became evident, however, Turkey entered the EU-Turkey deal (EUTD) in March 2016. In fact, many of the elements of EUTD were effectively in place by November 29, 2015, such as new visa requirements for Syrians and others, Turkey's opening of its labor market to Syrians with temporary protection, and enforcement and information sharing initiatives (Ludger Pries and Berna Safak Zülfikar Savci, 2023).

Among its signature accomplishments this area, Turkey has provided citizenship to roughly 200,000 Syrian refugees, has extended work permits to Syrians with temporary protection and has allowed Syrian children to attend public schools. It has also carried out military operations to establish a "safe zone" in Syria to pave the way for the repatriation of Syrians. Since 2016, roughly 500,000 Syrians have returned. An additional 50,000 have been resettled in third countries. Siddikoglu and Sagiroglue (2023) conclude that Turkey has made significant progress in developing "constructive long-term policies" in response to the challenges posed by displaced Syrians.

States often invoke "sovereignty" in support of exclusionary policies. Of course, individual states must play a leading role in responding to situations of protracted displacement within their territories. To do so effectively, they must often develop "institutional, policy and governing" capacity. However, they typically cannot resolve these situations unilaterally. They need to engage "regional, inter-governmental and international refugee regimes." To this end, Siddikoglu and Sagiroglue (2023) propose:

- Strengthened regional and global cooperation and collaboration;
- States become signatories to the 1951 Refugee Convention;
- More assistance to refugee hosting countries;
- Greater cooperation between refugee hosting countries with strong management policies and those with less capacity; and
- Monitoring and evaluation to ensure that state policies and practices for displaced persons reflect international standards.

Pries and Zülfikar Savci (2023) illustrate that large-scale refugee flows can trigger the creation of appropriate legal and management infrastructure to

protect, integrate, and promote durable solutions for displaced populations. The massive waves of Syrians arriving in Turkey, starting in 2011 and 2012, led it to adopt the beginning of "a legal framework for asylum protection;" its Law on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP) was approved in 2013 and went into effect in 2014 (ibid., 60). It also led Turkey to build a new migration management regime and to engage with UN organizations. Interestingly, UNHCR and Turkish authorities tried to keep Syrian refugees in camps, but they settled throughout the country. Religiously based NGOs offered relief services to Syrians and secular NGOs worked more extensively with urban refugees.

Pries and Zülfikar Savci (2023) examine the work of refugee-related organizations (RROs) in Turkey under the EUTD's Facility for Refugees (FRIT) program, which provided EUR 6 billion in two tranches. The first tranche largely consisted of socio-economic support (to Syrian refugee families), followed by funding for education, health care, protection, and migration management. The paper breaks down FRIT funding by category of funded organization, services provided, and the geographic distribution of programs (ibid.). It finds that FRIT supported the areas of the greatest need, particularly on Turkey's southern border. Expert interviews offered a nuanced assessment of the FRIT, reporting that:

- The FRIT largely benefitted "the most vulnerable Syrian refugees in Turkey;"
- It enhanced the ability of the Turkish government and NGOs "to cope with massive refugee flows consistent with international standards;"
- FRIT-funded, project-based programs represented a turn toward commercialization and a departure from NGO rights-centered work and humanitarian values;
- Significant funding for international NGOs went to their human resources, and less to the project-related work of smaller NGO subcontractors;
- Turkey made a strong effort, starting in mid and late 2000s to "institutionalize a genuine law-based migration and asylum system;"
- Turkey developed innovations in migration management in response to Syrian arrivals; and
- Turkish political parties "instrumentalized" the discontent of citizens who received very limited social assistance, compared to Syrian migrants (ibid., 72).

Overall, the paper credits the FRIT with fostering a diverse, well-coordinated network of organizations, and for the transparency of its funding commitments and programs (ibid.). It finds that the FRIT embodies best practice in addressing protracted displacement by combining effective, expeditious humanitarian response, with responsiveness to the long-term needs of Syrian refugees (ibid.). However, it criticizes the FRIT for its lack of "institutionalized mechanisms" to include refugees in program design and its failure to give refugees "voice at the national and international levels" (ibid., 72).

Muhumad and Jaji (2023) explore the de facto integration of persons in protracted displacement in Ethiopia and Kenya who have developed "symbiotic relationships" with their host communities. They note that Ethiopia and Kenya hosted Somali refugees in camps "even though they fled to areas predominantly inhabited by fellow Somalis" (ibid., 78). In this and many other cases, state borders arbitrarily separate and complicate migration between members of the same religious, ethnic, and cultural groups.

Moreover, UNHCR and its implementing partners offered tacit support to the encampment policy by directing aid to the camps. Muhumad and Jaji (2023, 76) find that "refugees' self-initiative and resourcefulness . . . can drive integration even when policies seek to obstruct it" and when states do not actively pursue any of the three durable solutions. In his magisterial reporting on life in the Dadaab refugee camps, Rawlence (2016, 344–58) illustrates the related issue of displaced persons for whom camps—despite privation, violence, and lack of opportunity—have become the only viable solution. In effect, some camp residents have "integrated" into Dadaab, which has taken on the features of a permanent community. Tens of thousands have lived their entire lives in camps, and others have little memory of their countries of birth or heritage.

Muhumad and Jaji (2023) find that Somali refugees have largely overcome the initial economic and

security concerns related to their presence among host communities. This has occurred despite the fact that they are "without documents that would facilitate legal integration" and place them "on a path to naturalization" (ibid., 76). Instead, they have developed solutions "through informal channels and structures that have enabled them to live in a state of de facto economic and sociocultural integration" (ibid.). Solidarity from local communities has facilitated their integration, particularly in communities with which the refugees enjoy linguistic, cultural, kinship, religious, ethnic, business, and historical ties. On a positive note, Somali women living in Nairobi have been able to expand their horizons and possibilities by working outside their homes, albeit in the informal sector. The integration and interconnectedness of Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia is reflected in members of host communities who registered as refugees and refugees who became citizens of Ethiopia and Kenya. In recent years, the two countries have "begun to consider relaxing" their encampment policies (ibid., 79).

Muhumad and Jaji (2023) recommend that host governments adopt policies that reflect "the shared needs and interests" and the affinities between refugee and host communities. National refugee policies, in turn, should build on informal institutions and structures that benefit both refugees and host communities (ibid.). Finally, they propose that UNHCR and partner organizations expand programs to meet the mutual interests of refugees and host communities (ibid.).

Several papers speak to the need to foster the agency and leadership of displaced populations. To this end, Mohammad Azizul Hoque, Tasnuva Ahmad, Samira Manzur, and Tasnia Khandaker Prova (2023) conducted community-centered research with Rohingya adolescents and young adults in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. They report that Rohingya lack "access to education and livelihood opportunities," which leaves "most Rohingya in a state of limbo and youth without a chance to build toward their futures" (ibid., 90). Research participants said that previously they "rarely saw the research findings or observed tangible changes following" research (ibid., 94).

Community-centered research "facilitates the collection of nuanced and diverse viewpoints, helps to foster community dialogue, and can help uplift marginalized voices" (ibid., 91). The authors also relied on Participatory Action Research (PAR) in which the research population participates in its design, content, implementation, and evaluation (ibid.). PAR, they aver, "helps reduce the extractive tendencies of research and holds the potential to contribute to positive change for individuals and communities" (ibid., 91). Hoque et al. (2023) find that community-centered research can train, educate and instill leadership skills in refugee youth and, for this reason, should be considered a durable solution for refugees, whatever the future might hold for them.

Imrul Islam (a humanitarian worker) and Zia Naing (a Rohingya refugee, journalist and community storyteller) examine youth participation in humanitarian programs in Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh. They paint a grim portrait of youth (18–24 years old) "largely excluded from decision-making processes," "almost entirely overlooked" by formal programs, and without access to schools and educational systems. Of those surveyed, 96 percent were unemployed, including 99 percent of women. These realities—exacerbated by COVID-19—led to increased drug smuggling, human trafficking, child marriages, and violence against women and girls. Islam and Naing characterize this situation as "not just a failure of inclusion, but as a failure of principled humanitarian action"(ibid., 101).

Limited mobility, poor health care, and the above conditions contribute to deteriorating mental health and "staggering levels of anxiety and stress" (ibid., 106) One respondent bluntly told researchers: "You can come and go as you like. We are here, even when we do not want to be here" (ibid.)

Cox's Bazar, the authors conclude, contradicts the belief that protracted displacement "deepens" refugee participation (ibid.). They find that youth participation, such as it exists, is "surface level and often tokenistic," and "largely limited to the bare minimum of 'voicing concerns' and 'suggesting improvements'" (ibid., 103). Rohingya youth have responded to emergencies and organized relief efforts, but without "meaningful, structural support" (ibid.) They wish to be leaders, but report that their community does not take them seriously due to their unemployment and lack of experience.

The paper recommends:

- Greater educational opportunities for youth;
- Examination of the link between "self-reliance and sustainable return;"
- More disaggregated data on youth across sectors;
- Funding for refugee and host community educational systems that include mental health and psychosocial support;
- Accelerated efforts to allow for "sustainable return" of Rohingya; and
- Humanitarian programming that promotes youth agency and offers skills that will facilitate repatriation (ibid.).

Oroub El-Abed, Watfa Najdi, and Mustafa Hoshmand (2023) examine refugee-led organizations (RLOs) in Turkey, Jordan, and Lebanon. Refugee groups enjoy intimate knowledge of local needs and, thus, have the potential to provide contextualized services in ways that international organizations cannot. They also often serve as first responders in times of acute need. El-Abed, Najdi, and Hoshmand (2023) define RLOs as entities that "often build on existing networks between people of the same religion, sect, ethnicity, nationality, or profession," but are responsive to diverse external policies and conditions. In all three countries, they report, refugee groups have developed contacts, sources of support and services that are "not limited to refugees" (ibid., 118).

Establishing RLOs demands social capital and capacity, which, in turn, requires funding and responsiveness to funder conditions and requirements. This dynamic carries the risk that refugees will lose the identity and control of their organizations. The paper finds that Jordan imposes a "heavy regulatory hand" on civil society organizations (ibid.). The state often denies requests without justification. In Lebanon, refugees cannot create organizations on their own, but need to partner with Lebanese nationals. While Turkey allows the establishment of RLOs, it imposes financially burdensome, often prohibitive conditions on them, such as requiring that they have an office, employ a salaried accountant, and provide additional services.

Refugees have created workarounds to formal registration requirements. However, RLO's inclusion in decision-making in the three states is limited by state policies, which are at odds with the international community's "call for self-reliance and a more empowered refugee community." More often, these restrictions and conditions, combined with lack of legal knowledge, lead refugees to establish informal, unregistered organizations. El-Abed, Najdi and Hoshmand (2023) propose:

- The three states adopt policies to extend "equal rights to every refugee group," including basic rights;
- RLOs partner to a greater extent with less formal refugee-led initiatives; and
- More research aimed at empowering refugee-led initiatives.

Isabel Gil-Everaert, Claudia Masferrer, and Oscar Rodríguez Chávez (2023) highlight the need for binational and regional cooperation in addressing protracted displacement. They examine three infrequently linked situations of protracted displacement in northern Mexico:

- IDPs who have been displaced mostly due to violence;
- Mexican nationals deported from the United States or who have otherwise returned to Mexico, many with US citizen family members; and
- Would-be asylum-seekers to the United States who face barriers to accessing the US asylum system, such as the Title 42 public health rule, and asylum-seekers to Mexico (ibid.). [5]

Insecurity is the cause and consequence of all three situations. Protracted displacement raises acute challenges related to housing, employment, legal status, uncertainty, health, and mental wellbeing. Everaert, Masferrer, and Rodriguez (2023) propose that Mexico:

- Resume negotiations with the United States, around an agenda to legalize long-term US residents, prioritize the best interests of children and families in deportation proceedings,

[5] In recent years, Mexico has become the third largest recipient of asylum requests, behind the United State and Germany.

facilitate family reunification of Mexican returnees, and make criminal violence a grounds for asylum;
- Reform Mexican law to permit the free movement of asylum-seekers;
- Strengthen efforts to approve and implement the Law on Internal Displacement, and create a budget for the Mexican Commission for Refugee Assistance (COMAR) to protect IDPs and safeguard their rights;
- Establish a binational initiative with the United States to meet the needs of persons in protracted displacement at the US-Mexico border; and
- Create and implement public/private integration programs that facilitate access to basic services.

Edwina Pio ONZM and Sakina Ewazi (2023) provide a poignant commentary on the consequences of state and individual decisions to protect imperiled migrants and prioritize their integration. In 2001, the MV Tampa, a Norwegian container ship, rescued 438 persons (most Afghan refugees) from an overcrowded fishing vessel that had foundered in the Indian Ocean on its way to Australia's Christmas Island. New Zealand accepted 150 of the MV Tampa passengers, including one of the paper's authors, a young girl at the time. The paper sets forth principles on the positive duty—by states, organizations, and individuals who constitute a "last resort"—to respond to persons in distress (ibid.). As articulated by the moral theologian David Hollenbach, S.J., these conditions include proximity to need, capability to assist, likelihood the potential agent is a "last resort," and the action does not cause disproportionate harm to the one providing assistance (Hollenbach 2016, 156).

New Zealand resettled the refugees, providing them with a new life and a home. The authors argue that it should extend resettlement services to asylum-seekers as well (Pio and Ewazi 2023). The integration process allowed the MV Tampa refugees, including the Shia Hazara co-author, to retain their religious and cultural identities, while integrating in other ways in their new country. The Christchurch massacre and white nationalist rhetoric, however, has undermined refugees' sense of well-being.

Katherine McCann, Fouad M. Fouad, Arturo Harker Roa, and Monette Zard (2023) recognize that situations of protracted displacement are not monolithic, but implicate host communities, diverse displaced populations, and displaced persons at different stages of integration. In a comparative analysis of the responses by Colombia and Jordan to protracted displacement, they highlight the importance of the integration of health and other systems created for displaced persons, with those of host communities (ibid.).[6] This need is salient for persons in protracted displacement, who often have less need for humanitarian support (than new arrivals), but no viable solutions other than integration. Access to healthcare serves as a bellwether to integration because it is associated with "social determinants" of health and integration metrics, such as legal status and employment.

The authors offer three overarching lessons. First, the integration of systems for displaced persons depends on financing and the interests of donors. The paper suggests that Colombia, which has received significantly less international support per Venezuelan migrant than Jordan has received per Syrian refugee, may nonetheless be better positioned (than Jordan) to control its programs for displaced persons and to create "incentives, such as increasing tax revenue through employment" that facilitate integration (ibid., 163). Short-term, external funding, it finds, "may—somewhat perversely—have constrained" Jordan's ability to establish "a robust domestically-based response" (ibid.). Jordan may "need to retain a visible refugee population" in order to obtain future international funding (ibid.).

Second, the integration of (refugee and host) health and other systems depends on knowledge of the evolving needs of the diverse populations they serve. Thus, the paper stresses the importance of demographic and health data on the needs of host

[6] The High-Level Dialogue on Protection Challenges also emphasized the "essential" need to avoid "the creation or perpetuation of parallel structures for service-delivery," which entails "making humanitarian and development programming more cohesive so that local populations can benefit and see the added value of having a refugee presence" (UNHCR 2010, §43).

communities, displaced communities, and displaced persons. Third, gaps in access to health care will be reduced—and health systems more easily integrated—if the social determinants of health are effectively addressed. This insight argues for a "whole of person" approach to those in protracted displacement (ibid., 166). If displaced persons can access education and work, for example, they will be able to contribute more to sustaining robust health systems and to increase the financial viability of integrating parallel systems.

The authors view the EU response to the Ukrainian refugee situation—its provision of temporary protection, work authorization, and public assistance—"as a template for a whole-of-person response to displacement" (ibid.). Finally, they make the point that the political viability of integrated systems will increase if host communities benefit from them (ibid.). In support, they cite the response to COVID-19 in Cox's Bazar, which also benefitted Bangladeshis in surrounding communities (ibid.).

Crosscutting Themes

Several crosscutting themes emerge from the papers. First, protracted displacement may persist, in part, because host governments and international institutions benefit from it. In looking at health policy for protracted refugees in Colombia and Jordan, McCann et al. (2023, 164) note the tension between fostering policies that promote integration and "Jordan's need to retain a visible refugee population that underscores the need for continued future funding." If humanitarian need decreases, due to greater integration, then it may risk compromising aid flows that are critical for Jordan's development.

Second, engagement with international and regional actors emerges from this special issue as a necessary and positive development, but one that carries risk and complications. Siddikoglu and Sagiroglue (2023) emphasize the need for states to engage international and regional refugee regimes in developing long-term solutions for protracted refugees. Pries and Zülfikar Savci (2023) praise Turkey's greater engagement with UN organizations in responding to Syrian refugees. However, McCann et al. (2023) suggest that international funding can be a mixed blessing. They report that Colombia has received from the international community per Venezuelan migrant a fraction of what Turkey has received per Syrian refugee (ibid.). However, they find Colombia better situated than Turkey to pursue effective integration strategies (ibid.).

There are also cases where the presence of refugees and IDPs have been used to further host governments' political and foreign policy interests as can be seen in the vagaries of refugee policies in Turkey (Pries and Zulfikar Savci 2023; Siddikogu and Sagiroglue 2023), in Azerbaijan's policies toward IDPs (Wistrand 2023), and in other cases such as Georgia.

Scholars have long attributed protracted displacement to "responses to refugee inflows, typically involving restrictions on refugee movement, and employment possibility, and confinement in camps" (Loescher and Milner 2008, 27). Thus, UNHCR's tacit support for encampment—referenced by Pries and Zülfikar Savci (2023) and Muhumad and Jaji (2023)– seems at odds with the theme of refugee self-reliance and the need for permanent solutions for refugees other than "integration" into camp settings that have taken on many of the features of permanent communities.

Fourth, a number of authors look at ways to improve and expand the three existing solutions or refugees and IDPs. Wistrand (2023), for example, considers the impact of development actors' engagement with resolving internal displacement by focusing on the World Bank's work in Azerbaijan. Her study also highlights the importance of not closing off any of the three traditional solutions as Azerbaijan did in its exclusive focus on return.

Others focus on improving the conditions of persons in protracted displacement. Hoque et al. (2023), for example, view community-centered research as a way to educate and instill skills in refugee youth, which benefit them, whatever their trajectories may be.

Fifth, the papers highlight the importance of a combined humanitarian and development approach to protracted displacement. The so-called humanitarian-development-peace nexus has emerged as a central theme in the humanitarian literature (Ferris 2020b). The HLP, for example, sees this approach as the main way to support IDP solutions and lays out a series of recommendations to involve development agencies from the beginning (UN HLP 2021). There are indications that the nexus is bearing fruit. The

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA, 2019) offers specific examples of humanitarian-development cooperation in solutions for IDPs in protracted displacement in four countries: Colombia, Haiti, Somalia, and Sudan. Somalia has emerged as perhaps the clearest case of how joint action between a willing government and development and humanitarian actors can produce comprehensive policies for resolving displacement (UN Somalia 2019; Federal Government of Somalia 2021; UNDP 2023).

In this special issue, Pries and Zülfikar Savci (2023) view the Facility for Refugees in Turkey (FRIT) as both an effective, expeditious humanitarian response to Syrian refugees, and a development success. McCann et al. (2023) consider how incorporating refugees and IDPs into the health sector of Jordan and Colombia can improve their prospects for integration.

Everaert, Masferrer, and Rodriquez (2023) consider the situation in Mexico where refugees, IDPs and returnees all have distinct integration needs and argue that a comprehensive approach is needed, rooted in policy reforms. They provide a useful reminder that returning refugees or migrants also need to be considered in looking at integration, noting that some half a million Mexican migrants have been returned, mostly involuntarily, from the United States and have problems fitting in. In this context, more effective re-integration of returnees might limit recidivism in cross-border movements.

Sixth, several papers emphasize the wisdom and efficacy of programs for displaced persons that benefit and thus enjoy the support of host communities. Muhumad and Jaji (2023), for example, propose that UNHCR and host governments support refugee policies and programs that build on “the shared needs and interests” of refugees and host communities. Conversely, Pries and Zülfikar Savci (2023) report on how Turkish political parties “instrumentalized” the resentment of citizens who receive very limited social assistance, compared to Syrian migrants.

Seventh, several papers would extend refugee protection to other populations. Wistrand (2023) proposes greater long-term investment in creating solutions for IDPs. Everaert, Masferrer, and Rodriguez (2023) recognize the shared needs of IDPs, deportees, refugees, and asylum-seekers in protracted displacement. Pio and Ewazi (2023) believe that New Zealand should extend refugee resettlement services to asylum-seekers.

In addition to discussing how access to the three traditional solutions for displacement can be improved, three other promising trends are explored in this special issue: the importance of refugee-led initiatives (and by extension, IDP-led initiatives), mobility, and self-reliance.

Several papers discuss refugee-led organizations and refugee agency. El-Abed, Najdi and Hoshmand (2023) discuss both the contributions and the challenges of refugee-led organizations in Turkey, Jordan, and Syria. In particular, they recommend that governments of host countries facilitate the process by which refugee-led organizations register and organize themselves, so that policymakers can benefit from their unique insights into finding solutions for refugees (2023). As Bradley (2019, 40) points out “refugees and IDPs are the primary architects of solutions.” Even in organized repatriations, most refugees return on their own, relying on family and friends for support.

Muhumad and Jaji (2023) also stress the importance of refugee networks. They look at the ways these networks contribute to refugee self-reliance and survival in countries that seek to foreclose the possibility of integration. Wistrand (2023) proposes the creation of degree-granting programs on situations of protracted displacement. The programs would honor IDP agency through a case study approach on potential solutions for IDP populations.

By contrast, Siddikoglu and Sagiroglue (2023) find that Pakistan has consistently restricted the development of Afghan civil society organizations. Pries and Zülfikar Savci (2023) criticize FRIT for its lack of “institutionalized mechanisms” to involve refugees in program design and its failure to “give them voice at the national and international levels.” Islam and Naing (2023) characterize the participation of refugee adolescents and young adults as “surface level and often tokenistic,” and “largely limited to the bare minimum.”

Mobility represents an underlying problem and challenge for persons in situations of protracted displacement. Islam and Naing (2023) highlight the

inability of most Rohingya youth in Cox's Bazar to access education, work, health care, or leadership roles. Mobility restrictions, combined with these other factors, lead to immense stress, anxiety, and "deteriorating" mental health (ibid.). Everaert, Masferrer and Rodriguez (2023) propose the free movement of asylum-seekers in Mexico.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Protracted displacement is not a new issue. For at least 20 years, UNHCR, NGOs, and other international agencies have devoted considerable energy to understanding the reasons displacement becomes protracted and its many negative consequences (Milner and Loescher 2011).

Given the sheer numbers of refugees and IDPs living in protracted displacement and the ensuing pain and loss of human capital that this causes, it is disappointing that there are so few academic efforts to suggest solutions to long-term displacement. Coming up with solutions requires energy, creativity, and funding. When problems appear intractable in places like Kenya, Tanzania, and Bangladesh, it is easier to focus on improving conditions in displacement and taking occasional piecemeal actions, such as advocating for more work permits for refugees, than analyzing and promoting efforts to end displacement.

There are some promising initiatives—complementary pathways, self-reliance, mobility, and refugee-led initiatives—which might offer some hope to those who have been displaced for years. But action by states is needed; governments of countries of origin need to resolve conflicts, refugee-hosting countries need to offer opportunities for refugees to fully integrate into their societies, resettlement countries need to come up with more resettlement places. Donor governments play a key role in setting priorities for international humanitarian work, but given the pressures of responding to new crises—such as Ukraine—it seems difficult to mobilize energy or funding to find solutions for long-standing displaced populations. It may be easier for refugee-serving agencies to continue to fund care and maintenance operations than to deal with the always-thorny issues around solutions.

Nor has much progress been made in preventing displacement in the first place or even minimizing it. People are often displaced in a matter of hours or days, often expecting it to be temporary, when in fact it can last for years. In 2019, the World Refugee Council, in its *Call to Action*, called on academic and policy researchers to develop a "displacement assessment tool" for situations of impending or actual conflict to understand the likely consequences of these conflicts (World Refugee Council 2019). The IDMC (2021) has estimated the cost of internal displacement in 2019 as $20 billion, including costs of meeting IDPs' basic needs and lost income.

Several of the articles in this issue highlight the complicated and double-edged role that the establishment and changing of state borders play in both displacement and protection. For example, Siddikoglu and Sagiroglue (2023), as well as Everaert, Masferrer, and Rodriguez (2023), report that changing state lines serve as: (1) barriers to protection; (2) a reason for the need for protection (where migrants could previously have moved without crossing borders); (3) the cause of displacement (such as the partition of India and the establishment of Bangladesh); and (4) a source of receptivity to refugees that cross borders to live with persons with whom they share religious, cultural, and historical ties (Somalis in Kenya and Ethiopia). More broadly, displacement highlights the failure of sovereign states to create the conditions that would allow residents to remain in their states and to protect both their own and other nationals.

Protracted displacement carries serious protection risks—in the communities where displacement occurs and in reducing possibilities for future asylum claims. It can also lead to excessive time between the events that gave rise to displacement and the related asylum/refugee claims. As a result, memories blur, testimonies are harder to come by, and evidence disappears. The widespread use of temporary protection for Ukrainians and Venezuelans and the use of humanitarian parole in the United States also invariably place stress on the asylum systems of the receiving states.

Further work is needed to explore the potential for complementary pathways, self-reliance, refugee-led initiatives, and mobility as solutions for protracted displacement situations. But most of all, more attention and greater political will is needed to affect

meaningful change for the millions of people who find themselves living in limbo for far too long.

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